Editing Condorcet method (section)

==Comparison with instant runoff and first-past-the-post (plurality)==
{{Essay|section|date=November 2020}}
Many proponents of [[instant-runoff voting]] (IRV) are attracted by the belief that if their first choice does not win, their vote will be given to their second choice; if their second choice does not win, their vote will be given to their third choice, etc. This sounds perfect, but it is not true for every voter with IRV. If someone voted for a strong candidate, and their 2nd and 3rd choices are eliminated before their first choice is eliminated, IRV gives their vote to their 4th choice candidate, not their 2nd choice. [[Condorcet voting]] takes all rankings into account simultaneously, but at the expense of violating the [[later-no-harm criterion]] and the [[later-no-help criterion]]. With IRV, indicating a second choice will never affect your first choice. With Condorcet voting, it is possible that indicating a second choice will cause your first choice to lose.

[[Plurality voting]] is simple, and theoretically provides incentives for voters to compromise for centrist candidates rather than throw away their votes on candidates who cannot win. Opponents to plurality voting point out that voters often vote for the lesser of evils because they heard on the news that those two are the only two with a chance of winning, not necessarily because those two are the two natural compromises. This gives the media significant election powers. And if voters do compromise according to the media, the post election counts will prove the media right for next time. Condorcet runs each candidate against the other head to head, so that voters elect the candidate who would win the most sincere runoffs, instead of the one they thought they had to vote for.

There are circumstances, as in the examples above, when both [[instant-runoff voting]] and the "[[plurality voting system|first-past-the-post]]" plurality system will fail to pick the Condorcet winner. (In fact, FPTP can elect the Condorcet loser and IRV can elect the second-worst candidate, who would lose to every candidate except the Condorcet loser.<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Nanson|first=E. J.|date=1882|title=Methods of election|url=https://archive.org/details/transactionsproc1719roya/page/207|journal=Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria|volume=19|pages=207–208|quote=although Ware's method cannot return the worst, it may return the next worst.}}</ref>) In cases where there is a Condorcet Winner, and where IRV does not choose it, a majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner. Proponents of the Condorcet criterion see it as a principal issue in selecting an electoral system. They see the Condorcet criterion as a natural extension of [[majority rule]]. Condorcet methods tend to encourage the selection of centrist candidates who appeal to the [[median]] voter. Here is an example that is designed to support IRV at the expense of Condorcet:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
!499 voters
!3 voters
!498 voters
|-
|1. A
|1. B
|1. C
|-
|2. B
|2. C
|2. B
|-
|3. C
|3. A
|3. A
|}

B is preferred by a 501–499 majority to A, and by a 502–498 majority to C. So, according to the Condorcet criterion, B should win, despite the fact that very few voters rank B in first place. By contrast, IRV elects C and plurality elects A. The goal of a ranked voting system is for voters to be able to vote sincerely and trust the system to protect their intent. Plurality voting forces voters to do all their tactics before they vote, so that the system does not need to figure out their intent.

The significance of this scenario, of two parties with strong support, and the one with weak support being the Condorcet winner, may be misleading, though, as it is a common mode in plurality voting systems (see [[Duverger's law]]), but much less likely to occur in Condorcet or IRV elections, which unlike Plurality voting, punish candidates who alienate a significant block of voters.

Here is an example that is designed to support Condorcet at the expense of IRV:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
!33 voters
!16 voters
!16 voters
!35 voters
|-
|1. A
|1. B
|1. B
|1. C
|-
|2. B
|2. A
|2. C
|2. B
|-
|3. C
|3. C
|3. A
|3. A
|}

B would win against either A or C by more than a 65–35 margin in a one-on-one election, but IRV eliminates B first, leaving a contest between the more "polar" candidates, A and C. Proponents of plurality voting state that their system is simpler than any other and more easily understood.

All three systems are susceptible to [[tactical voting]], but the types of tactics used and the frequency of strategic incentive differ in each method.