Editing Central African Armed Forces (section)

==Foreign military presence in support of the Government==

===Peacekeeping and peace enforcing forces===
Since the mutinies, a number of [[peacekeeping]] and [[Peace enforcement|peace enforcing]] international missions have been present in Central African Republic. There has been discussion of the deployment of a regional [[United Nations]] (UN) peacekeeping force in both Chad and Central African Republic, in order to potentially shore up the ineffectual Darfur Peace Agreement. The missions deployed in the country during the last 10 years are the following:<ref name="nine">[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%205%20CAR.pdf – Sudan Issue Brief: A widening war around Sudan – The proliferation of armed groups in the Central African Republic, January 2007] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100705001507/http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%205%20CAR.pdf |date=2010-07-05 }}</ref>

{| class="wikitable" style="margin: 1em auto 1em auto"
|+ International Peace Supporting Missions in Central African Republic
! Mission Name || Organisation || Dates || Greatest Strength || Tasks
|-
| '''Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the [[Bangui Agreements]]''' <br>(''Mission interafricaine de surveillance des Accords de Bangui, MISAB'') || Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and [[Togo]] || February 1997 to April 1998 || 820 || To monitor the fulfilling of the Bangui Agreements
|-
| '''UN Mission in the Central African Republic''' <br>(''Mission des Nations Unies en République centrafricaine, MINURCA'') || UN || April 1998 to February 2000 || 1,350 || Maintain peace and security; supervise disarmament; technical assistance during 1998 elections
|-
| '''United Nations Peace-building Office''' <br>(''Bureau politique d'observation des Nations Unies en Centrafrique, BONUCA'') || UN || February 2000 to 1 January 2010 || Five military and six civilian police advisers to follow up on security-related reforms and to assist in the implementation of the training programmes for the national police. || Consolidate peace and national reconciliation; strengthen democratic institutions; facilitate international mobilization for national reconstruction and economic recovery. Succeeded by UN Integrated Peace-building Office (BINUCA).
|-
| '''[[Community of Sahel-Saharan States]]''' <br>(''CEN-SAD'') || CEN-SAD || December 2001 to January 2003 || 300 || Enforce and restore peace
|-
| '''Multinational Force in the Central African Republic''' <br>(''Force multinationale en Centrafrique, FOMUC'') || [[Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa]] (CEMAC) || January 2003 to July 2008 || 380 || Ensure security; restructure FACA; and fight rebels in north-east. Replaced by MICOPAX.
|}

===Chad===
In addition to the multilateral forces, CAR has received bilateral support from other African countries, such as the Libyan and Congolese assistance to Patassé mentioned above. Bozizé is in many ways dependent on Chad's support. Chad has an interest in CAR, since it needs to ensure calmness close to its oil fields and [[Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project|the pipeline leading to the Cameroonian coast]], close to CAR's troubled northwest. Before seizing power, Bozizé built up his rebel force in Chad, trained and augmented by the Chadian military. Chadian President [[Idriss Déby|Déby]] assisted him actively in taking the power in March 2003 (his rebel forces included 100 Chadian soldiers). After the coup, Chad provided another 400 soldiers. Current direct support includes 150 non-FOMUC Chadian troops that patrol the border area near Goré, a contingent of soldiers in Bangui, and troops within the presidential lifeguard.<ref name="nine" /> The CEMAC Force includes 121 Chadian soldiers.

===France===
There has been an almost uninterrupted French military presence in Central African Republic since independence, regulated through agreements between the two Governments. French troops were allowed to be based in the country and to intervene in cases of destabilisation. This was particularly important during the cold war era, when Francophone Africa was regarded as a natural French sphere of influence.

Additionally, the strategic location of the country made it a more interesting location for military bases than its neighbours, and [[Bouar]] and Bangui were hence two of the most important French bases abroad.

However, in 1997, following [[Lionel Jospin]]'s expression "Neither interference nor indifference", France came to adopt new strategic principles for its presence in Africa. This included a reduced permanent presence on the continent and increased support for multilateral interventions.<ref name="five">{{cite web|url=http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/377.html|title=Out of Africa? Not the French|work=hartford-hwp.com}}</ref> In Central African Republic, the Bouar base and the Béal Camp (at that time home to 1,400 French soldiers) in Bangui were shut down, as the French concentrated its African presence to [[Abidjan]], [[Dakar]], [[Djibouti]], [[Libreville]] and [[N'Djamena]] and the deployment of a ''Force d'action rapide'', based in France.<ref name="six">{{cite web| url = http://www.uca.edu.ar/esp/sec-fpoliticas/esp/docs-publicaciones/coleccion/ed-especial/02martin.pdf| title = – Guy Martin: France's African policy in transition: disengagement and redeployment, University of Virginia, 2000}}</ref>

However, due to the situation in the country, France has retained a military presence. During the mutinies, 2,400 French soldiers patrolled the streets of Bangui. Their official task was to evacuate foreign citizens, but this did not prevent direct confrontations with the mutineers (resulting in French and mutineer casualties). The level of French involvement resulted in protests among the Central African population, since many sided with the mutineers and accused France of defending a dictator against the people's will. Criticism was also heard in France, where some blamed their country for its protection of a discredited ruler, totally incapable of exerting power and managing the country.<ref name="seven">[http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3466 – Francis Laloupo: Centrafrique, un destin confisqué] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927174737/http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3466 |date=September 27, 2007 }}</ref> After the mutinies in 1997, the MISAB became a multilateral force, but it was armed, equipped, trained and managed by France. The Chadian, Gabonese and [[Republic of the Congo|Congolese]] troops of the current ''Force multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC)'' mission in the country also enjoy logistical support from French soldiers.

A study carried out by the US Congressional Research Service revealed that France has again increased its arms sales to Africa, and that during the 1998–2005 period it was the leading supplier of arms to the continent.<ref name="eight">{{cite web|url=http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=16055|title=– William Church: Africa: France Increases Arms Sales and Intervention, November 6, 2006|work=americanchronicle.com|access-date=June 20, 2007|archive-date=May 7, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070507152413/http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=16055|url-status=dead}}</ref>