Editing Causality (section)

=== Process theories ===
Some theorists are interested in distinguishing between causal processes and non-causal processes (Russell 1948; Salmon 1984).<ref name="Salmon">Salmon, W. (1984) ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=2ug9DwAAQBAJ Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221212164029/https://books.google.com/books?id=2ug9DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover |date=12 December 2022 }}''. Princeton University Press.</ref><ref name="Russell">{{cite book|last=Russell|first= B. |date=1948|publisher= Simon and Schuster|isbn = 9780415083027 |title=Human Knowledge}}</ref> These theorists often want to distinguish between a process and a [[pseudo-process]]. As an example, a ball moving through the air (a process) is contrasted with the motion of a shadow (a pseudo-process). The former is causal in nature while the latter is not.

Salmon (1984)<ref name="Salmon" /> claims that causal processes can be identified by their ability to transmit an alteration over space and time. An alteration of the ball (a mark by a pen, perhaps) is carried with it as the ball goes through the air. On the other hand, an alteration of the shadow (insofar as it is possible) will not be transmitted by the shadow as it moves along.

These theorists claim that the important concept for understanding causality is not causal relationships or causal interactions, but rather identifying causal processes. The former notions can then be defined in terms of causal processes.

[[File:Herald of Free Enterprise WBG.png|thumb|600px|center|[[Why-Because analysis|Why-because]] graph of the capsizing of the [[Herald of Free Enterprise]] (Click to see in detail.)]]A subgroup of the process theories is the mechanistic view on causality. It states that causal relations supervene on mechanisms. While the notion of mechanism is understood differently, the definition put forward by the group of philosophers referred to as the 'New Mechanists' dominate the literature.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Williamson|first=Jon|date=2011|title=Mechanistic theories of causality part I|journal=Philosophy Compass|volume=6|issue=6|pages=421–432|doi=10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00400.x}}</ref>