Editing Belief (section)

===Justified true belief<!--Justified true belief' redirects here-->===
{{See also|Definitions of knowledge#Justified true belief}}
'''Justified true belief'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is a definition of [[knowledge]] that gained approval during the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], "justified" standing in contrast to "revealed". There have been attempts to trace it back to [[Plato]] and his dialogues, more specifically in the ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]],<ref>The received view holds it that Plato's theory presents knowledge as remembering eternal truths and justification reawakens memory, see {{cite book|title=Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays|last=Fine|first=G.|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2003|isbn=978-0199245581|location=New York|pages=5–7|chapter=Introduction}}</ref>'' and the ''[[Meno]]''. The concept of justified true belief states that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition but also have justification for doing so. In more formal terms, an agent <math>S</math> knows that a proposition <math>P</math> is true [[if and only if]]:
* <math>P</math> is true
* <math>S</math> believes that <math>P</math> is true, and
* <math>S</math> is justified in believing that <math>P</math> is true

That theory of knowledge suffered a significant setback with the discovery of [[Gettier problem]]s, situations in which the above conditions were seemingly met but where many philosophers deny that anything is known.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Foundations of Knowing|last=Chisholm|first=Roderick|publisher=University of Minnesota Press|year=1982|isbn=978-0816611034|location=Minneapolis|chapter=Knowledge as Justified True Belief|author-link=Roderick Chisholm}}</ref> [[Robert Nozick]] suggested a [[Gettier problems#Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking|clarification]] of "justification" which he believed eliminates the problem: the justification has to be such that were the justification false, the knowledge would be false.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791|title=Philosophical explanations|last=Nozick, Robert.|date=1981|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=0674664485|location=Cambridge, Mass.|oclc=7283862}}</ref> Bernecker and Dretske (2000) argue that "no epistemologist since Gettier has seriously and successfully defended the traditional view."<ref>{{cite book|title=Knowledge. Readings in contemporary epistemology|last1=Bernecker|first1=Sven|last2=Dretske|first2=Fred|date=2000|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0198752615|location=Oxford|page=3}}</ref>{{rp|3}} On the other hand, [[Paul Boghossian]] argues that the justified true belief account is the "standard, widely accepted" definition of knowledge.<ref name="Boghossian on Justification">{{Citation|author=Paul Boghossian|title=Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism|date=2007|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fear-of-knowledge-9780199230419?cc=us&lang=en&|location=Oxford, UK|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=978-0199230419|access-date=20 April 2017|archive-date=7 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171007022310/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fear-of-knowledge-9780199230419?cc=us&lang=en&|url-status=live}}, Chapter 2, p. 15.</ref>