Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

== Key issues ==

The agreed version of the declaration, a single sentence of just 67 words,{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=62}} was sent on 2{{nbsp}}November 1917 in a short letter from Balfour to Walter Rothschild, for transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland.{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} The declaration contained four [[clause]]s, of which the first two promised to support "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", followed by two "safeguard clauses"{{sfn|Kattan|2009|pp=60–61}}{{sfn|Bassiouni|Fisher|2012|p=431}} with respect to "the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine", and "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}}

=== The "national home for the Jewish people" vs. Jewish state ===
{{further|Homeland for the Jewish people}}

{{Quote box|width=256px|bgcolor=#c6dbf7|align=right|quote=
"This is a very carefully worded document and but for the somewhat vague phrase 'A National Home for the Jewish People' might be considered sufficiently unalarming&nbsp;... But the vagueness of the phrase cited has been a cause of trouble from the commencement. Various persons in high positions have used language of the loosest kind calculated to convey a very different impression to the more moderate interpretation which can be put upon the words. President Wilson brushed away all doubts as to what was intended from his point of view when, in March 1919, he said to the Jewish leaders in America, 'I am moreover persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.'{{efn|group=qt |On April 16, 1919, in response to a request from the American Peace Commissioners that he clarify the newspaper report of his views, Wilson stated "Of course I did not use any of the words quoted in the enclosed, and they do not indeed purport to be my words. But I did in substance say what is quoted though the expression "foundation of a Jewish commonwealth" goes a little further than my idea at that time. All that I meant was to corroborate our expressed acquiescence in the position of the British government in regard to the future of Palestine"{{sfn|Talhami|2017|p=27}}}} The late [[Theodore Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] declared that one of the Allies peace conditions should be that 'Palestine must be made a Jewish State.' Mr.&nbsp;[[Winston Churchill]] has spoken of a 'Jewish State' and Mr.&nbsp;[[Bonar Law]] has talked in Parliament of 'restoring Palestine to the Jews'."<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1920/apr/27/palestine-restoration-to-jews#S5CV0128P0_19200427_HOC_146]: HC Deb 27 April 1920 vol 128 cc1026-7</ref>{{efn|group=qt |Schmidt cites Stein "Bonar law's views on the Zionist question are unknown" together with his son and his biographer for similar opinions.{{sfn|Schmidt|2011|p=69}}}}

| source=Report of the [[Palin Commission]], August 1920{{sfn|Palin Commission|1920|p=9}}
}}
The term "national home" was intentionally ambiguous,{{sfn|Makovsky|2007|p=76|ps=: "The definition of "national home" was left intentionally ambiguous."}} having no legal value or precedent in international law,{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} such that its meaning was unclear when compared to other terms such as "state".{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} The term was intentionally used instead of "state" because of opposition to the Zionist program within the British Cabinet.{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}} According to historian Norman Rose, the chief architects of the declaration contemplated that a [[Jewish State]] would emerge in time while the [[Palestine Royal Commission]] concluded that the wording was "the outcome of a compromise between those Ministers who contemplated the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State and those who did not."{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=24}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|name=Rose1|Norman Rose described this as follows: "There can be no doubt about what was in the minds of the chief architects of the Balfour Declaration. The evidence is incontrovertible. All envisaged, in the fullness of time, the emergence of a Jewish state. For the Zionists, accordingly, it was the first step that would lead to Jewish statehood. Yet for Weizmann&nbsp;– a confirmed Anglophile&nbsp;– and the Zionist leadership there proved to be adverse repercussions. As the British attempted to reconcile their diverse obligations, there began for the Zionists a period full of promise but also of intense frustration. One cynic noted that the process of whittling down the Balfour Declaration began on 3&nbsp;November 1917."{{sfn|Rose|2010|p=18}}}}

Interpretation of the wording has been sought in the correspondence leading to the final version of the declaration. An official report to the War Cabinet sent by Sykes on 22 September said that the Zionists did ''not'' want "to set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in Palestine or in any part of Palestine" but rather preferred some form of protectorate as provided in the Palestine Mandate.{{efn|group=qt|Sykes's official memorandum providing feedback on the meeting recorded the following:<br />
"What the Zionists do not want: I. To have any special political hold on the old city of Jerusalem itself or control over any Christian or Moslem Holy Places; II. To set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in Palestine or in any part of Palestine; III. To enjoy any special rights not enjoyed by other inhabitants of Palestine; On the other hand the Zionists do want: I. Recognition of the Jewish&nbsp;inhabitants of Palestine as a national unit, federated with [other] national units in Palestine; II. The recognition of [the] right of bona fide Jewish settlers to be included in the Jewish national unit in Palestine"{{sfn|Strawson|2009|p=33}}}} A month later, Curzon produced a memorandum{{sfn|Curzon|1917}} circulated on 26 October 1917 where he addressed two questions, the first concerning the meaning of the phrase "a National Home for the Jewish race in Palestine"; he noted that there were different opinions ranging from a fully fledged state to a merely spiritual centre for the Jews.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|pp=225–257}}

Sections of the British press assumed that a Jewish state was intended even before the Declaration was finalized.{{efn|group=lower-roman |The ''[[Daily Chronicle (United Kingdom)|Daily Chronicle]]'', on 30 March 1917, advocated reviving "the Jewish Palestine" and building "a Zionist state ... under British protection."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=312}} ''[[The New Europe]]'', on 12, 19, and 26 April 1917, wrote about "a Jewish State," as did other papers, including the ''[[Liverpool Courier]]'' (24 April), ''[[The Spectator]]'' (5 May), and the ''[[The Herald (Glasgow)|Glasgow Herald]]'' (29 May).{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=312}} Some British papers wrote that it was in Britain's interest to reestablish a "Jewish State" or "Jewish Country." Among them were the ''Methodist Times'', The ''[[Manchester Guardian]]'', ''[[The Globe (London newspaper)|The Globe]]'', and ''[[The Daily News (UK)|The Daily News]]''.{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=312}}}} In the United States the press began using the terms "Jewish National Home", "Jewish State", "Jewish republic" and "Jewish Commonwealth" interchangeably.<ref>American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, ''The Balfour Declaration and American Interests in Palestine'' (New York 1941) pp. 8–10.</ref>

Treaty expert [[David Hunter Miller]], who was at the conference and subsequently compiled a 22 volume compendium of documents, provides a report of the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation to the [[Paris Peace Conference of 1919]] which recommended that "there be established a separate state in Palestine," and that "it will be the policy of the [[League of Nations]] to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state, as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}}<ref name=Miller>Miller, David Hunter. ''My Diary at the Conference of Paris'' (New York), Appeal Printing Co., (1924), vol 4 pp. 263–4</ref> The report further advised that an independent Palestinian state under a [[Mandate for Palestine|British League of Nations mandate]] be created. Jewish settlement would be allowed and encouraged in this state and this state's holy sites would be under the control of the League of Nations.<ref name = Miller/> Indeed, [[the Inquiry]] spoke positively about the possibility of a Jewish state eventually being created in Palestine if the necessary demographics for this were to exist.<ref name=Miller/>

Historian Matthew Jacobs later wrote that the US approach was hampered by the "general absence of specialist knowledge about the region" and that "like much of the Inquiry's work on the Middle East, the reports on Palestine were deeply flawed" and "presupposed a particular outcome of the conflict". He quotes Miller, writing about one report on the history and impact of Zionism, "absolutely inadequate from any standpoint and must be regarded as nothing more than material for a future report".{{sfn|Jacobs|2011|p=191}}
 
[[Lord Robert Cecil]] on 2 December 1917, assured an audience that the government fully intended that "Judea [was] for the Jews."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} Yair Auron opines that Cecil, then a deputy Foreign Secretary representing the British Government at a celebratory gathering of the English Zionist Federation, "possibly went beyond his official brief" in saying (he cites Stein) "Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judaea for the Jews".{{sfn|Auron|2017|p=278}}

The following October [[Neville Chamberlain]], while chairing a Zionist meeting, discussed a "new Jewish State."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} At the time, Chamberlain was a Member of Parliament for [[Birmingham Ladywood (UK Parliament constituency)|Ladywood, Birmingham]]; recalling the event in 1939, just after Chamberlain had approved the 1939 White Paper, the Jewish Telegraph Agency noted that the Prime Minister had "experienced a pronounced change of mind in the 21 years intervening"<ref>{{cite web|date=1939|url=https://www.jta.org/1939/05/19/archive/chamberlain-in-1918-envisaged-jewish-state-linked-to-u-s-or-britain|title=Chamberlain, in 1918, Envisaged Jewish State Linked to U.S. or Britain|publisher=Jewish Telegraph Agency|access-date=4 November 2017}}</ref> A year later, on the Declaration's second anniversary, General [[Jan Smuts]] said that Britain "would redeem her pledge ... and a great Jewish state would ultimately rise."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} In similar vein, Churchill a few months later stated:
{{blockquote|If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial.<ref>[[Edward Alexander (professor)|Alexander, Edward]]. ''The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal'', [[Routledge]] 2012 {{isbn|978-1-412-84614-1}}  pp. 225–226</ref>}}

At the 22 June 1921 meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, Churchill was asked by [[Arthur Meighen]], the Canadian Prime Minister, about the meaning of the national home. Churchill said "If in the course of many years they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over&nbsp;... pro rata with the Arab. We made an equal pledge that we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights".{{sfn|Johnson|2013|p=441}}

[[File:The Future of Palestine, Lord Curzon's October 1917 cabinet memorandum, one week prior to the Balfour Declaration.jpg|thumb|Lord Curzon's 26 October 1917 cabinet memorandum, circulated one week prior to the declaration, addressed the meaning of the phrase "a National Home for the Jewish race in Palestine", noting the range of different opinions{{sfn|Curzon|1917}}]]
Responding to Curzon in January 1919, Balfour wrote "Weizmann has never put forward a claim for the Jewish Government of Palestine. Such a claim in my opinion is clearly inadmissible and personally I do not think we should go further than the original declaration which I made to Lord Rothschild".{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p = 387}}

In February 1919, France issued a statement that it would not oppose putting Palestine under British trusteeship and the formation of a Jewish State.{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} Friedman further notes that France's attitude went on to change;{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} Yehuda Blum, while discussing France's "unfriendly attitude towards the Jewish national movement", notes the content of a report made by Robert Vansittart (a leading member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) to Curzon in November 1920 which said:

{{blockquote|[The French] had agreed to a Jewish National Home, not a Jewish State. They considered we were steering straight upon the latter, and the very last thing they would do was to enlarge that State for they totally disapproved our policy.<ref>{{cite web|first=Yehuda|last=Blum|date=2008|url=http://jcpa.org/article/the-evolution-of-israels-boundaries/|title=The Evolution of Israel's Boundaries|work=Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs |publisher='Jerusalem center for Public Affairs|access-date=3 November 2017}}</ref>}}
Greece's Foreign Minister told the editor of the Salonica Jewish organ Pro-Israel that "the establishment of a Jewish State meets in Greece with full and sincere sympathy ... A Jewish Palestine would become an ally of Greece."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} In [[Switzerland]], a number of noted historians including professors Tobler, Forel-Yvorne, and Rogaz, supported the idea of establishing a Jewish state, with one referring to it as "a sacred right of the Jews."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}} While in [[Germany]], officials and most of the press took the Declaration to mean a British sponsored state for the Jews.{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=313}}

The British government, including Churchill, made it clear that the Declaration did not intend for the whole of Palestine to be converted into a Jewish National Home, "but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine."{{efn|group=lower-roman|When asked in 1922 what was meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, Churchill replied, "it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community ... in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride&nbsp;... that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance&nbsp;... that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed."<ref>Gilbert, Martin. ''Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship'', Macmillan (2007) p. 74, taken from Churchill's letter of 1 March 1922</ref>{{efn|group=lower-roman|Churchill's letter to T. E. Lawrence added, "It is manifestly right that the Jews who are scattered all over the world should have a national centre and a national home where some of them may be reunited. And where else could that be but in the land of Palestine, with which for more than three thousand years they have been intimately and profoundly associated?"<ref name=Wallace>Wallace, Cynthia D. ''Foundations of the International Legal Rights of the Jewish People and the State of Israel'', Creation House, (2012) pp. 72–73</ref>}}}}{{efn|group=lower-roman|Col. T. E. Lawrence in a letter to Churchill on 17 January 1921, wrote that [[Faisal I of Iraq|Emir Faisal]], the eldest son of [[Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca|King Hussein]], "had agreed to abandon all claims of his father to Palestine" in return for Arab sovereignty in Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Syria. Friedman refers to this letter as being from Lawrence to Marsh (Churchill's private secretary) states that the date of 17 January is erroneous ("a slip of the pen, or a misprint") and claims that the most likely date is 17 February. Friedman as well refers to an undated ("presumably 17 February") letter from Lawrence to Churchill that does not contain this statement.{{sfn|Friedman|2017|p=277}} Paris references only the Marsh letter and while claiming the evidence is unclear, suggests that the letter may have described a meeting that took place shortly after 8 January at [[Edward Turnour, 6th Earl Winterton|Edward Turnour, Earl Winterton]]'s country house.{{sfn|Paris|2003|p=129}} 
Faisal's biographer discusses an acrimonious meeting which took place on 20 January 1921 between Faisal, Haddad, Haidar and Lindsey, Young and [[Kinahan Cornwallis]] and says that this meeting led to a misunderstanding that would later be used against Faisal as Churchill later claimed in parliament that Faisal had acknowledged that the territory of Palestine was specifically excluded from the promises of support for an independent Arab Kingdom. Allawi says that the minutes of the meeting show only that Faisal accepted that this could be the British government interpretation of the exchanges without necessarily agreeing with them.{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=323}} In parliament, Churchill in 1922 confirmed this, "..a conversation held in the Foreign Office on the 20th January, 1921, more than five years after the conclusion of the correspondence on which the claim was based. On that occasion the point of view of His Majesty's Government was explained to the Emir, who expressed himself as prepared to accept the statement that it had been the intention of His Majesty's Government to exclude Palestine."<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1922/jul/11/pledges-to-arabs]: HC Deb 11 July 1922 vol 156 cc1032-5</ref>}} [[Faisal I of Iraq|Emir Faisal]], King of Syria and Iraq, made a formal written agreement with Zionist leader [[Chaim Weizmann]], which was drafted by [[T. E. Lawrence]], whereby they would try to establish a peaceful relationship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.<ref name=Sekulow>Sekulow, Jay. ''Unholy Alliance: The Agenda Iran, Russia, and Jihadists Share for Conquering the World'', Simon and Schuster (2016) pp. 29–30</ref> The 3 January 1919 [[Faisal–Weizmann Agreement]] was a short-lived agreement for Arab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.{{efn|group=qt|[[Ali Allawi]] explained this as follows: "When Faisal left the meeting with Weizmann to explain his actions to his advisers who were in a nearby suite of offices at the Carlton Hotel, he was met with expressions of shock and disbelief. How could he sign a document that was written by a foreigner in favour of another foreigner in English in a language of which he knew nothing? Faisal replied to his advisers as recorded in [[Awni Abd al-Hadi|'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi's]] memoirs, "You are right to be surprised that I signed such an agreement written in English. But I warrant you that your surprise will disappear when I tell you that I did not sign the agreement before I stipulated in writing that my agreement to sign it was conditional on the acceptance by the British government of a previous note that I had presented to the Foreign Office… [This note] contained the demand for the independence of the Arab lands in Asia, starting from a line that begins in the north at Alexandretta-Diyarbakir and reaching the Indian Ocean in the south. And Palestine, as you know, is within these boundaries… I confirmed in this agreement before signing that I am not responsible for the implementation of anything in the agreement if any modification to my note is allowed""{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=189}}}} Faisal did treat Palestine differently in his presentation to the Peace Conference on 6 February 1919 saying "Palestine, for its universal character, [should be] left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties concerned".{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=92}}<ref>{{cite wikisource |title=Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6 February 1919, at 3 p.m. |wslink=Arab Memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference |author=[[United States Department of State|United States. Dept. of State]] |year=1919 |publisher=Foreign Relations of the United States – Peace Conference |volume=3 |pp=889, 890, 892}}</ref> The agreement was never implemented.{{efn|group=qt|Although it was noted by [[United Nations Special Committee on Palestine|UNSCOP]] that "To many observers at the time, conclusion of the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement promised well for the future co-operation of Arab and Jew in Palestine."{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 122}} and further referring to the 1937 report of the Palestine Royal Commission which noted that "Not once since 1919 had any Arab leader said that co-operation with the Jews was even possible" despite expressed hopes to the contrary by British and Zionist representatives.{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=78}}}} In a subsequent letter written in English by Lawrence for Faisal's signature, he explained:
{{blockquote|We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, suffering similar oppression at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step toward the attainment of their national ideals together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement&nbsp;... We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.<ref name=Sekulow/>}}When the letter was tabled at the [[Shaw Commission]] in 1929, [[Rustam Haidar]] spoke to Faisal in Baghdad and cabled that Faisal had "no recollection that he wrote anything of the sort".{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} In January 1930, Haidar wrote to a newspaper in Baghdad that Faisal: "finds it exceedingly strange that such a matter is attributed to him as he at no time would consider allowing any foreign nation to share in an Arab country".{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} [[Awni Abd al-Hadi]], Faisal's secretary, wrote in his memoirs that he was not aware that a meeting between Frankfurter and Faisal took place and that: "I believe that this letter, assuming that it is authentic, was written by Lawrence, and that Lawrence signed it in English on behalf of Faisal. I believe this letter is part of the false claims made by Chaim Weizmann and Lawrence to lead astray public opinion."{{sfn|Allawi|2014|p=215}} According to Allawi, the most likely explanation for the Frankfurter letter is that a meeting took place, a letter was drafted in English by Lawrence, but that its "contents were not entirely made clear to Faisal. He then may or may not have been induced to sign it", since it ran counter to Faisal's other public and private statements at the time.{{sfn|Allawi|2014|pp=216–217}} A 1 March interview by Le Matin quoted Faisal as saying:
<blockquote>This feeling of respect for other religions dictates my opinion about Palestine, our neighbor. That the unhappy Jews come to reside there and behave as good citizens of this country, our humanity rejoices given that they are placed under a Muslim or Christian government mandated by The League of Nations. If they want to constitute a state and claim sovereign rights in this region, I foresee very serious dangers. It is to be feared that there will be a conflict between them and the other races.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=1 March 1919|trans-title= The Return to Jerusalem What representatives of Muslim and Christian communities think of Zionism|title= Le Retour a Jerusalem Ce que pensent du sionisme les representants des musulmans et des communantes chretiennes|url= http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k572821s/f1.item |language= fr |work= Le Matin|location= France|access-date= 23 July 2017}}</ref>{{efn|group=lower-alpha|Ce sentiment de respect pour les autres religions dicte mon opinion touchant la Palestine, notre voisine. Que les juifs malheureux viennent s'y refugieret se comportent en bons citoyens de ce pays, notre humanite s'en rejouit mais quells soient places sous un gouverment musulman ou chretien mandate par La Societe des nations. S'ils veulent constituer un Etat et revendiquer des droits souveraigns dans cette region je prevois de tres graves dangers. Il est a craindre qu'il y ait conflit entre eux et les autres races.}}</blockquote>

Referring to his 1922 [[Churchill White Paper|White Paper]], Churchill later wrote that "there is nothing in it to prohibit the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State."{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 77}} And in private, many British officials agreed with the Zionists' interpretation that a state would be established when a Jewish majority was achieved.{{sfn|Mansfield|1992|pp=176–177}}

When Chaim Weizmann met with Churchill, Lloyd George and Balfour at Balfour's home in London on 21 July 1921, Lloyd George and Balfour assured Weizmann "that by the Declaration they had always meant an eventual Jewish State," according to Weizmann minutes of that meeting.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Churchill and the Jews|last=Gilbert|first=Martin|publisher=Henry Holt and Company, LLC|year=2007|location=New York|page=71}}</ref> Lloyd George stated in 1937 that it was intended that Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth if and when Jews "had become a definite majority of the inhabitants",{{efn|group=qt|Lloyd George stated in his testimony to the Palestine Royal Commission: "The idea was, and this was the interpretation put upon it at the time, that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth."<ref name="Peel23" />}} and Leo Amery echoed the same position in 1946.{{efn|group=qt|Amery's testimony under oath to the [[Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry]] in January 1946: "The phrase "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people" was intended and understood by all concerned to mean at the time of the Balfour Declaration that Palestine would ultimately become a "Jewish Commonwealth" or a "Jewish State", if only Jews came and settled there in sufficient numbers."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=p73lu61ZnCYC&pg=PA48|title=The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1984|publisher=[[Martinus Nijhoff]]|year=1997|isbn=978-90-411-0338-3|page=48}}</ref>}} In the UNSCOP report of 1947, the issue of home versus state was subjected to scrutiny arriving at a similar conclusion to that of Lloyd George.{{efn|group=lower-roman|{{blockquote|What exactly was in the minds of those who made the Balfour Declaration is speculative. The fact remains that, in the light of experience acquired as a consequence of serious disturbances in Palestine, the mandatory Power, in a statement on "British Policy in Palestine," issued on 3 June 1922 by the Colonial Office, placed a restrictive construction upon the Balfour Declaration.{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 142}}}} and
{{blockquote|Nevertheless, neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Mandate precluded the eventual creation of a Jewish State. The Mandate in its Preamble recognized, with regard to the Jewish people, the "grounds for reconstituting their National Home". By providing, as one of the main obligations of the mandatory Power the facilitation of Jewish immigration, it conferred upon the Jews an opportunity, through large-scale immigration, to create eventually a Jewish State with a Jewish majority.{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 145}}}}}}

=== Scope of the national home "in Palestine" ===

The statement that such a homeland would be found "in Palestine" rather than "of Palestine" was also deliberate.{{efn|name=Gelvin82|group=lower-roman|Gelvin wrote: "The words of the Balfour Declaration were carefully chosen. It was no accident that the declaration contains the phrase "in Palestine" rather than "of Palestine", nor was it an accident that the foreign office would use the words "national home" rather than the more precise "state"&nbsp;– in spite of the fact that "national home" has no precedent or standing in international law. And what exactly do "view with favour" and "use their best endeavours" mean? The seeming ambiguities of the declaration reflect debates not only within the British government but within the British Zionist and Jewish communities as well."{{sfn|Gelvin|2014|p=82''ff''}}}} The proposed draft of the declaration contained in Rothschild's 12 July letter to Balfour referred to the principle "that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish people."{{sfn|Stein|1961|p=470}} In the final text, following Lord Milner's amendment, the word "reconstituted" was removed and the word "that" was replaced with "in".{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=257}}{{sfn|Renton|2016|p=21}}

This text thereby avoided committing the entirety of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people, resulting in controversy in future years over the intended scope, especially the [[Revisionist Zionism]] sector, which claimed entirety of [[Mandatory Palestine]] and [[Emirate of Transjordan]] as [[Jewish Homeland]]{{sfn|Halpern|1987|p=163}}{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=257}} This was clarified by the 1922 Churchill White Paper, which wrote that "the terms of the declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded 'in Palestine.{{' "}}{{sfn|Caplan|2011|p=74}}

The declaration did not include any geographical boundaries for Palestine.{{sfn|Biger|2004|p=49}} Following the end of the war, three documents – the declaration, the McMahon–Hussein correspondence and the Sykes–Picot Agreement – became the basis for the negotiations to set the boundaries of Palestine.{{sfn|Biger|2004|p=51}}

=== Civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine ===

{{Quote box|width=256px|bgcolor=#c6dbf7|align=right|quote=
"If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to&nbsp;... it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase."
| source=Report of the [[King–Crane Commission]], August 1919{{sfn|Bickerton|Klausner|2016|p=109}}
}}

The declaration's first safeguard clause referred to protecting the [[human rights|civil and religious rights]] of non-Jews in Palestine. The clause had been drafted together with the second safeguard by Leo Amery in consultation with Lord Milner, with the intention to "go a reasonable distance to meeting the objectors, both Jewish and pro-Arab, without impairing the substance of the proposed declaration".{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=221}}{{efn|group=qt|Amery described this moment in his memoirs: "Half an hour before the meeting Milner looked in from his room in the Cabinet offices, next door to mine, told me of the difficulties, and showed me one or two alternative drafts which had been suggested, with none of which he was quite satisfied. Could I draft something which would go a reasonable distance to meeting the objectors, both Jewish and pro-Arab, without impairing the substance of the proposed declaration?"{{sfn|Amery|1953|p=116}}}}

Arabs constituted around 90% of the population of Palestine,{{sfn|Palin Commission|1920|p=11}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mansfield |first=Peter |author-link=Peter Mansfield (historian) |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofmiddlee00mans_0/page/164/mode/2up |title=A History of the Middle East |date=2004 |publisher=Penguin |isbn=978-0-14-303433-9 |edition=2nd |pages=164}}</ref> but{{Snd}}as stated by [[Ronald Storrs]], Britain's Military Governor of Jerusalem between 1917 and 1920{{Snd}}they were "not so much [named but] lumped together under the negative and humiliating definition of 'Non-Jewish Communities'".{{efn|group=qt|name=Storrs43|[[Ronald Storrs]], Britain's Military Governor of Jerusalem between 1917 and 1920, wrote in 1943: "The Declaration which, in addition to its main Jewish message, was at pains to reassure non-Palestinian Jews on the score of their national status, took no account whatever of the feelings or desires of the actual inhabitants of Palestine. In its drafting, Arabs observed the main and position portion to be reserved for the Jewish people, while the other races and creeds were not so much as named, either as Arabs, Moslems or Christians, but were lumped together under the negative and humiliating definition of "Non-Jewish Communities" and relegated to subordinate provisos. They further remarked a sinister and significant omission. While their religions and civil rights were specifically to be safeguarded, of their political rights there was no mention whatever. Clearly, they had none."{{sfn|Storrs|1943|p=51}}{{sfn|Hardie|Herrman|1980|p=88}}}} Additionally, there was no reference to protecting the political rights of this group, as there was regarding Jews in other countries.{{sfn|Storrs|1943|p=51}}{{sfn|Hardie|Herrman|1980|p=88}} This lack of interest was frequently contrasted against the commitment to the Jewish community, with various terms used over subsequent years to regard the two obligations as linked.{{efn|group=qt|name=Dual|The term "twofold duty" was used by the [[Permanent Mandates Commission]] in 1924,<ref>[[Permanent Mandates Commission]], [http://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-661-M-264-1924-VI_EN.pdf "Report on the Work of the Fifth (Extraordinary) Session of the Commission (held at Geneva from October 23rd to November 6th, 1924)"], League of Nations</ref> the phrase "double undertaking" was used by Prime Minister [[Ramsay MacDonald]] in his April 1930 [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] speech,<ref>[[Hansard]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1930/apr/03/prime-ministers-statement#S5CV0237P0_19300403_HOC_284 Prime Minister's Statement]: HC Deb 03 April 1930 vol 237 cc1466-7</ref> the [[Passfield white paper]], and his [[MacDonald letter|1931 letter to Chaim Weizmann]], whilst the 1937 Palestine Royal Commission used the term "dual obligation".{{sfn|Palestine Royal Commission|1937|p=218}}}} A heated question was whether the status of both groups had "equal weight", which the British government and the [[Permanent Mandates Commission]] held to be the case in the 1930 [[Passfield white paper]].{{efn|group=qt|At the 9&nbsp;June 1930 Permanent Mandates Commission, the British Accredited Representative, [[Drummond Shiels]], set out the British policy to reconcile the two communities. The [[Permanent Mandates Commission (Palestine)|Permanent Mandates Commission]] summarized that "From all these statements two assertions emerge, which should be emphasised: (1) that the obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to the two sections of the population are of equal weight; (2) that the two obligations imposed on the Mandatory are in no sense irreconcilable. The Mandates Commission has no objection to raise to these two assertions, which, in its view, accurately express what it conceives to be the essence of the Mandate for Palestine and ensure its future." This was quoted in the [[Passfield white paper]], with the note that: "His Majesty's Government are fully in accord with the sense of this pronouncement and it is a source of satisfaction to them that it has been rendered authoritative by the approval of the Council of the League of Nations."{{sfn|Geddes|1991|p=126}}}}

Balfour stated in February 1919 that Palestine was considered an exceptional case in which, referring to the local population, "we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of [[self-determination]],"{{efn|group=qt|19 February 1919, Balfour wrote to Lloyd George that: "The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance, and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can be given them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants."{{sfn|Friedman|1973|p=325|ps=: Friedman quoted F.O. 371/4179/2117, Balfour to the Prime Minister, 19&nbsp;February 1919}}}} although he considered that the policy provided self-determination to Jews.{{sfn|Balfour|1928|pp=14, 25}} Avi Shlaim considers this the declaration's "greatest contradiction".{{sfn|Shlaim|2005|pp=251–270}} This principle of self-determination had been declared on numerous occasions subsequent to the declaration{{snd}}President Wilson's January 1918 [[Fourteen Points]], Sykes's [[Declaration to the Seven]] in June 1918, the November 1918 [[Anglo-French Declaration]], and the June 1919 [[Covenant of the League of Nations]] that had established the [[League of Nations mandate|mandate system]].{{efn|group=qt|Wilson's January 1918 [[Fourteen Points]] stated a requirement for "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined",{{sfn|Haiduc-Dale|2013|p=40}} Sykes's June 1918 [[Declaration to the Seven]] stated that "the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the [[consent of the governed]]",{{sfn|Khouri|1985|p=527}} the November 1918 [[Anglo-French Declaration]] stated that the local "national governments and administrations [will derive] their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations,"<ref name="Khouri" /> and the June 1919 [[Covenant of the League of Nations]] stated that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a Mandatory" and described a "sacred trust", which was later interpreted in 1971 by the [[International Court of Justice]] that "the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples concerned".{{sfn|Dugard|2013|p=294}}}} In an August 1919 memo Balfour acknowledged the inconsistency among these statements, and further explained that the British had no intention of consulting the existing population of Palestine.{{efn|group=qt|name=Balfour1919q|In an August 1919 memo discussing the [[Covenant of the League of Nations]], Balfour explained: "What I have never been able to understand is how [our policy] can be harmonised with the [Anglo-French] declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry&nbsp;... In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate,"{{sfn|Lewis|2009|p=163}}{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=405}} and further that: "The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 'independent nation' of Palestine than in that of the 'independent nation' of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the [[King–Crane Commission|American Commission]] has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land."{{sfn|Lewis|2009|p=163}}<ref name="Balfour1919">[https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/60431057?access_key=key-136ulpy32ssl2l27p8nb Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia], 132187/2117/44A, August 11, 1919</ref>}} The results of the ongoing American [[King–Crane Commission|King–Crane Commission of Enquiry consultation]] of the local population – from which the British had withdrawn – were suppressed for three years until the report was leaked in 1922.{{sfn|Gelvin|1999|pp=13–29}} Subsequent British governments have acknowledged this deficiency, in particular the 1939 committee led by the [[Lord Chancellor]], [[Frederic Maugham, 1st Viscount Maugham|Frederic Maugham]], which concluded that the government had not been "free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine",{{sfn|Khouri|1985|p=9}} and the April 2017 statement by British Foreign Office minister of state [[Joyce Anelay, Baroness Anelay of St Johns|Baroness Anelay]] that the government acknowledged that "the Declaration should have called for the protection of political rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine, particularly their right to self-determination."{{efn|group=qt|This statement was first made during a debate regarding the upcoming [[centennial|centenary]] of the Declaration;<ref name="HL2017">[[Hansard]], [https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2017-04-03/debates/632A5268-21B5-4F91-884A-B339C52A0109/BalfourDeclaration Balfour Declaration]: 3&nbsp;April 2017, Volume&nbsp;782</ref> the Foreign Office subsequently repeated the statement in response to a petition on the [[UK Parliament petitions website]], which had called for an official apology for the Declaration.<ref>{{cite news |last=Dearden|first=Lizzie|date= 26 April 2017|title= UK refuses to apologise to Palestinians for Balfour Declaration and says it is 'proud of role in creating Israel'. |url= https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-uk-balfour-declaration-israel-sue-israel-zionism-refuse-apologise-lawsuit-a7702866.html|work= The Independent |access-date= 30 April 2017}}</ref>}}{{efn|group=qt|The [[United Nations Special Committee on Palestine]] acknowledged the same in 1947, noting that: "With regard to the principle of self-determination&nbsp;... it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the 'sui generis' Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle."{{sfn|UNSCOP|1947|p=II, Art. 176}}}}

=== Rights and political status of Jews in other countries ===

[[File:The Anti-Semitism of the Present Government, Edwin Montagu, 23 August 1917.jpg|thumb|[[Edwin Montagu]], then the only Jew in a senior British government position,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=193}} wrote a 23 August 1917 memorandum condemning Zionism as a "mischievous political creed" and stating his belief that: "the policy of His Majesty's Government is anti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallying ground for anti-Semites in every country of the world."]]
The second safeguard clause was a commitment that nothing should be done which might prejudice the rights of the Jewish communities in other countries outside of Palestine.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=336}} The original drafts of Rothschild, Balfour, and Milner did not include this safeguard, which was drafted together with the preceding safeguard in early October,{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=336}} in order to reflect opposition from influential members of the Anglo-Jewish community.{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=336}} Lord Rothschild took exception to the proviso on the basis that it presupposed the possibility of a danger to non-Zionists, which he denied.{{sfn|Ingrams|2009|p=13}}

The Conjoint Foreign Committee of the [[Board of Deputies of British Jews]] and the [[Anglo-Jewish Association]] had published a letter in ''[[The Times]]'' on 24 May 1917 entitled ''Views of Anglo-Jewry'', signed by the two organisations' presidents, [[David Lindo Alexander]] and [[Claude Montefiore]], stating their view that: "the establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine, founded on this theory of homelessness, must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and nationals of these lands."{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=214}} This was followed in late August by [[Edwin Montagu]], an influential [[anti-Zionist]] Jew and [[Secretary of State for India]], and the only Jewish member of the British Cabinet, who wrote in a Cabinet memorandum that: "The policy of His Majesty's Government is anti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallying ground for anti-Semites in every country of the world."{{sfn|Makdisi|2010|p=239}}