Editing Alec Douglas-Home (section)

=== Cold War ===
[[File:JFKWHP-AR7514-A.jpg|thumb|alt=Douglas-Home and John F. Kennedy smiling for a photo.|Douglas-Home with [[John F. Kennedy]] at the [[White House]], 30 September 1962.]]
Home's attention was mainly concentrated on the Cold War, where his forcefully expressed anti-communist beliefs were tempered by a pragmatic approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. His first major problem in this sphere was in 1961 when on the orders of the Soviet leader, [[Nikita Khrushchev]], the [[Berlin Wall]] was erected to stop [[East Germans]] escaping to [[West Germany]] via [[West Berlin]]. Home wrote to his American counterpart, [[Dean Rusk]], "The prevention of East Berliners getting into West Berlin has never been a ''casus belli'' for us. We are concerned with Western access to Berlin and that is what we must maintain."<ref>Thorpe (1997), p. 227</ref> The governments of West Germany, Britain and the US quickly reached agreement on their joint negotiating position; it remained to persuade [[Charles de Gaulle|President de Gaulle]] of France to align himself with the allies. During their discussions Macmillan commented that de Gaulle showed "all the rigidity of a poker without its occasional warmth."<ref>Thorpe (1997), p. 228</ref> An agreement was reached, and the allies tacitly recognised that the wall was going to remain in place. The Soviets for their part did not seek to cut off allied access to West Berlin through East German territory.<ref>Thorpe (1997), p. 229</ref>

The following year the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] threatened to turn the Cold War into a nuclear one. Soviet nuclear missiles were brought to Cuba, provocatively close to the US. The American president, [[John F Kennedy]], insisted that they must be removed, and many thought that the world was on the brink of catastrophe with nuclear exchanges between the two super-powers.{{Sfnp|Divine|1971|pp=40–41, 49}} Despite a public image of unflappable calm, Macmillan was by nature nervous and highly strung.<ref name=dnb/> During the missile crisis, Home, whose calm was genuine and innate, strengthened the Prime Minister's resolve, and encouraged him to back up Kennedy's defiance of Soviet threats of nuclear attack.<ref name=dnb/>  The Lord Chancellor ([[Reginald Manningham-Buller, 1st Viscount Dilhorne|Lord Dilhorne]]), the [[Attorney General for England and Wales|Attorney General]] ([[John Hobson (politician)|Sir John Hobson]]) and the [[Solicitor General for England and Wales|Solicitor General]], ([[Peter Rawlinson, Baron Rawlinson of Ewell|Sir Peter Rawlinson]]) privately gave Home their opinion that the American blockade of Cuba was a breach of international law,{{Efn|The legality of US actions in the crisis, including the blockade of Cuba, has subsequently been questioned by American writers specialising in law, including [[Abram Chayes]] in ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law'', and [[Stephen R Shalom]] in ''International Lawyers and Other Apologists: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis''. The former concludes that American actions were not in breach of international law;{{Sfnp|Chayes|1974|pp=25–40}} the latter takes the contrary view.<ref>Shalom, Stephen R. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234383 "International Lawyers and Other Apologists: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis"], ''Polity'', Vol. 12, No. 1 (Autumn 1979), pp. 83–109 {{Subscription required}}</ref>}} but he continued to advocate a policy of strong support for Kennedy.<ref>Thorpe (1997), p. 241</ref> When Khrushchev backed down and removed the Soviet missiles from Cuba, Home commented:
{{Blockquote|There has been a good deal of speculation about Russia's motives. To me they are quite clear. Their motive was to test the will of the United States and to see how the President of the United States, in particular, would react against a threat of force. If the President had failed for one moment in a matter which affected the security of the United States, no ally of America would have had confidence in United States protection ever again.<ref>Speech to the conference of the Institute of Directors, 31 October 1962, ''quoted'' in Thorpe (1997), p. 249</ref>|}}