Editing Teleological argument (section)

===Probabilistic arguments===
In 1928 and 1930, [[Frederick Robert Tennant|F. R. Tennant]] published his ''Philosophical Theology'', which was a "bold endeavour to combine scientific and theological thinking".<ref>"Tennant, Frederick Robert". ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]''.</ref> He proposed a version of the teleological argument based on the accumulation of the probabilities of each individual [[biological adaptation]]. "Tennant concedes that naturalistic accounts such as evolutionary theory may explain each of the individual adaptations he cites, but he insists that in this case the whole exceeds the sum of its parts: naturalism can explain each adaptation but not their totality."<ref name="Rout" /> The ''[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'' notes that "Critics have insisted on focusing on the cogency of each piece of theistic evidence – reminding us that, in the end, ten leaky buckets hold no more water than one." Also, "Some critics, such as [[John Hick]] and D.H. Mellor, have objected to Tennant's particular use of probability theory and have challenged the relevance of any kind of probabilistic reasoning to theistic belief."<ref name="Rout">Craig, E. 1998. "Tennant, Frederick Robert (1866–1957)." ''[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. London: [[Taylor & Francis]].</ref>

[[Richard Swinburne]]'s "contributions to philosophical theology have sought to apply more sophisticated versions of probability theory to the question of God's existence, a methodological improvement on Tennant's work but squarely in the same spirit".<ref name="Rout" /> He uses [[Bayesian probability]] "taking account not only of the order and functioning of nature but also of the 'fit' between human intelligence and the universe, whereby one can understand its workings, as well as human aesthetic, moral, and religious experience".<ref name="EB">"Christian philosophy". ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]''.</ref> Swinburne writes:<ref>[[Richard Swinburne|Swinburne, Richard]]. 2004. ''The Existence of God''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. p. 166.</ref>
{{blockquote|text=[T]he existence of order in the world confirms the existence of God if and only if the existence of this order in the world is more probable if there is a God than if there is not. ... the probability of order of the right kind is very much greater if there is a God, and so that the existence of such order adds greatly to the probability that there is a God.}}

Swinburne acknowledges that his argument by itself may not give a reason to believe in the existence of God, but in combination with other arguments such as [[cosmological argument]]s and evidence from [[mystical experience]], he thinks it can.

While discussing Hume's arguments, [[Alvin Plantinga]] offered a probability version of the teleological argument in his book ''[[God and Other Minds]]'':<ref>[[Alvin Plantinga|Plantinga, A.]] [1967] 1990. ''[[God and Other Minds|God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God]]''. [[Cornell University Press]]. p.&nbsp;104.</ref>

{{Poem quote|text=Every contingent object such that we know whether or not it was the product of intelligent design, was the product of intelligent design.
The universe is a contingent object.
So probably the universe is designed.}}

Following Plantinga, Georges Dicker produced a slightly different version in his book about [[George Berkeley]]:<ref>Dicker, G. 2011. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=5yVwAgAAQBAJ Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination]''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=5yVwAgAAQBAJ&dq=plantinga+++%22argument+from+design%22&pg=PA262 p.&nbsp;262].</ref>

{{Poem quote|text=A. The world ... shows amazing teleological order.
B. All Objects exhibiting such order ... are products of intelligent design.
C. Probably the world is a result of intelligent design.
D. Probably, God exists and created the world.}}

The ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica]]'' has the following criticism of such arguments:<ref name="EB" />
{{blockquote|text=It can of course be said that any form in which the universe might be is statistically enormously improbable as it is only one of a virtual infinity of possible forms. But its actual form is no more improbable, in this sense, than innumerable others. It is only the fact that humans are part of it that makes it seem so special, requiring a transcendent explanation.}}