Editing Tatmadaw (section)

===SLORC/SPDC era (1988–2010)===
{{See also|State Peace and Development Council}}
The third phase of doctrinal development of the Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of the [[State Law and Order Restoration Council]] (SLORC) in September 1988 as part of the armed forces modernisation programme. The development was the reflection of sensitivity towards direct foreign invasion or invasion by proxy state during the turbulent years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example: the unauthorised presence of a US [[aircraft carrier]] Battle Group in Myanmar's territorial waters during the 1988 political uprising as evidence of an infringement of Myanmar's [[sovereignty]]. Also, the {{lang|my|Tatmadaw}} leadership was concerned that foreign powers might arm the insurgents on the border to exploit the political situation and tensions in the country. This new threat perception, previously insignificant under the nation's isolationist foreign policy, led {{lang|my|Tatmadaw}} leaders to review the defence capability and doctrine of the {{lang|my|Tatmadaw}}.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces">Andrew Selth, ''Burma's Armed Forces''</ref>

The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing [[Human rights in Burma|human rights violations]], [[Religion in Burma|religious suppression]] and [[Internal conflict in Burma|ethnic cleansing]], remains high.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces"/>

Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that the Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces"/>

The Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces"/>

It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of the Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people [[militias]] and dispersed regular troops which would eventually wear down the invading forces, both physically and psychologically, and leave it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. If the conventional strategy of strategic denial fails, then the Tatmadaw and its auxiliary forces will follow Mao's strategic concepts of 'strategic defensive', 'strategic stalemate' and 'strategic offensive'.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces"/>

Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, the Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine.<ref name="Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces"/>