Editing Taliban (section)

=== Attitudes towards other Muslim communities ===
Unlike other Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the Taliban are not [[Salafi movement|Salafists]]. Although wealthy Arab nations had brought Salafist [[Madrasa]]s to Afghanistan during the Soviet war in the 1980s, the Taliban's strict Deobandi leadership suppressed the Salafi movement in Afghanistan after it first came to power in the 1990s. Following the 2001 US invasion, the Taliban and Salafists joined forces to wage a common war against NATO forces. Still, Salafists were relegated to small groups which were under the Taliban's command.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Islamic State Khorasan Province's Peshawar Seminary Attack and War Against Afghan Taliban Hanafis |url=https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-peshawar-seminary-attack-and-war-against-afghan-taliban-hanafis/ |access-date=26 August 2021 |website=Jamestown}}</ref>

The Taliban are averse to debating doctrine with other Muslims and "did not allow even Muslim reporters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the [[Qur'an]]."<ref name="rashid 107">{{Harvnb|Rashid|2000|p=107}}.</ref>

==== Opposition to Salafism ====
Following the Taliban victory, a nationwide campaign was launched against influential Salafi factions suspected of past ties to the [[Islamic State – Khorasan Province|ISIS–K]]. The Taliban closed most Salafi mosques and seminaries in 16 provinces, including [[Nangarhar Province|Nangarhar]], and detained [[Clergy|clerics]] it accused of supporting the Islamic State.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Taliban Wages Deadly Crackdown On Afghan Salafists As War With IS-K Intensifies |work=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-crackdown-salafis-islamic-state-khorasan/31524687.html |access-date=2023-04-05}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=The Taliban's religious roadmap for Afghanistan |url=https://www.mei.edu/publications/talibans-religious-roadmap-afghanistan |access-date=2023-04-05 |website=Middle East Institute}}</ref>

==== Shia Islam ====
During the period of the [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|first Taliban rule]] (1996 to 2001), the Taliban attempted to sway Shias, particularly [[Hazaras]], to their side, making deals with a number of Shia political figures, as well as securing the support of some Shia religious scholars.<ref name=":022">{{Cite web |last=Moiz |first=Ibrahim |date=2021-06-14 |title=Niazi No More: The Life and Legacy of a Taliban Mutineer |url=https://afghaneye.org/2021/06/14/niazi-no-more-the-life-and-legacy-of-a-taliban-mutineer/ |access-date=3 June 2023 |website=The Afghan Eye |quote=Contrary to some understandable, but inflated, claims ..., the Taliban had not intended to either wipe out Hazaras or Shias from the land; in fact they canvassed the support of several Hazara commanders, seniormost a former enemy called Muhammad Akbari, and even obtained the approval of some Shia clerics.}}</ref> One of these was [[Ustad Muhammad Akbari]], a Shia Hazara politician who separated from Abdul-Ali Mazari's [[Hezbe Wahdat|Islamic Unity Party]] to form the [[National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan|National Islamic Unity Party]], thereafter politically aligning himself and his group, which gained the support of the majority of Islamic Unity Party members in the [[Hazarajat|Hazara hinterland]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Christia |first=Fotini |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mrKsiFjP778C&pg=PA91 |title=Alliance Formation in Civil Wars |date=2012|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-02302-4 |pages=90–93|author-link=Fotini Christia |access-date=3 June 2023 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> with the Taliban.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ruttig |first=Thomas |date=2006-01-01 |title=Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan's Political Parties and where they come from (1902–2006) |url=https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/other-publications/external-publications/islamists-leftists-and-a-void-in-the-center-afghanistans-political-parties-and-where-they-come-from-1902-2006-2/ |access-date=3 June 2023 |website=Afghanistan Analysts Network |page=25 |quote=The largest of the Shia parties, Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, had already split into two during the Taleban era, when Ustad Muhammad Akbari struck an agreement with them and maintained control – under some Kandahari supervision – over parts of the Hazarajat, while Khalili's wing remained with the NA.}}</ref> Another significant Shia political figure in the administration of the first Islamic Emirate was Sayed Gardizi, a [[Seyyed Hazara|Sayed Hazara]] from [[Gardez|Gardiz]], who was appointed as the ''wuluswal'' (district governor) of [[Yakawlang District|Yakawlang district]], being the only Shia to hold the position of district governor during the period of the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ibrahimi |first=Niamatullah |date=January 2009 |title=Divide and rule: State penetration in Hazarajat (Afghanistan) from the Monarchy to the Taliban |url=https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b75e5274a27b2000b61/WP42.2.pdf |journal=Crisis States Working Papers |publisher=[[Crisis States Research Centre]] |volume=2 |issue=42 |issn=1749-1800 |s2cid=222130576 |access-date=2 June 2023 |quote=The only Shiite official of the Taliban was Sayed Gardizi, a Shiite Sayed from Gardez in the southeast of the country. He was appointed as the district governor of Yakawlang.}}</ref>

At the same time, however, certain incidents caused distrust between the Taliban and Afghan Shias. The [[1998 Mazar-i-Sharif massacre]] was the most significant, having taken place in response to ethnic Uzbek warlord [[Abdul Rashid Dostum|Abdur-Rashid Dustum]]'s betrayal and subsequent massacre of Taliban fighters, as well as false rumors that Hazaras had beheaded senior Taliban leader Mawlawi Ihsanullah Ihsan at the grave of Abdul-Ali Mazari, which led to the massacre of a significant number of Hazaras.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hamid |first=Mustafa |author-link=Abu Walid al-Masri |date=3 June 2010 |title=إجابات مصطفى حامد عن ثلاث أسئلة من شيعة أفغانستان |trans-title=Mustafa Hamid's answers to three questions from the Shiites of Afghanistan |url=https://www.mafa.world/2010/06/03/%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%89/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128193132/https://www.mafa.world/2010/06/03/%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%89/ |archive-date=28 January 2023 |access-date=3 June 2023 |website=Māfā as-Sīyāsī |language=ar}}</ref> The commander responsible for the massacre, Abdul-Manan Niazi, later became notable for his opposition to the Taliban's leadership, having formed the rebellious [[High Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]] in 2015, before being killed, reportedly by the Taliban themselves.<ref name=":12">{{Cite news |last=Ali |date=26 May 2021 |title=Assassination of Taliban splinter group leader exposes internal divisions |website=Salaam Times |url=https://afghanistan.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_st/features/2021/05/26/feature-02 |access-date=2022-05-12}}</ref><ref name=":022" />

The desire of the Taliban leadership to expand the group's relations with Afghan Shias continued after the American invasion of Afghanistan and the group's return to insurgency. Some time following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|American Invasion of Iraq]] in 2003, the Taliban published "A Message to the Mujahid People of Iraq and Afghanistan" by Mullah Omar, in which he condemned sectarianism whilst jointly addressing the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, saying:<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ash-Shāmī |first=Abū Maysarah |date=29 December 2014 |title=The Qā'idah of adh-Dhawāhirī, al-Harārī, and an-Nadhārī, and the Absent Yemeni Wisdom |url=https://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Dabiq (magazine)|Dabiq]] |issue=6 |pages=16–25 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108161122/https://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-issue-6-al-qaeda-of-waziristan.pdf |archive-date=8 January 2015 |access-date=3 June 2023 |via=[[Clarion Project]]}}</ref><blockquote>"It's incumbent upon all Muslims to thwart all the cursed plots of the cunning enemy, and to not give him the opportunity to light the fires of disagreement amongst the Muslims. A major component of American policy is to categorize the Muslims in Iraq with the labels of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and in Afghanistan with the labels of Pashtun, Tājīk, Hazārah and Uzbek, in order to decrease the severity and strength of the popular uprisings and the accompanying armed resistance. […] As such, I request the brothers in Iraq to put behind them the differences that exist in the name of Shī’ah and Sunnī, and to fight in unity against the occupying enemy, for victory is not possible without unity."</blockquote>Multiple Hazara Shia Taliban commanders took part in the Taliban insurgency, primarily from Bamyan and [[Daykundi Province|Daikundi]] provinces. Among the [[Qara Baghi (Hazara tribe)|Qarabaghi tribe]] of Shia Hazaras, a number of fighters voluntarily joined the Taliban due to their close relations with the nearby Taliban-supporting Sunni Pashtun population. Additionally, a pro-government Shia Hazara militia from [[Gizab District|Gizab district]] of Daikundi province, called Fedayi, defected and pledged allegiance to the Taliban a few years before 2016, with a reported size of 50 fighters.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1131093/90_1474353951_2019-09-easo-afghanistan-recruitment.pdf |title=COI Report: Afghanistan – Recruitment by armed groups |date=2016 |publisher=[[European Union Agency for Asylum|European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)]] |isbn=978-92-9494-181-7 |pages=19–20 |chapter=Hazaras in the Taliban's ranks |doi=10.2847/044654 |quote=Some senior Hazara commanders are with the Taliban in Bamyan and Daikundi, and there are a couple of Taliban shadow governors or provincial-level military leaders who are Hazara. ... Qarabaghi, a cluster of villages near the provincial capital of Ghazni, inhabited by a community of Shia Hazaras ... are surrounded by a Sunni population and have very normalised and friendly relations with them, including even inter-marriages. In this particular context, these Hazara communities had active Taliban fighters. ... The Hazaras joined with the Sunni Pashtuns in collective security or governance initiatives which were sometimes directed by the Taliban. ... A few years ago, a Hazara pro-government militia commander in Gizab district (Daykundi) named Fedayi defected with a few dozen of his men to the Taliban. A video was released of him pledging allegiance to the Taliban. It was claimed that he had about 50 fighters but this remained unverified. |author1=European Asylum Support Office. }}</ref>

In reaction to the [[2011 Afghanistan Ashura bombings]], which targeted Shia Afghans in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban published "Sectarian Killings; A Dangerous Enemy Conspiracy" by Taliban official [[Abdul Qahar Balkhi|Abdul-Qahhar Balkhi]], in which he stated:<ref>{{Cite web |last=Balkhi |first=Abdul-Qahhar |author-link=Abdul Qahar Balkhi |date=15 October 2016 |title=Sectarian Killings; A Dangerous Enemy Conspiracy |url=https://www.alemarahenglish.af/sectarian-killings-a-dangerous-enemy-conspiracy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603063642/https://www.alemarahenglish.af/sectarian-killings-a-dangerous-enemy-conspiracy/ |archive-date=3 June 2023 |access-date=2023-06-03 |website=[[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan|The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]]}}</ref>
<blockquote>"In Afghanistan, Sunnis and Shias have co-existed for centuries. They live communal lives and participate in their mutual festivities. And for centuries they have fought shoulder to shoulder against foreign invaders. [...] The majority of Shia populations in Bamyan, Daikundi and Hazarajat [have] actively aided and continue to support the Mujahideen against the foreigners and their puppets. The foreign occupiers seek to ignite the flames of communal hatred and violence between Sunnis and Shias in Afghanistan. [...] The followers of Islam will only ever reclaim their rightful place in this world if they forgo their petty differences and unite as a single egalitarian body."</blockquote>
In recent years, the Taliban have once again attempted to court Shiites, appointing a Shia cleric as a regional governor and recruiting Hazaras to fight against ISIS–K, in order to distance themselves from their past reputation and improve their relations with the Shia-led [[Government of Iran]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 May 2020 |title=Why Are the Taliban Wooing a Persecuted Afghanistan Minority Group? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/why-are-the-taliban-wooing-a-persecuted-afghanistan-minority-group/ |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]}}</ref> After the 2021 Taliban offensive, which led to the restoration of the Islamic Emirate, senior Taliban officials, including Deputy Prime Minister [[Abdul Salam Hanafi]] and Foreign Minister [[Amir Khan Muttaqi]], have stressed the importance of unity between Shiites and Sunnis in Afghanistan and promised to protect the Shiite community.<ref>{{cite news |date=17 October 2021 |title=Islamic Emirate Downplays Claims that Daesh is Emboldened |publisher=[[TOLOnews]] |url=https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175066}}</ref> The [[Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Afghanistan)|Ministry of Virtue and Vice]] have also agreed to hire Shia [[Ulama]] in order to implement the ministry's religious edicts.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ahmadi |first=Hussain |date=28 April 2022 |others=Translated by Ali Rezaei |title=The Agreement Between the Taliban and the Shia Ulema Council for "Interfering in People's Privacy" |url=https://nimrokhmedia.com/en/2022/07/28/the-agreement-between-the-taliban-and-the-shia-ulema-council-for-interfering-in-peoples-privacy/ |access-date=4 April 2023 |website=Nimrokh}}</ref> In general, the Taliban has maintained peace with most Muslims in the Shiite community,<ref>{{Cite news |first1=Margherita|last1=Stancati |first2=Ehsanullah |last2=Amiri |date=2 September 2021 |title=Taliban Reach Out to Shiite Hazara Minority, Seeking Unity and Iran Ties |newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-reach-out-to-shiite-hazara-minority-seeking-unity-and-iran-ties-11630599286 |access-date=2023-04-08}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Qazizai |first=Fazelminallah |date=2022-12-12 |title=In Bamiyan, the Taliban Walk a Perilous Tightrope |url=https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/in-bamiyan-the-taliban-walk-a-perilous-tightrope/ |access-date=2023-04-08 |website=[[New Lines Magazine]]}}</ref> although the 2022 [[Balkhab uprising]] resulted in the deaths of some Hazaras.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 August 2022 |title=The fate of Mehdi Mujahid; where was the mistake? |url=https://www.avapress.com/en/note/257260/the-fate-of-mehdi-mujahid-_where-was-the-mistake |access-date=3 June 2023 |website=Afghan Voice Agency (AVA)}}</ref>