Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== Egyptian policies in 1956 ==

=== Nasser and Jordan ===
Nasser frustrated British attempts to draw Jordan into the pact by sponsoring demonstrations in [[Amman]], leading King [[Hussein of Jordan]] in the [[Arabization of the Jordanian Army command]] to dismiss the British commander of the [[Arab Legion]], [[John Bagot Glubb]] (known to the Arabs as Glubb Pasha) in March 1956.<ref name="Kissinger 529">{{Harvnb|Kissinger|1994|p=529}}</ref> After one round of bloody rioting in December 1955 and another in March 1956 against Jordan joining the Baghdad Pact, both instigated by the Cairo-based [[Voice of the Arabs]] radio station, Hussein believed his throne was in danger.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=178–179}}</ref>

=== Nasser and Britain ===
British Prime Minister [[Anthony Eden]] was especially upset at the sacking of Glubb Pasha, and as one British politician recalled:
{{Blockquote|For Eden ... this was the last straw.... This reverse, he insisted was Nasser's doing.... Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East and he would not rest until he destroyed all our friends and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence.... Nasser must therefore be ... destroyed.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Mason |first1=Edward |title=The World Bank Since Bretton Woods |last2=Asher |first2=Robert |date=1973 |publisher=Brookings Institution |location=Washington |page=638}}</ref>}}
After the sacking of Glubb Pasha, which he saw as a grievous blow to British influence, Eden became consumed with an obsessional hatred for Nasser, and from March 1956 onwards, was in private committed to the overthrow of Nasser.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=180}}</ref> The American historian Donald Neff wrote that Eden's often hysterical and overwrought views towards Nasser almost certainly reflected the influence of the amphetamines to which Eden had become addicted following a botched operation in 1953 together with the related effects of sustained sleep deprivation (Eden slept on average about 5 hours per night in early 1956).<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=182–183}}</ref>

Britain was eager to tame Nasser and looked towards the United States for support. However, Eisenhower strongly opposed British-French military action.<ref>{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|loc=ch. 7–8}}</ref> The United States, opposed to foreign intervention in Egypt, initially blocked British access to IMF help, pressuring the United Kingdom to withdraw its troops. When the British government, left with no choice, acceded to US demands, the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]] extended its largest-ever loan to a member (an immediate $561 million drawing to replenish the UK's reserves, with an additional $739 million "stand-by" loan to be provided on an as-needed basis). Smaller loans were extended to France, Israel, and Egypt.<ref>
Eichengreen, Barry, and others, 'Cycles of Debt', In Defense of Public Debt (New York, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Sept. 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577899.003.0009, accessed 16 Mar. 2024.
</ref> America's closest Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, was just as fundamentally opposed to the Hashemite-dominated Baghdad Pact as Egypt, and the U.S. was keen to increase its own influence in the region.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=168–169}}</ref> The failure of the Baghdad Pact aided such a goal by reducing Britain's dominance over the region. "Great Britain would have preferred to overthrow Nasser; America, however uncomfortable with the '[[Czech arms deal]]', thought it wiser to propitiate him."<ref>{{Harvnb|Kissinger|1994|p=528}}</ref>

=== American financing for Egypt's Aswan Dam ===
On 16 May 1956, Nasser officially recognized the [[China|People's Republic of China]], which angered the U.S. and Secretary Dulles, a sponsor of the [[Republic of China]].<ref name="Kissinger 529"/> This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all American financial aid for the [[Aswan Dam]] project on 19 July.<ref name="Kissinger 529"/>

The Eisenhower administration believed that if Nasser were able to secure Soviet economic support for the high dam, that would be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to support, and in turn would strain Soviet-Egyptian relations.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 172">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=172}}</ref> Eisenhower wrote in March 1956 that "If Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would very quickly get sick of the prospect and would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in the region".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 172"/> Dulles told his brother, CIA director [[Allen Dulles]], "If they [the Soviets] do make this offer we can make a lot of use of it in propaganda within the satellite bloc. You don't get bread because you are being squeezed to build a dam".<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 172"/>

Finally, the Eisenhower administration had become very annoyed at Nasser's efforts to play the United States off against the Soviet Union, and refused to finance the Aswan high dam. As early as September 1955, when Nasser announced the [[Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal|purchase of the Soviet military equipment via Czechoslovakia]], Dulles had written that competing for Nasser's favor was probably going to be "an expensive process", one that Dulles wanted to avoid as much as possible.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=171–172}}</ref>

=== Nasser-US negotiations ===
In January 1956, to end the incipient arms race in the Middle East (set off by the Soviet Union selling Egypt arms on a scale unlimited by the Tripartite Declaration and with France doing likewise with Israel), which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent out his close friend [[Robert B. Anderson (Texas politician)|Robert B. Anderson]] to serve as a secret envoy who would permanently end the Arab–Israeli dispute.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=130–131}}</ref> During his meetings with Nasser, Anderson offered large quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. Nasser demanded Palestinian refugees be given the opportunity to choose between repatriation or resettlement in Arab countries, wanted to annex the southern half of Israel and rejected direct talks with Israel.<ref name="Alteras1993p166">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|loc=pp. 169 "Nasser's personal security and that of his government were at stake. Several times during the conversation Nasser mentioned the murder of King Abdullah."}}</ref> Given Nasser's territorial and refugee-related demands, the Israeli Prime Minister [[David Ben-Gurion]] suspected that Nasser was not interested in a settlement, insteading demanding face-to-face negotiations with Nasser, starting with lower-level negotiations, and weapons from the US.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=135–136}}</ref> Nasser was unwilling to accept direct negotiations, citing possible assassinations such as the assassination of [[Abdullah I of Jordan|King Abduallah]].<ref name="Alteras1993p166" />

A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally unsuccessful.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|pp=168–169}}</ref> Nasser sometimes suggested during his talks with Anderson that he was interested in peace with Israel if only the Americans would supply him with unlimited quantities of military and economic aid. In case of Israeli acceptance to the [[Palestinian right of return]] and to Egypt annexing the southern half of Israel, Egypt would not accept a peace settlement. The United States or the [[United Nations]] would have to present the Israeli acceptance to all Arabs as a basis for peace settlements.<ref name="Alteras1993p169">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993|p=169}}</ref> It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yahel |first=Ido |date=October 2016 |title=Covert Diplomacy Between Israel and Egypt During Nasser Rule: 1952–1970 |journal=SAGE Open |language=en |volume=6 |issue=4 |pages=215824401666744 |doi=10.1177/2158244016667449 |issn=2158-2440 |quote="Although Nasser may have wanted to reach some agreement with Israel, his suspicion and distrust prevented doing so."|doi-access=free }}</ref> The truth will likely never be known as Nasser was an intensely secretive man, who managed to hide his true opinions on most issues from both contemporaries and historians.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|pp=306–307}}</ref> However, the British historian P. J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership meant that peace was unlikely.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|p=252}}</ref>

Hasan Afif El-Hasan says that in 1955–1956 the Americans proposed to Nasser that he solve the Arab–Israeli conflict peacefully in exchange for American finance of the High Dam on the Nile river, but Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West (as opposed to remaining neutral) in the Cold War. Since the alternative to a peace agreement was a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser's refusal to accept the proposal was irrational, according to el-Hasan.<ref name="El-Hasan2010p156">{{Cite book |last=El-Hasan |first=Hasan Afif |title=Israel Or Palestine? Is the Two-state Solution Already Dead?: A Political and Military History of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict |date=1 January 2010 |publisher=Algora Publishing |isbn=978-0-8758-6794-6 |page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qywm7XKcRvgC&pg=PA156 156] |quote="in 1955...The U.S offered to finance the High Dam on the Nile river...in exchange for Egypt's help to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully...But Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West in the Cold War.... was the quasi alliance with the soviets more important than solving the Palestinian issue peacefully?...since the alternative to a negotiated settlement was a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser's refusal to accept the Negotiation offer was irrational. "}}</ref>