Editing Semantics (section)

=== Referential ===
[[File:Referential theory of meaning.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of referential theories|Referential theories identify meaning with the entities to which expressions point.]]

Referential theories state that the meaning of an expression is the entity to which it points.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} }}</ref> The meaning of [[singular term]]s like [[name]]s is the individual to which they refer. For example, the meaning of the name ''[[George Washington]]'' is the person with this name.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.1 The Theory of Reference}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} | {{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} }}</ref> General terms refer not to a single entity but to the set of objects to which this term applies. In this regard, the meaning of the term ''cat'' is the set of all cats.<ref>{{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}}</ref> Similarly, verbs usually refer to classes of actions or events and adjectives refer to properties of individuals and events.<ref>{{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}}</ref>

[[Simple referential theories]] face problems for meaningful expressions that have no clear referent. Names like ''[[Pegasus]]'' and ''[[Santa Claus]]'' have meaning even though they do not point to existing entities.<ref>{{harvnb|Davis|2005|p=211}}</ref> Other difficulties concern cases in which different expressions are about the same entity. For instance, the expressions ''[[Roger Bannister]]'' and ''the first man to run a four-minute mile'' refer to the same person but do not mean exactly the same thing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} }}</ref> This is particularly relevant when talking about beliefs since a person may understand both expressions without knowing that they point to the same entity.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.2 Theories of Reference Vs. Semantic Theories}}</ref> A further problem is given by expressions whose meaning depends on the context, like the deictic terms ''here'' and ''I''.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.4 Character and Content, Context and Circumstance}}</ref>

To avoid these problems, referential theories often introduce additional devices. Some identify meaning not directly with objects but with functions that point to objects. This additional level has the advantage of taking the context of an expression into account since the same expression may point to one object in one context and to another object in a different context. For example, the reference of the word ''here'' depends on the location in which it is used.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.4 Character and Content, Context and Circumstance}} }}</ref> A closely related approach is [[possible world]] semantics, which allows expressions to refer not only to entities in the actual world but also to entities in other possible worlds.{{efn|A possible world is a complete way of how things could have been.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Pavel|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 50]}} }}</ref>}} According to this view, expressions like ''the first man to run a four-minute mile'' refer to different persons in different worlds. This view can also be used to analyze sentences that talk about what is possible or what is necessary: possibility is what is true in some possible worlds while necessity is what is true in all possible worlds.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.5 Possible Worlds Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Rooij|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KlPwvH6ICqIC&pg=PA198 198–199]}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} }}</ref>