Editing SWIFT (section)

===SWIFT and sanctions===

====Iran====
In January 2012, the advocacy group [[United Against Nuclear Iran]] (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran's banking system, including the [[Central Bank of Iran]]. UANI asserted that Iran's membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT's own corporate rules.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=31 January 2012 |title=Iran Praises Nuclear Talks with Team from U.N. |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-calls-un-nuclear-teams-visit-constructive.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref>

Consequently, in February 2012, the [[United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs|U.S. Senate Banking Committee]] unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using [[Informal value transfer system|IVTS]]. [[Mark Wallace]], president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.<ref name="nyt">{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=3 February 2012 |title=Senate Panel Approves Potentially Toughest Penalty Yet Against Iran's Wallet |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/tough-iran-penalty-clears-senate-banking-panel.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref>

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,<ref name="nyt" /> but later{{when|date=May 2021}} said that "it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Solomon |first1=Jay |last2=& Adam Entous |date=4 February 2012 |title=Banking Hub Adds to Pressure on Iran |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203889904577201330206741436 |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Targeted banks would be—amongst others—[[Saderat Bank of Iran]], [[Bank Mellat]], [[Post Bank of Iran]] and [[Sepah Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 February 2012 |title=Banking's SWIFT says ready to block Iran transactions |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-sanctions-swift-idUSL5E8DH31020120217 |access-date=17 February 2012}}</ref> On 17 March 2012, following an agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the [[Council of the European Union]] and the council's subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torchia |first=Andrew |date=17 February 2016 |title=Iranian banks reconnected to SWIFT network after four-year hiatus |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSKCN0VQ1FD |access-date=21 April 2016}}</ref> 

In November 2024, Iran implemented a [[paradigm shift]] approach to shift the focus from the SWIFT payment system by initiating the concept of bringing [[ACUMER]]. ACUMER was coined by Iran as a retaliation to the international sanctions imposed by the United States which has ever since limited Iran's competitive edge in the context of [[international trade]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last= |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran top banker: Significant measures taken to counter sanctions |url=https://en.irna.ir/news/85670174/Iran-top-banker-Significant-measures-taken-to-counter-sanctions |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=IRNA English |language=en}}</ref> Iran had long conceived an idea of bringing a viable alternative option to SWIFT in order to actively engage in smooth economic activities and international trade.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran unveils SWIFT competitor called ACUMER |url=https://www.intellinews.com/iran-unveils-swift-competitor-called-acumer-354944/ |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=www.intellinews.com |language=en}}</ref>

====Israel====
In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke [[Banking in Israel|Israeli banks]]' access to its network owing to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.<ref>[http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.619514 International banking giant refuses to cut off Israel, despite boycott calls]. ''[[Haaretz]]''. 7 October 2014.</ref>

====Russia and Belarus====
{{See also|SWIFT ban against Russian banks}}
Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to [[Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014–present)|Russian military intervention in Ukraine]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hutton |first1=Robert |last2=Ian Wishart |date=29 August 2014 |title=U.K. Wants EU to Block Russia From SWIFT Banking Network |agency=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-29/u-k-wants-eu-to-block-russia-from-swift-banking-network.html |access-date=31 August 2014}}</ref> However, SWIFT refused to do so.<ref>{{Cite press release |title=SWIFT Sanctions Statement |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/shownews?param_dcr=news.data/en/swift_com/2014/PR_swift_sanctions_statement.xml |work=swift.com}}</ref> [[SPFS]], a Russian alternative to SWIFT, was developed by the [[Central Bank of Russia]] as a backup measure.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Turak |first=Natasha |date=23 May 2018 |title=Russia's central bank governor touts Moscow alternative to SWIFT transfer system as protection from US sanctions |publisher=CNBC |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/23/russias-central-bank-governor-touts-moscow-alternative-to-swift-transfer-system-as-protection-from-us-sanctions.html |access-date=4 October 2018}}</ref>

During the [[prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Shalal|first=Andrea|date=2022-02-11|title=SWIFT off Russia sanctions list, state banks likely target -U.S., EU officials|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swift-off-russia-sanctions-list-state-banks-likely-target-us-eu-officials-2022-02-11/|access-date=2022-02-14}}</ref> Following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the foreign ministers of the Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks' exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.<ref>{{cite web |title=EU unlikely to cut Russia off SWIFT for now, sources say |url=https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/eu-unlikely-to-cut-russia-off-swift-for-now-sources-say/ar-AAUf89H |website=Reuters |access-date=24 February 2022 |language=en |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove a few Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.<ref>{{cite web |title=Joint Statement on further restrictive economic measures |url=https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1423 |website=ec.europa.eu |date=26 February 2022 |access-date=26 February 2022}}</ref><ref name=":2" />

On 20 March 2023, Russia was banned from SWIFT.<ref>{{cite web |title=New financial messaging rules for Russia approved {{!}} Bank of Russia |url=https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |website=[[Central Bank of Russia]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812012003mp_/http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |archive-date=2023-08-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author1=Adeela Naureen |author2=Waqar K Kauravi |title=De-dollarisation and emerging global order |url=https://tribune.com.pk/story/2415289/de-dollarisation-and-emerging-global-order |work=[[The Express Tribune]] |date=6 May 2023 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[European Union]] issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus; the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Martin |first=Jessica |date=27 February 2022 |title=EU extends Russia sanctions to airspace, media, Belarus |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220301014247/https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |archive-date=1 March 2022 |access-date=1 March 2022 |website=Euractiv |language=en-GB}}</ref> After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,<ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1497981026093703180|user=nexta_tv|title=Lithuanian Prime Minister proposed to disconnect Belarus from SWIFT}}</ref> the [[European Union]], which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate [[President of Belarus]], started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2022 |title=EU to impose new sanctions on Belarus this week -EU official |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |url-status=live |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302205535/https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |archive-date=2 March 2022}}</ref>