Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Watergate===
{{watergate|Intelligence}}
[[File:Vernon A Walters.jpg|thumb|left|Gen. [[Vernon Walters|Walters]], Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency<ref>[[Vernon Walters|Lt. Gen. Vernon "Dick" Walters]] (1917–2002), at CIA only six weeks when the Watergate break-in occurred, before had served in military intelligence and since 1958 as a foreign language interpreter for Nixon. Helms wondered if Nixon considered Walters "his man at CIA", but the Democratic [[The Wise Men (book)|"Wise Man"]] [[Averell Harriman]] had told Helms that, notwithstanding any political differences, Walters was "reliable". After fielding repeated requests for cover and funds from Nixon's team, Walters told Helms he would volunteer to take the fall in order to satisfy their demands, then retire. Helms writes in his memoirs that he then carefully and pointedly told Walters: <blockquote>CIA's reputation depends on straightforward, honest relations with both the executive branch and the Congress. There's no way that the deputy DCI could have furnished secret funds to the Watergate crowd without permanently damaging and perhaps even destroying the Agency.</blockquote>In the event, when Helms instructed Walters "to refuse their demands", Walters did so without incident. Later in 1973, although Walters was ''de jure'' the acting DCI for 16 weeks, he co-operated fully with William Colby. Helms (2003) p. 8 (Walters' career, Harriman), pp. 10–11 (Nixon's man?), p. 13 (Helms' CIA quote), p. 283 (Walters refuses their demands), p. 424 (acting DCI); Wiener (2007) p. 630. In 1989–1991 Walters served as American Ambassador to the United Nations, and then to the [[Federal Republic of Germany|Fed. Rep. of Germany]] during reunification.</ref>]]

After first learning of the [[Watergate scandal]] on June 17, 1972, Helms developed a general strategy to distance the CIA from it altogether, including any third-party investigations of Nixon's role in the precipitating break-in.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 288–289; at 296, 298, 299 ("distance the CIA").</ref><ref>Colby (1978) p. 321 ("Just stay away from the whole damn thing"), p. 328 ("Helms' careful distancing of the Agency from Watergate").</ref> The scandal created a flurry of media interest during the 1972 presidential election, but only reached its full intensity in the following years. Among those initially arrested (the "plumbers") were former CIA employees; there were loose ends with the agency.<ref>Cf., generally ''[[United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States|Rockefeller Report]]'' (1975) chapter 14, pp. 172–207: "Involvement of the CIA in Improper Activities for the White House," e.g., [[E. Howard Hunt]] at 173–182, 193–199; operations against [[Daniel Ellsberg]] pp. 182–190. The Report (p. 199) found "no evidence either that the CIA was a participant in the planning or execution of the Watergate break-in or that it had advance knowledge of it."</ref> Helms and DDCI [[Vernon Walters]] became convinced that CIA top officials had no culpable role in the break-in. It soon became apparent, however, that it was "impossible to prove anything to an inflamed national press corps already in full cry" while "daily leaks to the press kept pointing at CIA". Only later did Helms conclude that "the leaks were coming directly from the White House" and that "President Nixon was personally manipulating the administration's efforts to contain the scandal".<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 3–7, quotes at 6, 7.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 277–278, 289–297; at 297 (quoting Helms that CIA did not run the break-in); p. 303 (Walters learned from Colby that CIA was not involved in the break-in, and no reason to block the FBI).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 323–324.</ref>

On June 23, 1972, Nixon and Haldeman discussed the progress the FBI was making in their investigation and an inability to control it.<ref name=":1">'The smoking gun' tape.  Source: Nixon Library. Watergate Tapes. Recording available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oe3OgU8W0s</ref> In discussing how to ask Helms for his assistance to seek a "hold" on the FBI investigation, Nixon said "well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things".<ref name=":1" /> Nixon's team (chiefly [[H.R. Haldeman|Haldeman]], [[John Ehrlichman|Ehrlichman]], and [[John Dean|Dean]]) then asked Helms in effect to assert a phony national security reason for the break-in and, under that rationale, to interfere with the ongoing FBI investigation of the Watergate burglaries. Such a course would also involve the CIA in posting bail for the arrested suspects. Initially Helms made some superficial accommodation that stalled for several weeks the FBI's progress. At several meetings attended by Helms and Walters, Nixon's team referred to the Cuban [[Bay of Pigs]] fiasco, using it as if a talisman of dark secrets, as an implied threat against the integrity of CIA. Immediately, sharply, Helms turned aside this gambit.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 9–10 (Bay of Pigs), pp. 11–12 (bail), p. 283 (Nixon's team members). The White House specifically requested Helms to bring DDCI Walters with him to meetings (p. 8).</ref><ref>Powers (1979) pp. 297–311.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 520–530.</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) p. 630 (investigation stalled for "sixteen days at most").</ref>

By claiming then a [[State secrets privilege|secrecy privilege for national security]], Helms could have stopped the FBI investigation, but he decisively refused the President's repeated request for cover. [[Stansfield Turner]] (DCI under Carter) called this "perhaps the best and most courageous decision of his career". Nixon's fundamental displeasure with Helms and the CIA increased. Yet "CIA professionals remember" that Helms "stood up to the president when asked to employ the CIA in a cover-up."<ref>Turner (2005) p. 133 (quote), p. 134 (quote).</ref><ref>Helms (2003) pp. 282–283, 395.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) at 328.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) at 528–529 (the FBI chief's request to Walters, and Helms' orders to Walters).</ref><ref>''Rockefeller Report'' (1975) at 202, which states that it "found no evidence" that "officers of the Agency actively joined in the cover-up conspiracy formed by the White House staff in June 1972. There is no evidence that the Agency sought to block the FBI investigation."</ref>

[[John Dean]], Nixon's [[White House Counsel]], reportedly asked for $1 million to buy the silence of the jailed Watergate burglars. Helms in a 1988 interview stated:

<blockquote>"We could get the money. ... We didn't need to launder money—ever." But "the end result would have been the end of the agency. Not only would I have gone to jail if I had gone along with what the White House wanted us to do, but the agency's credibility would have been ruined forever."<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 321 (quote), pp. 321–322: on July 6 Helms then in Southeast Asia instructed Walters to refuse the request by [[L. Patrick Gray|Gray]] at FBI to ''put in writing'' the CIA's national security claim, thus permitting FBI to proceed with its investigation.</ref></blockquote>

For the time being, however, Helms had succeeded in distancing the CIA as far as possible from the scandal.<ref>Helms was accordingly faulted by the ''Rockefeller Report'' (1975) p. 202, which criticized "the Director's opinion that since the Agency was not involved in Watergate, it should not become involved in the Watergate investigation."</ref> Yet the Watergate scandal became a major factor (among others: the Vietnam war) in the great shift of American public opinion about the federal government: their suspicions aroused, many voters turned critical. Hence, the political role of the Central Intelligence Agency also became a subject of controversy.<ref>Powers (1979) p. 298 ("undermined the consensus of trust in Washington" and "ended the congressional acquiescence to the special intimacy between the CIA and the President" so that "Watergate in short made the CIA fair game"); pp. 330–333.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 530–533.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 327–328.</ref>