Editing Physicalism (section)

== Other views ==

=== Realistic physicalism<!--'Realistic physicalism' and 'Realistic monism' redirect here--> ===
[[Galen Strawson]]'s '''realistic physicalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> or '''realistic monism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref>[[Galen Strawson|Strawson, Galen]] (2006). "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism". ''[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]]''. Volume 13, No 10–11, Exeter, Imprint Academic pp. 3–31.</ref> is the view that physicalism entails [[panpsychism]] – or at least [[wikt:micropsychism|micropsychism]].<ref name="Strawson2006">{{cite book
|author      = Strawson, Galen
|author-link  = Galen Strawson
|title       = Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?
|publisher   = Imprint Academic
|year        = 2006
|pages       = 4, 7
|isbn        = 978-1845400590
|url         = http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/strawson_on_panpsychism.doc
|quote       = I don't define the physical as concrete reality, as concrete-reality-whatever-it-is; obviously I can't rule out the possibility that there could be other non-physical (and indeed non-spatiotemporal) forms of concrete reality. I simply fix the reference of the term 'physical' by pointing at certain items and invoking the notion of a general kind of stuff. It is true that there is a sense in which this makes my use of the term vacuous, for, relative to our universe, 'physical stuff' is now equivalent to 'real and concrete stuff', and cannot be anything to do with the term 'physical' that is used to mark out a position in what is usually taken to be a substantive debate about the ultimate nature of concrete reality (physicalism vs immaterialism vs dualism vs pluralism vs…). But that is fine by me. If it's back to Carnap, so be it.
|url-status     = live
|archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20120111170934/http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/strawson_on_panpsychism.doc
|archive-date = 2012-01-11
}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author     = Lockwood, Michael
|author-link = Michael Lockwood (philosopher)
|title      = Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound 'I'
|publisher  = Blackwell Pub
|year       = 1991
|isbn       = 978-0631180319
|pages      = [https://archive.org/details/mindbrainquantum0000lock/page/4 4, 7]
|url        = https://archive.org/details/mindbrainquantum0000lock/page/4
|url-access = registration
}}</ref><ref name="Skrbina2009">{{cite book|first=D.|last=Skrbina|year=2009|title=Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium|series=Advances in Consciousness Research|publisher=John Benjamins Publishing Company|isbn=9789027290038|lccn=2008042603|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zZU5AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA322|page=322}}</ref> Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists [are mistakenly] committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness".<ref name="Strawson2006"/> Because experiential phenomena allegedly [[Panpsychism#Non-emergentism|cannot be emergent]] from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to [[substance dualism]], [[property dualism]], [[eliminative materialism]] and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".<ref name="Strawson2006"/>
{{blockquote|Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving.  They must at least embrace ''micropsychism''. Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an 'inference to the best explanation'... Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realistic physicalists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential.  But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the big step has already been taken with micropsychism, the admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential. 'And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us' I think that the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are experiential would look like the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are spatio-temporal (on the assumption that spacetime is indeed a fundamental feature of reality). I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things. In fact (to disagree with my earlier self) it is hard to see why this view would not count as a form of dualism... So now I can say that physicalism, i.e. real physicalism, entails panexperientialism or panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of 'substance dualism'... Real physicalism, realistic physicalism, entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face.<ref name="Strawson2006"/>|[[Galen Strawson]]|''Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?''}}