Editing Otto von Bismarck (section)

===Foreign policies===
[[File:Httpdigi.ub.uni-heidelberg.dediglitklabismarck18900050a.jpg|thumb|upright=1.4|Cartoon from 1867 making fun of Bismarck's different roles, from general to minister of foreign affairs, federal chancellor, hunter, diplomat and president of the parliament of the [[Zollverein]], the Prussian-dominated German customs union]]

One of the secrets of Bismarck's success was his careful in-depth study of the national interest of all the other states. He thereby avoided the pitfall of misunderstandings that led to conflicts. Even more important he identified opportunities whereby the national interest of another state was congruent to that of Germany, and a deal could be achieved to the benefit of both.<ref>Norman Rich, "The question of national interest in Imperial German foreign policy: Bismarck, William II, and the Road to World War I" ''Naval War College Review'', (1973) 26#1 pp. 28-41 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/44641416 online at p. 30]</ref>

Summarizing Bismarck's mastery of diplomacy, [[Jonathan Steinberg (historian)|Jonathan Steinberg]] argues:
:In international relations, it meant absolutely no emotional commitment to any of the actors. Diplomacy should, he believed, deal with realities, calculations of probabilities, assessing the inevitable missteps and sudden lurches by the other actors, states, and their statesmen.  The chessboard could be overseen and it suited Bismarck's peculiar genius for politics to maintain in his head multiple possible moves by adversaries....He had his goals in mind and achieved them. He was and remained to the end master of the finely tuned game of diplomacy. He enjoyed it. In foreign affairs he never lost his temper, rarely felt ill or sleepless. He could outsmart and outplay the smartest people in other states.<ref>Steinberg, ''Bismarck,'' p. 472.</ref>

The powerful [[Imperial German Army]] was under the control of Bismarck's close ally Field Marshall [[Helmuth von Moltke the Elder]]. It was a model of professionalism although it fought no wars. The [[Imperial German Navy]] was small under Bismarck.<ref>Alfred Vagts, "Land and Sea Power in the Second German Reich." ''Journal of Military History'' 3.4 (1939): 210+ [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3038611 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716033911/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3038611 |date=16 July 2020 }}</ref>

After fifteen years of warfare in the Crimea, Germany and France, Europe began a period of peace in 1871.<ref>Albrecht-Carrié, ''A Diplomatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna'' (1958) pp 145-57.</ref><ref>Taylor, ''The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1918'' (1954) pp 201-24.</ref> With the founding of the German Empire in 1871, Bismarck emerged as a decisive figure in European history from 1871 to 1890. He retained control over Prussia and as well as the foreign and domestic policies of the new German Empire. Bismarck had built his reputation as a war-maker but changed overnight into a peacemaker. In this role, he employed [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] diplomacy to maintain Germany's position in a Europe which, despite many disputes and war scares, remained at peace. For historian [[Eric Hobsbawm]], it was Bismarck who "remained undisputed world champion at the game of multilateral diplomatic chess for almost twenty years after 1871, [and] devoted himself exclusively, and successfully, to maintaining peace between the powers".<ref>[[Eric Hobsbawm]], ''The Age of Empire: 1875–1914'' (1987),  p. 312.</ref> Historian [[Paul Knaplund]] concludes:
:A net result of the strength and military prestige of Germany combined with situations created or manipulated by her chancellor was that in the eighties Bismarck became the umpire in all serious diplomatic disputes, whether they concerned Europe, Africa, or Asia. Questions such as the boundaries of Balkan states, the treatment of [[Armenians in the Ottoman Empire|Armenians in the Turkish Empire]] and of [[History of the Jews in Romania|Jews in Rumania]], the [[Caisse de la Dette Publique|financial affairs of Egypt]], Russian expansion in the Middle East, the [[Sino-French War|war between France and China]], and the [[Scramble for Africa|partition of Africa]] had to be referred to Berlin; Bismarck held the key to all these problems.<ref>Paul Knaplund, ed. ''Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 1871–1874, 1880–1885'' (1944) p. 8 [https://archive.org/details/annualreportofth011083mbp/page/n7/mode/2up online]</ref>

Bismarck's main mistake was giving in to the Army and to intense public demand in Germany for the acquisition of the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, thereby turning France into a permanent, deeply-committed enemy (''see'' [[French–German enmity]]). [[Theodore Zeldin]] says, "Revenge and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine became a principal object of French policy for the next forty years. That Germany was France's enemy became the basic fact of international relations."<ref>Theodore Zeldin, ''France, 1848–1945: Volume II: Intellect, Taste, and Anxiety'' (1977) 2: 117.</ref> Bismarck's solution was to make France a pariah nation, encouraging royalty to ridicule its new republican status, and building complex alliances with the other major powers – Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Britain – to keep France isolated diplomatically.<ref>Carlton J. H. Hayes, ''A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900'' (1941), pp 1-2.</ref><ref>Mark Hewitson, "Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy" ''English Historical Review'' (2000) 115#462 pp. 570-606 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 in JSTOR] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200617163234/https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 |date=17 June 2020 }}</ref> A key element was the [[League of the Three Emperors]], in which Bismarck brought together rulers in Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg to guarantee each other's security, while blocking out France; it lasted 1881–1887.<ref>J. A.  Spender, ''Fifty Years of Europe: A study in pre-war documents'' (1933)  pp. 21-27</ref><ref>W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881–1887", ''Transactions of the Royal Historical Society'' Vol. 27 (1945), pp. 61-83 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180819012339/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 |date=19 August 2018 }}</ref>

====Early relations with Europe====
{{Main|International relations (1814–1919)}}
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Having unified his nation, Bismarck now devoted himself to preventing war in Europe with his skills in statesmanship. He was forced to contend with French [[revanchism]], the desire to avenge the losses of the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck, therefore, engaged in a policy of diplomatically isolating France while maintaining cordial relations with other nations in Europe. He had little interest in naval or colonial entanglements and thus avoided discord with Great Britain. Historians emphasise that he wanted no more territorial gains after 1871, and vigorously worked to form cross-linking alliances that prevented any war in Europe from starting. By 1878 both the Liberal and Conservative spokesmen in Britain hailed him as the champion of peace in Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hDiTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |title=Splendidly Victorian: Essays in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British History in Honour of Walter L. Arnstein |date=2016 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-317-24327-4 |editor-last=Shirley |editor-first=Michael H. |pages=146ff |editor-last2=Larson |editor-first2=Todd E. A. |access-date=28 August 2018 |archive-date=12 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712182202/https://books.google.com/books?id=hDiTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[A. J. P. Taylor]], a leading British diplomatic historian, concludes that, "Bismarck was an honest broker of peace; and his system of alliances compelled every Power, whatever its will, to follow a peaceful course".<ref>A.J.P. Taylor, ''Europe: Grandeur and Decline'' (1967) p. 89.</ref>

Well aware that Europe was sceptical of his powerful new Reich, Bismarck turned his attention to preserving the status quo in Europe based on a balance of power that would allow Germany's economy to flourish. Bismarck feared that a hostile combination of Austria-Hungary, France, and Russia would crush Germany. If two of them were allied, then the third would ally with Germany only if Germany conceded excessive demands. The solution was to ally with two of the three. In 1873 he formed the [[League of the Three Emperors]] (''Dreikaiserbund''), an alliance of Wilhelm, Tsar [[Alexander II of Russia]], and Emperor [[Franz Joseph I of Austria|Francis Joseph]] of Austria-Hungary. Together they would control Eastern Europe, making sure that restive ethnic groups such as the Poles were kept under control. The Balkans posed a more serious issue, and Bismarck's solution was to give Austria-Hungary predominance in the western areas, and Russia in the eastern areas. This system collapsed in 1887.<ref>Raymond James Sontag, ''European Diplomatic History: 1871–1932'' (1933) pp. 3–58.</ref><ref>W. N. Medlicott, "Bismarck and the Three Emperors' Alliance, 1881-87", ''Transactions of the Royal Historical Society'' Vol. 27 (1945), pp. 61–83 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180819012339/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678575 |date=19 August 2018 }}</ref>

In 1872, a protracted quarrel began to fester between Bismarck and Count [[Harry von Arnim]], the imperial ambassador to France. Arnim saw himself as a rival and competitor for the chancellorship, but the rivalry escalated out of hand, and Arnim took sensitive records from embassy files in Paris to back up his case. He was formally accused of misappropriating official documents, indicted, tried and convicted, finally fleeing into exile where he died. No one again openly challenged Bismarck in foreign policy matters until his resignation.<ref>George O. Kent, ''Arnim and Bismarck'' (Oxford University Press. 1968) pp 182–185.</ref>

====France====
{{Main|International relations (1814–1919)#"War in Sight" crisis of 1875}}
[[File:Otto Fürst von Bismarck.JPG|thumb|right|Bismarck {{Circa|1875}}]]

France was Bismarck's main problem. Peaceful relations with France became impossible after 1871 when Germany annexed all of the province of Alsace and much of Lorraine. Public opinion demanded it to humiliate France, and the Army wanted its more defensible frontiers. Bismarck reluctantly gave in, the French would never forget or forgive, he calculated, so might as well take the provinces. (That was a mistaken assumption—after about five years the French did calm down and considered it a minor issue.)<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mitchell |first=Allan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gQZfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT190 |title=The German Influence in France after 1870: The Formation of the French Republic |date=2018 |isbn=978-1-4696-2292-7 |page=190 |publisher=UNC Press Books |access-date=19 July 2018 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201123022/https://books.google.com/books?id=gQZfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT190 |url-status=live }}</ref> Germany's foreign policy fell into a trap with no exit. "In retrospect it is easy to see that the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a tragic mistake."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kent |first=George O. |url=https://archive.org/details/bismarckhistimes0000kent |title=Bismarck and His Times |publisher=Southern Illinois UP |date=1978 |isbn=978-0-8093-0859-0 |page=[https://archive.org/details/bismarckhistimes0000kent/page/79 79] |url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>See also {{Cite book |last=Ullrich |first=Volker |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M1grDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT57 |title=Bismarck |date=2015 |isbn=978-1-910376-24-9 |page=57 |publisher=Haus |access-date=19 July 2018 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201123026/https://books.google.com/books?id=M1grDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT57 |url-status=live }} and {{cite book|last=Clark|first=Christopher M.|title=Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947|publisher=Harvard University Press|url=https://archive.org/details/ironkingdomrised00chri|url-access=registration|date=2006|page=[https://archive.org/details/ironkingdomrised00chri/page/553 553]|isbn=978-0-674-02385-7}}</ref> Once the annexation took place the only policy that made sense was trying to isolate France, so it had no strong allies. However, France complicated Berlin's plans when it became friends with Russia. In 1905 a German plan for an alliance with Russia fell through because Russia was too close to France.<ref>John Keiger, ''France and the World since 1870'' (2001) pp 111–17.</ref>

Between 1873 and 1877, Germany repeatedly manipulated the internal affairs of France's neighbours to hurt France. Bismarck put heavy pressure on Belgium, Spain, and Italy hoping to obtain the election of liberal, anticlerical governments. His plan was to promote [[republicanism]] in France by isolating the clerical-monarchist regime of President [[Patrice de MacMahon]]. He hoped that surrounding France with liberal states would help the French republicans defeat MacMahon and his reactionary supporters.<ref name="stone281"/>

The bullying, however, almost got out of hand in mid-1875, when an editorial entitled "''Krieg-in-Sicht''" ("War in Sight") was published in a Berlin newspaper close to the government, the ''Post''. The editorial indicated that highly influential Germans were alarmed by France's rapid recovery from defeat in 1875 and its announcement of an increase in the size of its army, as well as talks of launching a preventive war against France. Bismarck denied knowing about the article ahead of time, but he certainly knew about the talk of preventive war. The editorial produced a war scare, with Britain and Russia warning that they would not tolerate a preventive war against France. Bismarck had no desire for war either, and the crisis soon blew over. It was a rare instance where Bismarck was outmanoeuvred and embarrassed by his opponents, but from that, he learned an important lesson. It forced him to take into account the fear and alarm that his bullying and Germany's fast-growing power were causing among its neighbours and reinforced his determination that Germany should work in a proactive fashion to preserve the peace in Europe, rather than passively let events take their own course and reacting to them.<ref>Lothar Gall, ''Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, Volume 2: 1871–1898'' (1986) pp. 46–48.</ref><ref>William L. Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890'' (2nd ed. 1950) pp. 44–55.</ref><ref>James Stone, ''The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the mid-1870s'' (2010)</ref><ref>Joseph V. Fuller, "The War-Scare of 1875" ''American Historical Review'' (1919) 24#2 pp. 196-226 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1835164 online]</ref>

====Italy====
Bismarck maintained good relations with [[Kingdom of Italy|Italy]], although he had a personal dislike for Italians and their country.{{Sfn|Taylor|1969|p=212}} He can be seen as a marginal contributor to [[Italian unification]]. Politics surrounding the 1866 [[Austro-Prussian War]] allowed Italy to annex [[Veneto|Venetia]], which had been a ''kronland'' ("crown land") of the Austrian Empire since the 1815 [[Congress of Vienna]]. In addition, French mobilisation for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 made it necessary for Napoleon III to withdraw his troops from Rome and the [[Papal States]]. Without these two events, Italian unification would have been a more prolonged process.

====Russia====
After [[Russian Empire|Russia]]'s victory over the [[Ottoman Empire]] in the [[Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878)|Russo-Turkish War]] of 1877–1878, Bismarck helped negotiate a settlement at the [[Congress of Berlin]]. The [[Treaty of Berlin (1878)|Treaty of Berlin]] revised the earlier [[Treaty of San Stefano]], reducing the size and sovereignty of the new [[Principality of Bulgaria]] (a pro-Russian state at that time). Bismarck and other European leaders opposed the growth of Russian influence and tried to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (see [[Eastern Question]]). As a result, Russo-German relations further deteriorated, with the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov denouncing Bismarck for compromising his nation's victory. The relationship was additionally strained due to Germany's protectionist trade policies. Some in the German military clamoured for a [[preemptive war]] with Russia; Bismarck refused, stating: "Preemptive war is like committing suicide for fear of death."{{Sfn|Retallack|2008|p=29}}

Bismarck realised that both Russia and Britain considered control of central Asia a high priority, dubbed the "[[Great Game]]". Germany had no direct stakes, however, its dominance of Europe was enhanced when Russian troops were based as far away from Germany as possible. Over two decades, 1871–1890, he manoeuvred to help the British, hoping to force the Russians to commit more soldiers to Asia.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Stone | first1 = James | date = 2015 | title = Bismarck and the Great Game: Germany and Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890 | journal = Central European History | volume = 48 | issue = 2| pages = 151–175 | doi = 10.1017/s0008938915000321 | s2cid = 146241990 }}</ref>

====Triple Alliance====
{{Main|Triple Alliance (1882)}}

The League of the Three Emperors having fallen apart, Bismarck negotiated the [[Dual Alliance (1879)|Dual Alliance]] with Austria-Hungary, in which each guaranteed the other against Russian attack. He also negotiated the [[Triple Alliance (1882)|Triple Alliance]] in 1882 with Austria-Hungary and Italy, and Italy and Austria-Hungary soon reached the "Mediterranean Agreement" with Britain. Attempts to reconcile Germany and Russia did not have a lasting effect: the Three Emperors' League was re-established in 1881 but quickly fell apart, ending Russian-Austrian-Prussian solidarity, which had existed in various forms since 1813. Bismarck therefore negotiated the secret [[Reinsurance Treaty]] of 1887 with Russia, in order to prevent the Franco-Russian encirclement of Germany. Both powers promised to remain neutral towards one another unless Russia attacked Austria-Hungary. However, after Bismarck's departure from office in 1890, the treaty was not renewed, thus creating a critical problem for Germany in the event of a war.{{citation needed|date=April 2021}}

====Colonies and imperialism====
{{Main|German colonial empire}}
[[File:Hissen der kaiserlichen Flagge auf Mioko.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.35|Hoisting the German flag at [[Duke of York Islands|Mioko]], [[German New Guinea]] in 1884]]

Bismarck had opposed colonial acquisitions, arguing that the burden of obtaining, maintaining, and defending such possessions would outweigh any potential benefit. He felt that colonies did not pay for themselves, that the German formal bureaucratic system would not work well in the easy-going tropics, and that the diplomatic disputes colonies brought would distract Germany from its central interest, Europe itself.<ref name="Strandmann1969">{{Cite journal |last=von Strandmann |first=Hartmut Pogge |date=1969 |title=Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial Expansion under Bismarck |journal=Past & Present |issue=42 |pages=140–159 |jstor=650184}}</ref> As for French designs on [[Morocco]], [[Chlodwig, Prince of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst]] wrote in his memoirs that Bismarck had told him that Germany "could only be pleased if France took possession of the country" since "she would then be very occupied" and distracted from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.<ref>Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, ''Memoirs'', W. Heinemann, 1906, p. 259.</ref> However, in 1883–1884 he suddenly reversed himself and overnight built a colonial empire in Africa and the South Pacific. The [[Berlin Conference]] of 1884–1885 organised by Bismarck can be seen as the formalisation of the [[Scramble for Africa]].

Historians have debated the exact motive behind Bismarck's sudden and short-lived move.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1988|loc=ch 10}} He was aware that public opinion had started to demand colonies for reasons of German prestige. He also wanted to undercut the anti-colonial liberals who were sponsored by the Crown Prince, who—given Wilhelm I's old age—might soon become emperor and remove Bismarck.{{Sfn|Eyck|1964|pp=273–76}}{{Sfn|Wehler|1970|pp=119–55}} Bismarck was influenced by Hamburg merchants and traders, his neighbours at Friedrichsruh. The establishment of the [[German colonial empire]] proceeded smoothly, starting with [[German New Guinea]] in 1884.<ref name="Strandmann1969" />{{Sfn|Crankshaw|1981|pp=395–97}}

[[File:Kongokonferenz.jpg|thumb|European officials staking claims to [[Africa]] in the [[Berlin Conference|Conference of Berlin]] in 1884]]

Other European nations, led by Britain and France, were acquiring colonies in a rapid fashion (see [[New Imperialism]]). Bismarck therefore made the decision to join the [[Scramble for Africa]]. [[German colonial empire|Germany's new colonies]] included [[German Togoland|Togoland]] (now [[Togo]] and part of [[Ghana]]), [[German Kamerun]] (now [[Cameroon]] and part of [[Nigeria]]), [[German East Africa]] (now [[Rwanda]], [[Burundi]], and the mainland part of [[Tanzania]]), and [[German South-West Africa]] (now [[Namibia]]). The [[Berlin Conference (1884)|Berlin Conference]] (1884–1885) established regulations for the acquisition of African colonies; in particular, it protected free trade in certain parts of the [[Congo Basin]]. Germany also acquired colonies in the Pacific, such as [[German New Guinea]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Firth |first=S. G. |date=1972 |title=The New Guinea Company, 1885–1899: A case of unprofitable imperialism |journal=Historical Studies |volume=15 |issue=59 |pages=361–377 |doi=10.1080/10314617208595478}}</ref>

[[Hans-Ulrich Wehler]] argues that his imperialistic policies were based on internal political and economic forces; they were not his response to external pressure. At first he promoted liberal goals of free trade commercial expansionism in order to maintain economic growth and social stability, as well as preserve the social and political power structure. However, he changed, broke with the liberals, and adopted tariffs to win Catholic support and shore up his political base. Germany's imperialism in the 1880s derived less from strength and instead represented Bismarck's solution to unstable industrialization. Protectionism made for unity at a time when class conflict was rising. Wehler says the chancellor's ultimate goal was to strengthen traditional social and power structures and avoid a major war.{{Sfn|Wehler|1970|pp=119–55}}

====Avoiding war====
[[File:Franz von Lenbach - Portrait of Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck - Walters 371007 - View B.jpg|thumb| [[Franz von Lenbach]]'s portrait of Bismarck in his 75th year. He is in uniform of [[Major General]] of the [[Guards Cuirassiers (Prussia)|Guards Cuirassiers]] of [[Prussia]].]]

In February 1888, during a [[Bulgarian Crisis (1885–1888)|Bulgarian crisis]], Bismarck addressed the Reichstag on the dangers of a European war:

{{blockquote|He warned of the imminent possibility that Germany will have to fight on two fronts; he spoke of the desire for peace; then he set forth the Balkan case for war and demonstrated its futility:
"Bulgaria, that little country between the [[Danube]] and the [[Balkans]], is far from being an object of adequate importance... for which to plunge Europe from Moscow to the [[Pyrenees]], and from the [[North Sea]] to [[Palermo]], into a war whose issue no man can foresee. At the end of the conflict we should scarcely know why we had fought."{{Sfn|Ludwig|1927a|p=73}}}}

Bismarck also repeated his emphatic warning against any German military involvement in Balkan disputes. Bismarck had first made this famous comment to the Reichstag in December 1876, when the Balkan revolts against the Ottoman Empire threatened to extend to a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia:

{{blockquote|Only a year later [1876], he is faced by the alternative of espousing the cause of Russia or that of Austria-Hungary. Immediately after the last crisis, in the summer of 1875, the mutual jealousies between Russia and Austria-Hungary had been rendered acute by the fresh risings in the Balkans against the Turks. Now the issues hung upon Bismarck's decision. Immediately after the peace, he had tried to paralyse the Balkan rivals by the formation of the Three Emperors' League. "I have no thought of intervening," he said privately. "That might precipitate a European war.... If I were to espouse the cause of one of the parties, France would promptly strike a blow on the other side.... I am holding two powerful heraldic beasts by their collars, and am keeping them apart for two reasons: first of all, lest they should tear one another to pieces; and secondly, lest they should come to an understanding at our expense." In the Reichstag, he popularises the same idea in the words: "I am opposed to the notion of any sort of active participation of Germany in these matters, so long as I can see no reason to suppose that German interests are involved, no interests on behalf of which it is worth our risking—excuse my plain speaking—the healthy bones of one of our [[Pomerania]]n [[musketeer]]s."{{Sfn|Ludwig|1927b|p=511}}}}

A leading diplomatic historian of the era, [[William L. Langer]] sums up Bismarck's two decades as Chancellor:
<blockquote>Whatever else may be said of the intricate alliance system evolved by the German Chancellor, it must be admitted that it worked and that it tided Europe over a period of several critical years without a rupture.... there was, as Bismarck himself said, a premium upon the maintenance of peace.<ref>William L. Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments: 1871–1890'' (2nd ed.) 1950 p. 459.</ref></blockquote>

Langer concludes:
<blockquote>His had been a great career, beginning with three wars in eight years and ending with a period of 20 years during which he worked for the peace of Europe, despite countless opportunities to embark on further enterprises with more than even chance of success.... No other statesman of his standing had ever before shown the same great moderation and sound political sense of the possible and desirable.... Bismarck at least deserves full credit for having steered European politics through this dangerous transitional period without serious conflict between the great powers."<ref>Langer, ''European Alliances and Alignments: 1871–1890'' pp. 503–504.</ref></blockquote>