Editing Neville Chamberlain (section)

==== Road to Munich (March 1938 – September 1938) ====
In March 1938, Austria became a part of Germany in the ''Anschluss''. Though the beleaguered Austrians requested help from Britain, none was forthcoming.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Britain did send Berlin a strong note of protest{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=148}} without specifying any actual action that the British government might take. In addressing the Cabinet shortly after German forces crossed the border, Chamberlain placed blame on both Germany and Austria.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Chamberlain noted,

{{blockquote| It is perfectly evident now that force is the only argument Germany understands and that "collective security" cannot offer any prospect of preventing such events until it can show a visible force of overwhelming strength backed by the determination to use it.&nbsp;... Heaven knows I don't want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately she may drive us to it.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}}}}

On 14 March, the day after the ''Anschluss'', Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons and strongly condemned the methods used by the Germans in the takeover of Austria. Chamberlain's address met with the approval of the House.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=148}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H12967, Münchener Abkommen, Chamberlain.jpg|thumb|right|Chamberlain arrives in Munich, September 1938]]
With Austria absorbed by Germany, attention turned to Hitler's obvious next target, the [[Sudetenland]] region of Czechoslovakia. With three million ethnic Germans, the Sudetenland represented the largest German population outside the ''Reich''{{sfn|Self|2006|p=302}} and Hitler began to call for the union of the region with Germany.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=156}} Britain had no military obligations toward Czechoslovakia,{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=237}} but France and Czechoslovakia had a mutual assistance pact{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} and both the French and Czechoslovaks also had an alliance with the Soviet Union. After the fall of Austria, the Cabinet's Foreign Policy Committee considered seeking a "grand alliance" to thwart Germany or, alternatively, an assurance to France of assistance if the French went to war. Instead, the committee chose to advocate that Czechoslovakia be urged to make the best terms it could with Germany.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=159–60}} The full Cabinet agreed with the committee's recommendation, influenced by a report from the chiefs of staff stating that there was little that Britain could do to help the Czechs in the event of a German invasion.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=159–60}} Chamberlain reported to an amenable House that he was unwilling to limit his government's discretion by giving commitments.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=160}}

[[Easter Accords|Britain and Italy signed an agreement]] on 16 April 1938. In exchange for ''de jure'' recognition of Italy's Ethiopian conquest, Italy agreed to withdraw some Italian "volunteers" from the Nationalist (pro-[[Francisco Franco|Franco]]) side of the [[Spanish Civil War]]. By this point, the Nationalists strongly had the upper hand in that conflict, and they completed their victory the following year.{{sfn|Smart|2010|p=234}} Later that month, the new French prime minister, [[Édouard Daladier]], came to London for talks with Chamberlain, and agreed to follow the British position on Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=162}}

In May, Czech border guards shot two Sudeten German farmers who were trying to cross the border from Germany into Czechoslovakia without stopping for border controls. This incident caused unrest among the Sudeten Germans, and Germany was then said to be moving troops to the border. In response to the report, Prague moved troops to the German border. Halifax sent a note to Germany warning that if France intervened in the crisis on Czechoslovakia's behalf, Britain might support France. Tensions appeared to calm, and Chamberlain and Halifax were applauded for their "masterly" handling of the crisis.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Though it was not known at the time, it later became clear that Germany had had no plans for a May invasion of Czechoslovakia.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=304}} Nonetheless, the Chamberlain government received strong and almost unanimous support from the British press.{{sfn|Faber|2008|p=189}}

Negotiations between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans dragged on through mid-1938.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=202–03}} They achieved little result; Sudeten leader [[Konrad Henlein]] was under private instructions from Hitler not to reach an agreement. On 3 August, Walter Runciman (by now Lord Runciman) travelled to Prague as a [[Runciman Mission|mediator]] sent by the British government.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=199–200}} Over the next two weeks, Runciman met separately with Henlein, Czechoslovak president [[Edvard Beneš]], and other leaders, but made no progress.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=211–14}} On 30 August, Chamberlain met his Cabinet and Ambassador Henderson and secured their backing—with only [[First Lord of the Admiralty]] Duff Cooper dissenting against Chamberlain's policy to pressure Czechoslovakia into making concessions, on the grounds that Britain was then in no position to back up any threat to go to war.{{sfn|Faber|2008|pp=230–34}}

Chamberlain realised that Hitler would likely signal his intentions in his 12 September speech at the annual [[Nuremberg Rally]], and so he discussed with his advisors how to respond if war seemed likely. In consultation with his close advisor [[Horace Wilson (civil servant)|Horace Wilson]], Chamberlain set out "Plan Z". If war seemed inevitable, Chamberlain would fly to Germany to negotiate directly with Hitler.{{sfn|Self|2006|p=308}}