Editing Miranda warning (section)

====Deliberate elicitation of information from the defendant by governmental agents====
Deliberate elicitation is defined as the intentional creation of circumstances by government agents that are likely to produce incriminating information from the defendant.<ref>''Illinois v. Perkins'', 496 U.S. 292 (1990).</ref> Clearly express questioning (interrogation) would qualify but the concept also extends to surreptitious attempts to acquire information from the defendant through the use of undercover agents or paid informants.{{refn|group="Note"|''Massiah'' does not prohibit the government's use of a cellmate as a "silent listening post"—a person who is simply placed in a position to hear any incriminating statements the defendant might make about the charged offense but who does not do anything to coax or induce the defendant to talk about the charged crime.<ref>Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).</ref>}}

The definition of "deliberate elicitation" is not the same as the definition of "interrogation" under the ''Miranda'' rule. ''Miranda'' interrogation includes express questioning and any actions or statements that an officer would reasonably foresee as likely to cause an incriminating response. ''Massiah'' applies to express questioning and any attempt to deliberately and intentionally obtain incriminating information from the defendant regarding the crime charged. The difference is purposeful creation of an environment likely to produce incriminating information (''Massiah'') and action likely to induce an incriminating response even if that was not the officer's purpose or intent (''Miranda'').

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific&nbsp;– the right only applies to post-commencement attempts to obtain information relating to the crime charged.<ref>''McNeil v. Wisconsin'', 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).</ref>{{refn|group="Note"|Lower federal courts has extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to factually related offenses. In Texas v. Cobb, the Supreme Court made clear that the right to counsel applied only to the crime charged and did not apply to attempts to gather information about "other offenses 'closely related factually' to the charged offense".<ref name="Texas v. Cobb 2001">''Texas v. Cobb'', 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).</ref>}} The right does not extend to uncharged offenses if factually related to the charged crime.<ref name="Texas v. Cobb 2001">''Texas v. Cobb'', 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001).</ref>

Information obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is subject to suppression unless the government can establish that the defendant waived his right to counsel. The waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.<ref>''Brewer v. Williams'', 430 U.S. 387 (1977)</ref> A valid ''Miranda'' waiver operates as a waiver of Sixth Amendment right.