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==Criticism and alternatives== ===From contemporary physicists=== [[Rudolf Peierls]], a physicist who played a major role in the [[Manhattan Project]], rejected materialism: "The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being{{nbsp}}... including knowledge and consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/vedanta/matter-undermined/articleshow/17055344.cms|website=The Economic Times|date=2 November 2012|access-date=21 June 2019|title=Matter Undermined}}</ref> [[Erwin Schrödinger]] said, "Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else."<ref>"General Scientific and Popular Papers." In ''Collected Papers'', Vol. 4. Vienna: [[Austrian Academy of Sciences]]. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg & Sohn. p. 334.</ref> [[Werner Heisenberg]] wrote: "The [[ontology]] of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct 'actuality' of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation, however, is impossible{{nbsp}}... Atoms are not things."<ref>Heisenberg, Werner. 1962. ''Physics and philosophy: the revolution in modern science''</ref> ====Quantum mechanics==== Some 20th-century physicists (e.g., [[Eugene Wigner]]<ref>{{Cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EFboCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA252 |title = Philosophical Reflections and Syntheses|isbn = 9783642783746|last1 = Wigner|first1 = Eugene Paul|date = 6 December 2012| publisher=Springer }}</ref> and [[Henry Stapp]]),<ref>[[Henry Stapp|Stapp, Henry]]. "Quantum interactive dualism - an alternative to materialism." ''[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]]''</ref> and some modern physicists and science writers (e.g., [[Stephen Barr]],<ref>{{cite web|author=John Farrell |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnfarrell/2017/01/29/a-physicist-talks-god-and-the-quantum/ |title=A Physicist Talks God And The Quantum |work=Forbes.com |date= |accessdate=2022-03-17}}</ref> [[Paul Davies]], and [[John Gribbin]]) have argued that materialism is flawed due to certain recent findings in physics, such as [[quantum mechanics]] and [[chaos theory]]. According to Gribbin and Davies (1991): {{blockquote|text=Then came our Quantum theory, which totally transformed our image of matter. The old assumption that the microscopic world of atoms was simply a scaled-down version of the everyday world had to be abandoned. Newton's deterministic machine was replaced by a shadowy and paradoxical conjunction of waves and particles, governed by the laws of chance, rather than the rigid rules of causality. An extension of the quantum theory goes beyond even this; it paints a picture in which solid matter dissolves away, to be replaced by weird excitations and vibrations of invisible field energy. Quantum physics undermines materialism because it reveals that matter has far less "substance" than we might believe. But another development goes even further by demolishing Newton's image of matter as inert lumps. This development is the theory of chaos, which has recently gained widespread attention.|author=Paul Davies and John Gribbin|title=''The Matter Myth''|source=Chapter 1: "The Death of Materialism"}} ====Digital physics==== The objections of Davies and Gribbin are shared by proponents of [[digital physics]], who view information rather than matter as fundamental. The physicist and proponent of digital physics [[John Archibald Wheeler]] wrote, "all matter and all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe."<ref>[[Wojciech H. Zurek|Zurek, Wojciech H.]], ed. 1990. "Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links." In ''Complexity, Entropy and the Physics of Information''.</ref> Some founders of quantum theory, such as [[Max Planck]], shared their objections. He wrote: {{blockquote|text=As a man who has devoted his whole life to the most clear headed science, to the study of matter, I can tell you as a result of my research about atoms this much: There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter.|author=Max Planck|source=''Das Wesen der Materie'' (1944)}} [[James Jeans]] concurred with Planck, saying, "The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter."<ref>Jeans, James. 1937. ''[[The Mysterious Universe]]''. p. 137.</ref> ===Philosophical objections=== In the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', [[Immanuel Kant]] argued against materialism in defending his [[transcendental idealism]] (as well as offering arguments against [[subjective idealism]] and [[mind–body dualism]]).<ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. (2nd ed., pp. 244–7).</ref><ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. A379, p. 352: "If, however, as commonly happens, we seek to extend the concept of dualism, and take it in the transcendental sense, neither it nor the two counter-alternatives — pneumatism [idealism] on the one hand, materialism on the other — would have any sort of basis. … Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that which underlies inner intuition, is in itself either matter or a thinking being, but a ground (to us unknown)…"</ref> But Kant argues that change and time require an enduring substrate.<ref>[http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT7 ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070206102552/http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT7|date=6 February 2007}}: "Kant argues that we can determine that there has been a change in the objects of our perception, not merely a change in our perceptions themselves, only by conceiving of what we perceive as successive states of enduring substances (see Substance)."</ref><ref>Kant, Immanuel. "The refutation of idealism." pp. 345–52 in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1st ed.), edited by [[Norman Kemp Smith|N. K. Smith]]. B274, p. 245: "All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me…"</ref> [[Postmodern]]/[[poststructuralist]] thinkers also express skepticism about any all-encompassing metaphysical scheme. Philosopher [[Mary Midgley]]<ref>[[Mary Midgley|Midgley, Mary]]. 1990. ''The Myths We Live By''.</ref> argues that materialism is a [[self-refuting idea]], at least in its [[Eliminative materialism|eliminative materialist]] form.<ref>Baker, L. 1987. ''Saving Belief''. Princeton: Princeton University Press</ref><ref>Reppert, V. 1992. "Eliminative Materialism, Cognitive Suicide, and Begging the Question." ''[[Metaphilosophy (journal)|Metaphilosophy]]'' 23:378–92.</ref><ref>Seidner, Stanley S. 10 June 2009. "A Trojan Horse: Logotherapeutic Transcendence and its Secular Implications for Theology." [[Mater Dei Institute of Education|Mater Dei Institute]]. p. 5.</ref><ref>[[Peter Boghossian|Boghossian, Peter]]. 1990. "The Status of Content." ''[[The Philosophical Review|Philosophical Review]]'' 99:157–84; and 1991. "The Status of Content Revisited." ''[[Pacific Philosophical Quarterly]]'' 71:264–78.</ref> ====Varieties of idealism==== Arguments for [[idealism]], such as those of [[Hegel]] and [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], often take the form of an argument against materialism; indeed, Berkeley's idealism was called ''[[immaterialism]]''. Now, matter can be argued to be redundant, as in [[bundle theory]], and mind-independent properties can, in turn, be reduced to subjective [[percept]]s. Berkeley gives an example of the latter by pointing out that it is impossible to gather direct evidence of matter, as there is no direct experience of matter; all that is experienced is perception, whether internal or external. As such, matter's existence can only be inferred from the apparent (perceived) stability of perceptions; it finds absolutely no evidence in direct experience.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Having an Idea of Matter: A Peircean Refutation of Berkeleyan Immaterialism|last=de Waal|first=Cornelis|author-link=Cornelis de Waal|journal=[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]|date=April 2006|volume=67|issue=2|pages=292–293, 302–303|jstor=30141879}}</ref> If matter and energy are seen as necessary to explain the physical world, but incapable of explaining mind, [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualism]] results. [[Emergence]], [[holism]] and [[process philosophy]] seek to ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of traditional (especially [[mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]]) materialism without abandoning materialism entirely.{{Citation needed|date=June 2019}} ===Materialism as methodology=== Some critics object to materialism as part of an overly skeptical, narrow or [[reductionism|reductivist]] approach to theorizing, rather than to the ontological claim that matter is the only substance. [[particle physics|Particle physicist]] and Anglican [[theology|theologian]] [[John Polkinghorne]] objects to what he calls ''promissory materialism''—claims that materialistic science will eventually succeed in explaining phenomena it has not so far been able to explain.<ref>However, critics of materialism are equally guilty of prognosticating that it will ''never'' be able to explain certain phenomena. "Over a hundred years ago [[William James]] saw clearly that science would never resolve the [[mind-body dichotomy|mind-body problem]]." [http://www.designinference.com/documents/1999.10.spiritual_machines.htm ''Are We Spiritual Machines?''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131111064335/http://www.designinference.com/documents/1999.10.spiritual_machines.htm |date=11 November 2013 }} Dembski, W.</ref> Polkinghorne prefers "[[dual-aspect monism]]" to materialism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.crosscurrents.org/polkinghorne.htm |title=Interview with John Polkinghorne |publisher=Crosscurrents.org |access-date=2013-06-24}}</ref> Some scientific materialists have been criticized for failing to provide clear definitions of matter, leaving the term ''materialism'' without any definite meaning. [[Noam Chomsky]] states that since the concept of matter may be affected by new scientific discoveries, as has happened in the past, scientific materialists are being dogmatic in assuming the opposite.<ref name="Chomsky, Noam 2000" />
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