Editing Luftwaffe (section)

===Development and equipment===
[[File:Heinkel He 177A-02 in flight 1942.jpg|left|thumb|The most troublesome of all German designs during WWII – both in development and in service – was the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|He 177]]A {{lang|de|Greif}} heavy bomber.]]
In terms of technological development, the failure to develop a long-range bomber and capable long-range fighters during this period left the Luftwaffe unable to conduct a meaningful strategic bombing campaign throughout the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|p=118}}</ref> However, Germany at that time suffered from limitations in raw materials such as oil and aluminum, which meant that there were insufficient resources for much beyond a tactical air force: given these circumstances, the Luftwaffe's reliance on tactical mid-range, twin-engined medium bombers and short-range dive-bombers was a pragmatic choice of strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Homze|1976|p=123}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|p=108}}</ref> It might also be argued that the Luftwaffe's {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader}} medium and heavy bomber wings were perfectly capable of attacking strategic targets, but the lack of capable long-range escort fighters left the bombers unable to carry out their missions effectively against determined and well-organised fighter opposition.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 282">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=282}}</ref>

The greatest failure for the {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader}}, however, was being saddled with an aircraft intended as a capable four-engined heavy bomber: the perpetually troubled Heinkel He 177, whose engines were [[Heinkel He 177#Engine difficulties|prone to catch fire]] in flight. Of the three parallel proposals from the Heinkel engineering departments for a four-engined version of the A-series He 177 [[Heinkel He 277#Trio of separate efforts|by February 1943]], one of these being [[Heinkel He 277|the Heinkel firm's ''Amerikabomber'' candidate]], only one, the [[Heinkel He 177#Further development: the Heinkel He 177B|He 177B]], emerged in the concluding months of 1943. Only three airworthy prototypes of the B-series He 177 design were produced by early 1944, by which point the [[Avro Lancaster]], the most successful RAF heavy bomber, was already in widespread service.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1978-043-02, Focke-Wulf Fw 200 C Condor.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|Arguably, one of the greatest tactical failures was the neglect of naval aviation in the western theatre, 1939–1941 (pictured is a [[Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor|Focke-Wulf Fw 200]] C Condor).]]

Another failure of procurement and equipment was the lack of a dedicated [[Naval aviation|naval air arm]]. Felmy had already expressed a desire to build a naval air arm to support {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} operations in the Atlantic and British waters. Britain was dependent on food and raw materials from its Empire and North America. Felmy pressed this case firmly throughout 1938 and 1939, and, on 31 October 1939, {{lang|de|[[Grand admiral|Großadmiral]]}} [[Erich Raeder]] sent a strongly worded letter to Göring in support of such proposals. The early-war twin-engined [[Heinkel He 115]] floatplane and [[Dornier Do 18]] [[flying boat]] were too slow and short-ranged. The then-contemporary [[Blohm & Voss BV 138]] {{lang|de|Seedrache}} ("seadragon") flying boat became the Luftwaffe's primary seaborne maritime patrol platform, with nearly 300 examples built; it had a 4,300 km (2,670 mi) maximum range. Another Blohm und Voss design of 1940, the enormous, 46-meter wingspan [[Blohm & Voss BV 222]] {{lang|de|Wiking}} maritime patrol flying boat was capable of a 6,800 km (4,200-mile) range at maximum endurance. The [[Dornier Do 217]] would have been ideal as a land-based choice but suffered production problems.{{cn|date=December 2023}} Raeder also complained about the poor standard of aerial torpedoes, although their design was the responsibility of the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}}, even considering production of the Japanese [[Type 91 torpedo#Provision of the aerial torpedo technology to Germany|Type 91 torpedo]] used in the [[Attack on Pearl Harbor]] as the {{lang|de|Lufttorpedo}} '''LT 850''' by August 1942.{{Efn| see [[Yanagi missions]] and [[Heinkel He 111 operational history#Torpedo bomber operations|Heinkel He 111 torpedo bomber operations]]}}<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=281}}</ref>

Without specialised naval or land-based, purpose-designed maritime patrol aircraft, the Luftwaffe was forced to improvise. The [[Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor]] – developed as a civilian airliner  – lacked the structural strength for combat maneuvering at lower altitudes, making it unsuitable for use as a bomber in maritime patrol duties. The Condor lacked speed, armor and bomb load capacity. Sometimes the fuselage literally "broke its back" or a wing panel dropped loose from the [[wing root]] after a hard landing. Nevertheless, it was adapted for the long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping roles and, between August 1940 and February 1941, Fw 200s sank 85 vessels for a claimed total of 363,000 GRT. Had the Luftwaffe focused on naval aviation – particularly maritime patrol aircraft with long range, Germany might well have been in a position to win the [[Battle of the Atlantic]].{{cn|date=December 2023}} However, Raeder and the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} failed to press for naval air power until the war began, mitigating the Luftwaffe's responsibility. At the same time Göring regarded any other branch of the German military developing its own aviation as an encroachment on his authority and continually frustrated the navy's attempts to build its own airpower.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 282"/>

The absence of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe, following Wever's death in 1936 and the end of the Ural bomber programme was not addressed until the authorisation of the "[[Bomber B]]" design competition in July 1939, which sought to replace the medium bomber force with which the Luftwaffe would begin the war, and the partly achieved {{lang|de|[[Schnellbomber]]}} high-speed medium bomber concept with more advanced, twin-engined high-speed bomber aircraft fitted with pairs of relatively [[Bomber B#High-output engines|"high-power" engines]] of 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) and upwards as a follow-on to the earlier {{lang|de|Schnellbomber}} project, that would also be able to function as shorter-range heavy bombers.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B19957, Edgar Petersen.jpg|thumb|upright|left|{{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Edgar Petersen]], head of the Luftwaffe's {{lang|de|Erprobungsstellen}} network of test facilities late in the war]] 

The spring 1942 {{lang|de|[[Amerikabomber]]}} programme sought to produce strategic bomber designs for the Luftwaffe to directly attack the United States from Europe or the Azores. Inevitably, both the ''Bomber B'' and {{lang|de|Amerikabomber}} programmes were victims of the continued emphasis of the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}} combined military's insistence for its Luftwaffe air arm to support the {{lang|de|Heer}} as its primary mission, and the damage to the German aviation industry from Allied bomber attacks.

====Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues====
The RLM's apparent lack of a dedicated "technical-tactical" department, that would have directly been in contact with combat pilots to assess their needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice, had never been seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the planning of the original German air arm.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287">{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=287}}</ref> The RLM did have its own ''Technisches Amt'' (T-Amt) department to handle aviation technology issues, but this was tasked with handling all aviation technology issues in Nazi Germany, both military and civilian in nature, and also not known to have ever had any clear and actively administrative and consultative links with the front-line forces established for such purposes. On the front-line combat side of the issue, and for direct contact with the German aviation firms making the Luftwaffe's warplanes, the Luftwaffe did have its own reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or {{lang|de|Erprobungstellen}} located at three coastal sites – [[Peenemünde Airfield|Peenemünde-West]] (also incorporating a separate facility in nearby [[Karlshagen]]), [[Tarnewitz test site|Tarnewitz]] and [[Priwall Peninsula|Travemünde]] – and the central inland site of [[Müritz Airpark|Rechlin]], itself first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire, with the four-facility system commanded later in World War II by {{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Edgar Petersen]]. However, due to lack of co-ordination between the RLM and the OKL, all fighter and bomber development was oriented toward short-range aircraft, as they could be produced in greater numbers, rather than quality long-range aircraft, something that put the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage [[Aircraft of the Battle of Britain#German fighter fuel capacity|as early as the Battle of Britain]].<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> The "ramp-up" to production levels required to fulfill the Luftwaffe's front-line needs was also slow, not reaching maximum output until 1944.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> 

Production of fighters was not given priority until the [[Emergency Fighter Program]] was begun in 1944; [[Adolf Galland]] commented that this should have occurred at least a year earlier.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> Galland also pointed to the mistakes and challenges made in the development of the [[Messerschmitt Me 262]] including the protracted development time required for its [[Junkers Jumo 004]] jet engines to achieve reliability. German combat aircraft types that were first designed and flown in the mid-1930s had become obsolete, yet were kept in production, in particular the Ju 87 Stuka, and the Bf 109, because there were no well-developed replacement designs.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>