Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

====Cover story====
A committee of Army, Navy, USAF, CIA, [[National Security Agency|NSA]], and [[United States State Department|State Department]] representatives created lists of priority targets for U-2 and other intelligence-gathering methods. The U-2 project received the list and drew up flight plans, and the committee provided a detailed rationale for each plan for the president to consider as he decided whether to approve it. The CIA's Photo Intelligence Division grew in size to prepare for the expected flood of U-2 photographs. Before the aircraft became operational, however, USAF's [[Project Genetrix]], which used high-altitude balloons to photograph the Soviet Union, China, and eastern Europe, led to many [[diplomatic protest]]s from those countries and for a while, CIA officials feared that the U-2 project was at risk. While Genetrix was also a technical failure—only 34 of the 516 balloons returned usable photographs—the balloon flights gave the United States many clues on how the Communist countries used radar to track overflights, which benefited the U-2 program.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=80–88}}

With approval from the [[National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics]] (NACA)'s director [[Hugh Dryden]], Bissell's team at the CIA developed a cover story for the U-2 that described the aircraft as used by NACA for high-altitude weather research; the cover story would be used if the aircraft were lost over hostile territory. U-2s flew some real weather-related missions, taking photographs that appeared in the press,{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=89–90,156–157,216}}{{r|afmag-richelson}} and sometimes had civilian government decals,<ref name="michael20120902">{{Cite web |last=Michael |first=Tal |date=2012-09-02 |title=The Israeli Air Force : Mysterious Spyplane Revealed |url=https://www.iaf.org.il/4385-39415-en/IAF.aspx |access-date=2020-06-06 |website=Israeli Air Force}}</ref> but few believed in the cover story; in May 1957 the UK's ''[[Daily Express]]'' newspaper reported the U-2 operating east of the [[Iron Curtain]].{{r|afmag-richelson}}

The civilian advisers Land and Killian disagreed with the cover story, advising that in case of an aircraft loss, the United States forthrightly acknowledge its use of U-2 overflights "to guard against surprise attack". Their advice was not followed, and the weather cover story led to the disaster that followed the May 1960 U-2 loss.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=89–90,156–157,216}}