Editing Juno Beach (section)

==Aftermath==
===Analysis===
[[File:Beny-sur-Mer radar switchboard.jpg|thumb|Corporal W. Nichorster of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals examines the telephone switchboard in the underground bunker of a German radar station at Beny-sur-Mer. Although the site was originally intended to be taken on D-Day, a series of problems delayed its capture until 11 June.]]

While the Normandy landings in all five sectors managed to establish footholds in Normandy, many D-Day objectives were not met. The [[82nd Airborne Division|82nd]] and [[101st Airborne Division|101st]] US Airborne divisions had suffered many casualties—their landings were scattered all over the dropzones—but had captured [[Sainte-Mère-Église]] to the west of Utah.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=113}} On the Cotentin Peninsula, the American [[4th Infantry Division (United States)|4th Infantry Division]] had suffered lighter casualties in securing Utah, and had established a strong bridgehead by the end of D-Day.{{sfn|Vat|2003|p=91}} Omaha had met with less success, as intact defences and high-calibre troops of the 352nd Infantry Division caused more casualties than at any of the other beaches; at one point the attack was going so badly that [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Omar Bradley]] considered withdrawing [[V Corps (United States)|V Corps]] from the beaches.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=113}}{{sfn|Vat|2003|p=93}} A second wave of attacks breached the coastal defences, but could only push {{convert|2000|yd|m|abbr=on}} inland by nightfall.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=114}} To the west of Juno, the British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division encountered only light resistance, and succeeded in advancing inland and creating a continuous front with Juno (though not with Omaha) with only 413 casualties.{{sfn|Wieviorka|2008|p=197}} To their east, the British 3rd Infantry Division established a foothold on Sword. Counter-attacks by the 21st Panzer Division in the afternoon prevented the 3rd Infantry Division from capturing Caen and from making contact with the 3rd Canadian Infantry division on Juno.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=114}} The counter-attack failed to drive the British into the sea.{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=143}}

In spite of the many casualties inflicted on the 352nd and 716th Infantry divisions, the 7th Army quickly established plans for counter-attacks. Early orders to move towards the invasion beaches were confused, as the divisions necessary for counter-attacks fell under a different jurisdiction than those defending the coast.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=61}} The panzer divisions, such as the Panzer Lehr, 12th SS Panzer and [[1 SS|2nd SS Panzer]], could not be mobilized for the coast without authorization by Hitler. The order to mobilize Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS was finally given in the mid-afternoon of 6 June.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=122}} When the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers began to advance on 7 June, they were met by dug in troops of the 716th Infantry and 21st Panzer divisions.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=64}} At 17:00, the advancing force was counter-attacked by the 12th SS, under the command of [[Kurt Meyer (soldier)|Kurt Meyer]]. The 9th Brigade was forced to withdraw to its D-Day positions, having suffered more casualties than any unit on Juno the previous day. The 7th Brigade reached its final D-Day objectives along Line Oak, while the 8th Brigade attempted to destroy German radar stations to their east, which took until 11 June.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|pp=133–134}}

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division made contact with the British from Sword on 7 June, before forming a continuous front with the American sector by 13 June. The subsequent advance on Caen and Cherbourg was slow, as a greater number of German Panzer units were concentrated near Caen and Carentan.{{sfn|Vat|2003|pp=136–137}} The Canadians captured Carpiquet Airfield during [[Operation Windsor]] on 5 July, while Anglo-Canadian forces captured Caen as part of [[Operation Charnwood]] (8–9 July) and [[Operation Atlantic]] (18–20 July).{{sfn|Roy|1984|p=50}}{{sfn|Stacey|1966|pp=163, 166}}

===Preliminary bombardment===
Military historians have generally drawn the conclusion that the preliminary aerial and naval bombardment of Juno was not as effective as had been hoped, yet differ in their opinions as to how ineffective. The aerial bombardment of Juno's defences the night before is considered to have been very ineffective, primarily because of the inclement weather. [[John Keegan]] notes that "the prevailing low, thick cloud frustrated its [Bomber Command's] efforts".{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=132}} Colonel Stacey—the official historian of the Canadian Army in the Second World War—considers the effects of the bombing runs to have been "spotty", noting that while several coastal batteries were not hit, those that were (such as the battery at Houlgate) were hit accurately.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=93}} [[Chester Wilmot]] offers a different view, suggesting that "[the coastal guns] had been accurately bombed, but had survived because they were heavily protected by the concrete casemates Rommel had insisted upon".{{sfn|Wilmot|1952|p=269}} Historians' assessment of the naval bombardment is even more mixed; while they generally agree that it failed to fully neutralize German defences on Juno, they are in disagreement as to why. Stacey suggests that while the "beach-drenching fire" was concentrated and substantial, it was both inaccurate and of insufficient firepower to destroy the coastal bunkers.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=99}} He further suggests that the effect of the drenching fire was moral rather than material, in that it forced defenders to keep below-ground and sapped their morale.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=100}} Terry Copp echoes this analysis, noting that "reasonable accuracy could not be obtained from the pitching decks of LCTs [by mounted artillery on the ships]"; the 13th Field Regiment's drenching fire fell on average {{convert|200|yd|m}} past their targets.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=45}} British historian [[Max Hastings]] notes that because of the delay in landing times by ten minutes, a substantial gap existed between the cessation of bombardment and the actual landing of the first waves of infantry, meaning that platoons of the 716th had ample time to return to their positions.{{sfn|Hastings|1984|p=105}} The bombardment of strongpoints in the towns along the coast was inconsistent; the North Shore Regiment reported that the strongpoint near Saint-Aubin "appeared not to have been touched" by bombardment, while the strongpoints facing the Canadian Scottish Regiment had been eliminated by naval bombardment before their landing.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|pp=108, 104}}

===Overall===
[[File:Group of prisoners who surrendered to Canadians in Courseulles.jpg|thumb|right|Allied soldiers guarding German prisoners on Juno]]

Despite the failure to capture any of the final D-Day objectives, the assault on Juno is considered by some—alongside Utah—the most strategically successful of the D-Day landings.{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=142}} Historians suggest a variety of reasons for this success. [[Mark Zuehlke]] notes that "the Canadians ended the day ahead of either the US or British divisions despite the facts that they landed last (a delay of half an hour due to bad weather) and that only the Americans at Omaha faced more difficulty winning a toehold on the sand".{{sfn|Zuehlke|2004|pp=345–346}} Chester Wilmot claims that the Canadian success in clearing the landing zones is attributable to the presence of amphibious DD tanks on the beaches; The DD Tanks arrival on the British beaches had been seriously disrupted by bad weather and choppy seas, and the absence of DD tanks altogether was largely responsible for the heavier casualties on Omaha, the only beach with heavier resistance than Juno.{{sfn|Wilmot|1952|pp=275, 265}} Canadian historian Terry Copp attributes the steady advance of the 7th Brigade in the afternoon to "less serious opposition" than the North Shore Regiment encountered in Tailleville.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=54}}

Despite the verdict of a successful D-Day for the 3rd CID, the failure of Canadian units to reach their final objectives has proven more disputed than the reasons for their success. Terry Copp places the blame on Keller, who committed the entirety of the 9th Brigade reserve to land on the narrower beaches of the 8th Brigade—which was itself still fighting to clear the seaside towns—after receiving reports of poor progress by the 7th Brigade.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=52}} Dutch historian [[Dan van der Vat]] notes that "the planned breakout of the 9th Brigade was held up by a huge jam of vehicles".{{sfn|Vat|2003|p=120}} Wilmot also places the blame with logistical difficulties of the landing, saying that "on the whole it was not so much the opposition in front as the congestion behind—on the beaches and in Bernières—that prevented the Canadians from reaching their final D-Day objective".{{sfn|Wilmot|1952|p=276}} Stacey offers a different view, suggesting that it was not impossible for the 3rd CID to reach its D-Day objectives, and that the failure to do so rests in the fact that "British and Canadian forces were usually better at deceiving the enemy and achieving initial success in an assault than they were at exploiting surprise and success once achieved. Perhaps they were rather too easily satisfied".{{sfn|Stacey|1966|pp=118–119}} Copp disagrees with Stacey's assessment, suggesting that such caution was not the result of poor planning but of the fact that "the British and Canadians fought the way they had been trained, moving forward to designated objectives in controlled bounds and digging in at the first sign of a counterattack". He also disputes whether the capture of the final objectives would have been strategically intelligent, observing that "if 9th Brigade had reached Carpiquet and dug in, with artillery in position to offer support, the commander of the 26th Panzer Grenadiers might have followed orders and waited until a coordinated counterattack with other divisions had been organized. Such an attack might well have done far more damage to the Allied beachhead than the hastily improvised operation actually carried out [on 7 June]".{{sfn|Copp|2004|pp=57–58}}

Stacey offers a second line of analysis on the Canadians' failure to advance to Line Oak, suggesting that difficulties encountered by the British 3rd Infantry Division on Sword caused Dempsey to halt the advance of the entire British Second Army. The British encountered heavy counterattacks by the 21st Panzer Division, which prevented the British 9th Brigade from establishing contact with the Canadians at Juno.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=116}} Copp wrote that, "Before this withdrawal [of the 21st Panzer Division] became evident, Dempsey had concluded that more armoured counter-attacks could be expected. So he ordered the three assault divisions to dig in at their second line of objectives. This decision was relayed to subordinate commanders somewhere after 19:00", just as the 9th Canadian Brigade was preparing to advance south towards Carpiquet.{{sfn|Copp|2004|pp=55–56}} Wilmot wrote that the British 3rd Infantry Division brigade commanders were overly cautious in advancing towards Caen and this slowed the Anglo-Canadian advance, especially given the reports of counter-attacks Dempsey received from Sword.{{sfn|Wilmot|1952|pp=278–279}}

===Casualties===
Predictions of the casualties on Juno had been about 2,000 men, including 600 drowned.{{sfn|Bercuson|2004|p=211}}{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=141}} The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division suffered 340 men killed, 574 wounded and 47 taken prisoner.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=112}} The Queen's Own Rifles suffered 143 casualties, the most of any battalion, the Royal Winnipegs 128, the North Shore 125 and the Regina Rifles 108.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=650}} Of the landing craft used on the run-in to Juno, 90 of 306 were lost or damaged.{{sfn|Roy|1984|p=23}} Due to the lack of records for D-Day, casualties for the German 716th Infantry Division are unknown.{{efn|Stacey notes that "the 716th Division reported that little information concerning the beach battle was available [on 6 June], observation having been hindered by smoke screens and communications disrupted ... while few of the troops who held the beach defences ever returned to report".{{sfn|Stacey|1966|p=123}}}} Of the four German battalions numbering 7,771 men before the invasion, Richter reported that the equivalent of only one battalion—at 80 per cent strength—remained.{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=141}} At least one of the two conscript battalions of the 716th was reported to have fled. Richter also reported that 80 per cent of the divisional artillery had been destroyed or captured on D-Day, while only two gun batteries were intact west of the River Orne.{{sfn|Stacey|1966|pp=123–124}} By 9 June, the division had been reduced to a [[Battlegroup (army)|battlegroup]] of 292 officers and men.{{sfn|Keegan|1982|p=141}}