Editing James Longstreet (section)

====July 1–2====
{{main|Battle of Gettysburg, second day}}
[[File:Gettysburg Battle Map Day2.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Gettysburg, July 2 {{legend|#ff0000|Confederate}}{{legend|#0000ff|Union}}|alt=Map with lines and arrows showing troops movements]]
Longstreet's actions at the [[Battle of Gettysburg]] would become the centerpiece of lasting controversy.<ref>Sears, Stephen W. "[http://americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/1/2005_1_46.shtml General Longstreet and the American Cause] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081120004214/http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/1/2005_1_46.shtml |date=2008-11-20 }}" ''American Heritage'', Feb/March 2005.</ref> Longstreet arrived on the battlefield at about 4:30p.m on the first day, July 1, 1863, hours ahead of his troops. Lee had not intended to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and decisions by A.P. Hill, whose troops were the first to be engaged, brought on the confrontation. The battle on the first day was a strong Confederate victory. Two Union corps had been driven by Ewell and Hill from their positions north of Gettysburg back through the town into defensive positions on the heights to the south. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the Union defensive position on elevated ground and advocated a strategic movement around their left flank, to "secure good ground between him and his capital", which would presumably compel Meade to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates.{{sfn|Piston|1987|p=51}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=346–361}}{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=360–361}} Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, I will attack him." Longstreet replied, "If he is there tomorrow it is because he wants you to attack."{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=358}} Lee, energized by the success of his army that day, again refused. Longstreet suggested an immediate assault on the federal positions, but Lee insisted on waiting for Hood and McLaws, who were marching towards Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Pike. Longstreet sent a courier down the Cashtown Road to hurry them along. They eventually bivouacked about four miles (6.4&nbsp;km) behind the lines. Pickett was performing rearguard duty in [[Cashtown, Pennsylvania|Cashtown]] and would not be ready to move until morning. A major blunder occurred when Ewell failed to seize the heights on [[Cemetery Hill]] after being ordered to do so "if practicable" by Lee.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=258–261; 267}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|p=165}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=259}}

Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left flank, to be followed by Hill's attack on [[Cemetery Ridge]] near the center, while Ewell demonstrated on the Union right. Longstreet again argued for a flanking maneuver around the Union left, but Lee rejected his plan. Longstreet was not ready to attack as early as Lee envisioned. He received permission from Lee to wait for [[Alabama Brigade (American Civil War)|Law's brigade]] of Hood's division to reach the field before advancing. Law marched his men quickly, covering {{convert|28|mi}} in eleven hours, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march column some distance from their designated positions.{{sfn|Fuller|1957|p=198}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=260–261}} Longstreet's soldiers were forced to take a long detour while approaching the enemy position, misled by inadequate reconnaissance that failed to identify a completely concealed route.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=378–379}}

Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle.{{sfn|Dickson|2000|p=1215}} Early and [[William N. Pendleton]] testified that Lee had ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise and that Longstreet disobeyed. This claim was factually untrue and denied by Lee's staff officers [[Walter H. Taylor]] and [[Charles Marshall (colonel)|Charles Marshall]].{{sfn|Connelly|Bellows|1982|p=34}} Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his formal order for the attack until 11 A.M. Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders to launch an attack. Sorrel writes that Longstreet, unenthusiastic about the attack, displayed lethargy in bringing his troops forward. While Lee expected an attack around noon, Longstreet was not ready until 4 P.M. Meade used the time to bring more of his troops forward.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=268}}{{sfn|Hattaway|Jones|1983|pp=406–407}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=166–168}} Campaign historian Edwin Coddington presents the approach to the federal positions as "a comedy of errors such as one might expect of inexperienced commanders and raw militia, but not of Lee's 'War Horse' and his veteran troops".{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=378–380}}

Hood opposed an attack on the Union left, arguing that the Union position was too strong, and proposed that his troops be moved to the right near [[Big Round Top]] and hit the Union in the rear. Longstreet insisted that Lee had rejected this plan and ordered him to make the assault against the front of the enemy lines.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=355; 368}}{{sfn|Alexander|1989|p=237}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|p=169}} Once the assault began at around 4&nbsp;pm, Longstreet pressed McLaws and Hood strongly against heavy Union resistance.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|pp=206–207}} Longstreet personally led the attack on horseback. Union Major General [[Daniel Sickles]], commanding the III Corps, had, contrary to Meade's orders, marched his men to the [[The Peach Orchard|Peach Orchard]], an exposed position well in front of the main Union lines. R.H. Anderson's division of Hill's corps, alongside McLaws' division and part of the division of Hood, launched a ferocious assault against Sickles with heavy artillery support which, after extremely intense fighting, pushed his corps back to the main Union lines. The Confederates were eventually repulsed after encountering fierce resistance from Union reinforcements. General Hood was wounded and replaced in command of his division by Law. Brigade commanders Barksdale and [[Paul Jones Semmes]], both under McLaws, were mortally wounded. Law's brigade attempted to carry [[Little Round Top]], a hill on the far left of the Union lines. The hill had originally been without troops before Union Brigadier General [[Gouverneur K. Warren]], Chief of Engineers, taking advantage of the Confederate delay, sent soldiers from the V Corps to fortify it. Confederate troops took the part of the hill known as [[Devil's Den]], but were unable to drive off Union forces at the top of the hill.{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=168–169}}{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=237–241}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=368–374}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=273–278}} The attacks had failed, and Longstreet's corps suffered more than 4,000 casualties.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=278–279}} Contributing to Longstreet's failure was the fact that his attacks did not occur simultaneously with those of A.P. Hill and Ewell. Large portions of Hill's and Ewell's corps, including soldiers who had seen significant action the day before, were unengaged, and Meade was able to shift [[Thomas H. Ruger]]'s division from Ewell's front to oppose Longstreet.{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=242–243}}