Editing Immanuel Kant (section)

====Dialectical inferences of pure reason====
In the second of the two Books of "The Transcendental Dialectic", Kant undertakes to demonstrate the contradictory nature of unbounded reason. He does this by developing contradictions in each of the three metaphysical disciplines that he contends are in fact pseudosciences. This section of the ''Critique'' is long and Kant's arguments are extremely detailed. In this context, it not possible to do much more than enumerate the topics of discussion. The first chapter addresses what Kant terms the ''paralogisms''{{mdash}}i.e., false inferences{{mdash}}that pure reason makes in the metaphysical discipline of rational psychology. He argues that one cannot take the mere thought of "I" in the proposition "I think" as the proper cognition of "I" as an object. In this way, he claims to debunk various metaphysical theses about the substantiality, unity, and self-identity of the soul.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc=§2(g.i)}} The second chapter, which is the longest, takes up the topic Kant calls the [[Kant's antinomies|''antinomies of pure reason'']]{{mdash}}that is, the contradictions of reason with itself{{mdash}}in the metaphysical discipline of rational cosmology. Originally, Kant had thought that all transcendental illusion could be analyzed in [[Antinomy|antinomic terms]].{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=16}} He presents four cases in which he claims reason is able to prove opposing theses with equal plausibility:

# That "reason seems to be able to prove that the universe is both finite and infinite in space and time";
# that "reason seems to be able to prove that matter both is and is not infinitely divisible into ever smaller parts";
# that "reason seems to be able to prove that free will cannot be a causally efficacious part of the world (because all of nature is deterministic) and yet that it must be such a cause"; and,
# that "reason seems to be able to prove that there is and there is not a necessary being (which some would identify with God)".{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.ii)}}{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=16–17}}

Kant further argues in each case that his doctrine of transcendental idealism is able to resolve the antinomy.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.ii)}} The third chapter examines fallacious arguments about God in rational theology under the heading of the "Ideal of Pure Reason". (Whereas an ''idea'' is a pure concept generated by reason, an ''ideal'' is the concept of an idea as an ''individual thing''.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=17}}) Here Kant addresses and claims to refute three traditional arguments for the existence of God: the [[ontological argument]], the [[cosmological argument]], and the [[argument from design|physio-theological argument]] (i.e., the argument from design).{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc=§2(g.iii)}} The results of the transcendental dialectic so far appear to be entirely negative. In an Appendix to this section, Kant rejects such a conclusion. The ideas of pure reason, he argues, have an important ''regulatory'' function in directing and organizing our theoretical and practical inquiry. Kant's later works elaborate upon this function at length and in detail.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=18}}