Editing Hugo Black (section)

===Due process clause===
Justice Black was well known for his rejection of the doctrine of [[substantive due process]]. Most Supreme Court Justices accepted the view that the due process clause encompassed not only procedural guarantees, but also "fundamental fairness" and fundamental rights. Thus, it was argued that due process included a "substantive" component in addition to its "procedural" component.{{citation needed|date=August 2022}}

Black, however, believed that this interpretation of the due process clause was unjustifiably broad. In his dissent to ''[[Griswold v. Connecticut|Griswold]]'', he charged that the doctrine of substantive due process "takes away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom, and transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination".<ref name="GriswoldvConnecticut"/> Instead, Black advocated a much narrower interpretation of the clause. In his dissent to ''[[In re Winship]]'', he analyzed the history of the term "due process of law", and concluded: "For me, the only correct meaning of that phrase is that our Government must proceed according to the 'law of the land'—that is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court decisions."<ref name="caselaw.lp.findlaw.com">{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=397&invol=358|title=FindLaw's United States Supreme Court case and opinions.|website=Findlaw|access-date=February 18, 2006|archive-date=June 17, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060617004534/http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=397&invol=358|url-status=live}}</ref>

Black's view on due process drew from his reading of British history; to him, due process meant all persons were to be tried in accordance with the Bill of Rights' procedural guarantees and in accordance with constitutionally pursuant laws. Black advocated equal treatment by the government for all persons, regardless of wealth, age, or race. Black's view of due process was restrictive in the sense that it was premised on equal ''procedures''; it did not extend to ''substantive'' due process. This was in accordance with Black's literalist views.<ref name="Ball (2006)" />{{rp|116–117}} Black did not tie procedural due process exclusively to the Bill of Rights, but he did tie it exclusively to the Bill of Rights combined with other explicit provisions of the Constitution.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wiecek |first=William |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eaAivaq6zVAC&pg=PA517 |title=The birth of the modern Constitution: the United States Supreme Court, 1941–1953 |page=517 |year=2006 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521848206 |access-date=February 19, 2016 |archive-date=January 14, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140114052728/http://books.google.com/books?id=eaAivaq6zVAC&pg=PA517 |url-status=live }}</ref>

None of Black's colleagues shared his interpretation of the due process clause. His chief rival on the issue (and on many other issues) was [[Felix Frankfurter]], who advocated a substantive view of due process based on "natural law"—if a challenged action did not "shock the conscience" of the jurist, or violate British concepts of fairness, Frankfurter would find no violation of due process of law. [[John M. Harlan II]] largely agreed with Frankfurter, and was highly critical of Black's view, indicating his "continued bafflement at{{nbsp}}... Black's insistence that due process{{nbsp}}... does not embody a concept of fundamental fairness" in his ''Winship'' concurrence.<ref name="caselaw.lp.findlaw.com"/>