Editing History of Uzbekistan (section)

==The 1980s==
Moscow's control over Uzbekistan weakened in the 1970s as Uzbek party leader Sharaf Rashidov brought many cronies and relatives into positions of power. In the mid-1980s, Moscow attempted to regain control by again purging the entire Uzbek party leadership. However, this move increased Uzbek nationalism, which had long resented Soviet policies such as the imposition of cotton monoculture and the suppression of Islamic traditions.

===Perestroika and Glasnost===
{{Main|History of the Soviet Union (1982–1991)|Perestroika|Glasnost}}
In the late 1980s, the liberalized atmosphere of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (in power 1985–91) fostered political opposition groups and open (albeit limited) opposition to Soviet policy in Uzbekistan. In 1989 a series of violent ethnic clashes involving Uzbeks brought the appointment of ethnic Uzbek outsider [[Islam Karimov]] as Communist Party Chief. When the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan reluctantly approved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Karimov became president of the Republic of Uzbekistan.<ref name=cp/>

During the decade following the death of Rashidov, Moscow attempted to regain the central control over Uzbekistan that had weakened in the previous decade. In 1986 it was announced that almost the entire party and government leadership of the republic had conspired in falsifying cotton production figures. Eventually, Rashidov himself was also implicated (posthumously) together with [[Yuri Churbanov]], Brezhnev's son-in-law. A massive purge of the Uzbek leadership was carried out, and corruption trials were conducted by prosecutors brought in from Moscow. In the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan became synonymous with corruption. The Uzbeks themselves felt that the central government had singled them out unfairly; in the 1980s, this resentment led to a strengthening of Uzbek nationalism. Moscow's policies in Uzbekistan, such as the strong emphasis on cotton and attempts to uproot [[Islamic]] tradition, then came under increasing criticism in Tashkent.<ref name=1980s>Lubin, Nancy. "The 1980s". In Curtis.</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=January 2014}}

In 1989 ethnic animosities came to a head in the [[Fergana Valley]], where local [[Meskhetian Turks]] [[Fergana massacre|were assaulted]] by Uzbeks, and in 1990 in the Kyrgyz city of [[Osh]] [[Osh riots (1990)|Uzbek and Kyrgyz youth clashed]].

===Priority over Soviet Union laws and negotiations on a new Treaty===
{{Main|Parade of sovereignties|War of Laws|New Union Treaty}}
Moscow's response to this violence was a reduction of the purges and the appointment of [[Islam Karimov]] as first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The appointment of Karimov, who was not a member of the local party elite, signified that Moscow wanted to lessen tensions by appointing an outsider who had not been involved in the purges.<ref name=1980s/>

Resentment among Uzbeks continued to smolder, however, in the liberalized atmosphere of Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]]'s policies of [[perestroika]] and [[glasnost]]. With the emergence of new opportunities to express dissent, Uzbeks expressed their grievances over the cotton scandal, the purges, and other long-unspoken resentments. These included the environmental situation in the republic, recently exposed as a catastrophe as a result of the long emphasis on heavy industry and a relentless pursuit of cotton. Other grievances included discrimination and persecution experienced by Uzbek recruits in the Soviet army and the lack of investment in industrial development in the republic to provide jobs for the ever-increasing population.<ref name=1980s/>

By the late 1980s, some dissenting intellectuals had formed political organizations to express their grievances. The most important of these, [[Unity (Uzbekistan)|Birlik]] (Unity), initially advocated the diversification of agriculture, a program to salvage the desiccated [[Aral Sea]], and the declaration of the Uzbek language as the state language of the republic. Those issues were chosen partly because they were real concerns and partly because they were a safe way of expressing broader disaffection with the Uzbek government. In their public debate with Birlik, the government and party never lost the upper hand. As became especially clear after the accession of Karimov as party chief, most Uzbeks, especially those outside the cities, still supported the communist party and the government. Birlik's intellectual leaders never were able to make their appeal to a broad segment of the population.<ref name=1980s/>