Editing Hafez al-Assad (section)

==Premiership and presidency: 1970–2000==
{{main|Presidency of Hafez al-Assad}}
[[File:General Hafez al-Assad in 1970, during the Syrian Corrective Revolution.jpg|thumb|289x289px|General Hafez al-Assad in 1970]]

===Domestic events and policies===

====Consolidating power====
{{main|Corrective Movement (Syria)}}
According to Patrick Seale, Assad's rule "began with an immediate and considerable advantage: the government he displaced was so detested that any alternative came as a relief".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=169}} He first tried to establish national unity, which he felt had been lost under the leadership of Aflaq and Jadid.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=170}} Assad differed from his predecessor at the outset, visiting local villages and hearing citizen complaints.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=170}} The Syrian people felt that Assad's rise to power would lead to change;{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=190}} one of his first acts as ruler was to visit [[Sultan al-Atrash]], father of the Aflaqite Ba'athist Mansur al-Atrash, to honor his efforts during the [[Arab Revolt|Great Arab Revolution]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=170}} He made overtures to the Writers' Union, rehabilitating those who had been forced underground, jailed or sent into exile for representing what radical Ba'athists called the [[Reactionary|reactionary classes]]:{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=170}} "I am determined that you shall no longer feel strangers in your own country."{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=170}} Although Assad did not democratize the country, he eased the government's repressive policies.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} Assad was approved as president in a referendum on 12 March 1971 and was formally inaugurated on 14 March.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/syria-1946-present/ | title=24. Syria (1946-present) }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1971/03/14/archives/syrian-voters-back-assad-as-president.html | title=Syrian Voters Back Assad as President | work=The New York Times | date=14 March 1971 }}</ref>

He cut prices for basic foodstuffs 15 percent, which won him support from ordinary citizens.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} Jadid's security services were purged, some military criminal investigative powers were transferred to the police, and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} Restrictions on travel to and trade with Lebanon were eased, and Assad encouraged growth in the [[private sector]].{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} While Assad supported most of Jadid's policies, he proved more pragmatic after he came to power.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}}
[[File:Syrian general Hafez Assad soon after his "Corrective movement".jpg|left|thumb|Assad soon after the coup.]]
Most of Jadid's supporters faced a choice: continue working for the Ba'ath government under Assad, or face repression.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} Assad made it clear from the beginning "that there would be no second chances".{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} However, later in 1970, he recruited support from the Ba'athist old guard who had supported Aflaq's leadership during the 1963–1966 power struggle.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} An estimated 2,000 former Ba'athists rejoined the party after hearing Assad's appeal, among them party ideologist Georges Saddiqni and Shakir al-Fahham, a secretary of the founding, 1st National Congress of the Ba'ath Party in 1947.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=171}} Assad ensured that they would not defect to the pro-Aflaqite Ba'ath Party in Iraq with the Treason Trials in 1971, in which he prosecuted Aflaq, Amin al-Hafiz and nearly 100 followers (most ''[[trial in absentia|in absentia]]'').{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=175}} The few who were convicted were not imprisoned long, and the trials were primarily symbolic.{{sfn|Seale|1990|p=175}}

At the 11th National Congress, Assad assured party members that his leadership was a radical change from that of Jadid, and he would implement a "corrective movement" to return Syria to the true "nationalist socialist line".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=61}} Unlike Jadid, Assad emphasised "the advancement of which all resources and manpower [would be] mobilised [was to be] the liberation of the occupied territories".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=61}} This would mark a major break with his predecessors and would, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, dictate "major alterations in the course of the Ba'thist state".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=61}}

====Institutionalization====
[[File:The first inauguration of President Hafez al-Assad in Parliament - March 1971.jpg|thumb|alt=Large group of men sitting in rows|Assad's first inauguration as president in the People's Council, March 1971. L–R: Assad, Abdullah al-Ahmar, Prime Minister [[Abdul Rahman Khleifawi]], Assistant Regional Secretary Mohamad Jaber Bajbouj, Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam and People's Council Speaker Fihmi al-Yusufi. In the third civilian row are Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass (MP in the 1971 Parliament) and Air Force Commander Naji Jamil. Behind Tlass is Rifaat al-Assad, Assad's younger brother. On the far right in the fourth row is future vice president [[Zuhair Masharqa]], and behind Abdullah al-Ahmar is Deputy Prime Minister [[Mohammad Haidar]].]]
Assad turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=63}} In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military [[Leninism]];{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=63}} Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=63}} According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Assad's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=63}}

Assad institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} The state-sponsored [[cult of personality]] became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=57}}{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}}

While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=69}} those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=69}} None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=69}} General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Assad's handling of the [[Islamist uprising in Syria|Islamist uprising]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=69}} The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=72}} Joint sessions of these bodies resembled [[politburo]]s in [[socialist states|socialist states which espoused communism]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=72}} Assad headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=72}} The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=72}} As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=74}} The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the ''de jure'' superior body—but the Regional Congress had ''de facto'' authority.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=72–73}} The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the [[Comintern]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=73}} It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's [[foreign policy]] and party ideology.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=73}} The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Assad.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=73}} In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker [[National Progressive Front (Syria)|National Progressive Front]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=74}}

====Economy====
[[File:Tabaqah assad.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Satellite photo of lake and dam|Tabqa Dam (center), built-in 1974]]
Assad called his domestic reforms a corrective movement, and it achieved some results. He tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the [[Tabqa Dam]] on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake al-Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.{{sfn|Reich|1990|p=56}}

By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Assad's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Assad's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.{{sfn|Reich|1990|pp=59–60}}
[[File:Syrian president Hafez Assad image.jpg|thumb|Assad in 1978.]]
During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Assad's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Assad's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8&nbsp;million in goods during its first week.{{sfn|Olmert|1986|pp=683–684}}

The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Assad's government liberalised the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Assad's government did not privatize state-owned companies.{{sfn|Zisser|1995|pp=728–729}}

Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was [[statism]] in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Assad's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|pp=598–599}}

Assad's government tried to decrease population growth, but this was only marginally successful. One sign of economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on an agreement. The main cause of this failure was the country's difficulty in meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernised it would not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Assad's government gave civil servants a 20-percent pay raise on the anniversary of the corrective movement that brought him to power. Although the foreign press criticised Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy, Assad's government refused to modernize the bank system, permit private banks and open a stock exchange.{{sfn|Zisser|2002|p=599}}

====Sectarianism====
[[File: Hafez al-Assad and his top officials in 1971.png|thumbnail|alt=Four men in suits|Hafez in 1971 with Sunni members of the political elite: (L–R) Ahmad al-Khatib, Assad, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass]]
[[File:President Hafez al-Assad of Syria greets President Nixon on his arrival at Damascus airport - NARA - 194584.tif|thumb|Assad greeting [[Richard Nixon]] on the latter's arrival at [[Damascus Airport]], 15 July 1974]]
When Assad came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Assad "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections; [[Rifaat al-Assad]] controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's brother-in-law [[Adnan Makhlouf]] was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=65}} Other prominent figures were [[Ali Haydar (Syrian army officer)|Ali Haydar]] (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head), [[Muhammad al-Khuli]] (head of Assad's [[Air Force Intelligence Directorate]] from 1970 to 1987) and Military Intelligence head [[Ali Duba]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=65–66}} Assad controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals [[Shafiq Fayadh]] (commander of the 3rd Division), [[Ibrahim Safi]] (commander of the 1st Division) and [[Adnan Badr Hassan]] (commander of the 9th Division).{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} During the 1990s, Assad further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General [[Hikmat al-Shihabi]] with General [[Ali Aslan]] as chief of staff.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} [[Anti-Sunnism|Anti-Sunni]] orientation of his Alawite regime also pushed Assad to pursue closer relations with [[Shia Islam|Shia]] Iran.{{Sfn|Lüthi|2020|p=507}}

During the early years of his rule, some of Assad's elite had appeared non-sectarian;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were [[Abdul Halim Khaddam]], Shihabi, Naji Jamil, [[Abdullah al-Ahmar]] and [[Mustafa Tlass]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=66}} However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Assad.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Assad's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Assad or the Alawite-dominated security system.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence).{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} After the failed Islamst uprising, Assad's reliance on his relatives intensified;{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=226}} A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast."{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}} Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=227}}

=== Islamist uprising ===
{{main|Islamist uprising in Syria}}
[[File:Gaddafi-Boumedienne-Assad-1977-Tripolis.jpg|thumb|200x200px|Assad, Algerian President Houari Boumediene and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1977]]
[[File:1979-14-august.-Vizita-in-R.A.-Siriana.-Inmanarea-albumului-orasului-Kuneitra-1024x700.jpg|thumb|Hafez al-Assad alongside [[Socialist Republic of Romania|Romanian]] President [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] in 1979]]

==== Background ====
Assad's pragmatic policies indirectly led to the establishment of a "new class",{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} and he accepted this while it furthered his aims against [[Israel]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} When Assad began pursuing a policy of [[economic liberalization]], the state bureaucracy began using their positions for personal gain.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=85}} The state gave implementation rights to "much of its development program to foreign firms and contractors, fueling a growing linkage between the state and private capital".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} What ensued was a spike in corruption, which led the political class to be "thoroughly [[bourgeoisie|embourgeoised]]".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The channeling of external money through the state to private enterprises "created growing opportunities for state elites' self-enrichment through corrupt manipulation of state-market interchanges. Besides outright embezzlement, webs of shared interests in commissions and kickbacks grew up between high officials, politicians, and business interests".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=86}} The Alawite military-security establishment got the greatest share of the money;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} the Ba'ath Party and its leaders ruled a new class, defending their interests instead of those of peasants and workers (whom they were supposed to represent).{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|pp=86–89}} This, coupled with growing Sunni disillusionment with what Hinnebusch calls "the regime's mixture of statism, rural and sectarian favouritism, corruption and new inequalities", fueled the growth of the Islamic movement.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=89}} Because of this, the [[Muslim Brotherhood of Syria]] became the vanguard of anti-Ba'athist forces.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}

The Brotherhood had historically been a vehicle for Islamism during its introduction to the Syrian political scene during the 1960s under the leadership of [[Mustafa al-Siba'i]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} After Siba'i's imprisonment, under [[Isam al-Attar]]'s leadership the Brotherhood developed into the ideological antithesis of Ba'athist rule.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} However, the Ba'ath Party's organizational superiority worked in its favor;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} with Attar's enforced exile, the Muslim Brotherhood was in disarray.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} It was not until the 1970s that the Muslim Brotherhood established a clear, central collective authority for its organization under Adnan Saad ad-Din, [[Sa'id Hawwa]], [[Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni]] and Husni Abu.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}} Because of their organizational capabilities, the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] grew tenfold from 1975 to 1978 (from 500 to 700 in Aleppo); nationwide, by 1978 it had 30,000 followers.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=90}}

==== Events ====
[[File:Hafez al Assad portrait.jpg|left|thumb|Assad in early 1980s]]The Islamist uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=94}} As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by [[Mahmoud al-Ayyubi]]) began.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=94}} The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The party leadership—with the exception of Assad and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} With Assad's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean [[Abdul Rauf al-Kasm]]) was established with new, young technocrats.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}}
[[File:After Hama Massacre 23.jpg|thumb|Hama devastation after bombardment by the Syrian army.]]

Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo;{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} the attacks became urban [[guerrilla warfare]].{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=95}} Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Assad's life in June 1980,{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} and began responding to the uprising with [[state terrorism]] later that year.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} Under Rifaat al-Assad, Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a [[death squad]] to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} The military court began condemning captured prisoners, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings".{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters,{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} and violence was met with violence.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}}
[[File:After Hama Massacre 18.jpg|thumb|Destruction in Hama in 1982. The inscription left by Syrian forces reads: "There is no god but the Motherland, there is no messenger but Ba'ath".]]
Ultimately this culminated in the [[1982 Hama massacre]]{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=96}} when the government crushed the uprising.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=97}} After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Assad came to power.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}} The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}} The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Assad's position as undisputed leader of Syria.{{sfn|Hinnebusch|2001|p=98}}

=== {{anchor|The Succession Crisis of 1983–1984}}1983–1984 succession crisis ===
{{Main|1984 Syrian coup attempt}}
In November 1983 Assad, a [[Diabetes|diabetic]],{{Sfn|Collelo|1987}} had a heart attack complicated by [[phlebitis]]; this triggered a succession crisis.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=232}} On 13 November, after visiting his brother in the hospital,{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=230}} Rifaat al-Assad reportedly announced his candidacy for president; he did not believe Assad would be able to continue ruling the country.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=232}} When he did not receive support from Assad's inner circle, he made, in the words of historian [[Hanna Batatu]], "abominably lavish" promises to win them over.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=232}}[[File:Hafez Assad rifaat Assad.jpg.webp|thumb|305px|Hafez al-Assad (''r'') with his brother [[Rifaat al-Assad]] during a military ceremony in [[Damascus]], 1984. Rifaat launched a failed coup attempt the same year, resulting in his expulsion from [[Syria]].]]Until his 1985 ouster, Rifaat al-Assad was considered the face of corruption by the Syrian people.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=230}} Although highly paid as Commander of [[Defense Companies (Syria)|Defense Companies]], he accumulated unexplained wealth.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=230}} According to Batatu, "there is no way that he could have permissibly accumulated the vast sums needed for the investments he made in real estate in Syria, Europe and the United States".{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=230}}

Although it is unclear if any top officials supported Rifaat al-Assad, most did not.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=233}} He lacked his brother's stature and charisma, and was vulnerable to charges of corruption.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=233}} His 50,000-strong Defense Companies were viewed with suspicion by the upper leadership and throughout society;{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=233}} they were considered corrupt, poorly disciplined and indifferent to human suffering.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=233}} Rifaat al-Assad also lacked military support;{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=233}} officers and soldiers resented the Defense Companies' monopoly of Damascus' security, their separate intelligence services and prisons and their higher pay.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|pp=233–234}} He did not abandon the hope of succeeding his brother, opting to take control of the country through his post as Commander of Defense Companies.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} In what became known as the "poster war", personnel from the Defense Companies replaced posters of Assad in Damascus with those of Rifaat al-Assad.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} The security service, still loyal to Hafez, responded by replacing Rifaat al-Assad's posters with Hafez's.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} The poster war lasted for a week until Assad's health improved.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}}

Shortly after the poster war, all of Rifaat al-Assad's proteges were removed from positions of power.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} This decree nearly sparked a clash between the Defense Companies and the [[Republican Guard (Syria)|Republican Guard]] on 27 February 1984, but conflict was avoided by Rifaat al-Assad's appointment as one of three [[Vice President of Syria|Vice Presidents]] on 11 March.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} He acquired this post by surrendering his position as Commander of Defense Companies to a Hafez supporter.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} Rifaat al-Assad was succeeded as Defense Companies head by his son-in-law.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} During the night of 30 March, Rifaat ordered Defense Company loyalists to seal Damascus off and advance to the city.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=234}} The Republican Guard was put on alert in Damascus, and 3rd Armored Division commander [[Shafiq Fayadh]] ordered troops outside Damascus to encircle the Defense Companies blocking the roads into the city.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=235}} Rifaat al-Assad's plan might have succeeded if Special Forces commander [[Ali Haydar (Syrian army officer)|Ali Haydar]] supported him, but Haydar sided with the president.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=235}} Assad punished Rifaat al-Assad with exile, allowing him to return in later years without a political role.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=235}} The Defense Companies were reduced by 30,000–35,000 men,{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=236}} and their role was assumed by the Republican Guard.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=236}} Makhluf, the Republican Guard commander was promoted to major general, and Hafez's son [[Bassel al-Assad]], then an army major, became influential in the guard.{{sfn|Batatu|1999|p=236}}