Editing Gerd von Rundstedt (section)

===Ardennes Offensive===
Hitler, however, had no intention of staying on the defensive in the west over the winter. As early as mid-September he was planning a counter-offensive.{{Sfn|McCarthy|Syron|2003|p=221}} By October, with the front stabilising, he had decided on an [[Battle of the Bulge|attack in the Ardennes]], designed to split the British and American fronts at a weakly held point, cross the Meuse and recapture Antwerp. On 27 October Rundstedt and Model met with General [[Alfred Jodl]], chief of operations at OKW, and told him flatly that they considered this impossible with the available forces. Instead they suggested a more modest operation to destroy the Allied concentrations around Liège and Aachen. Jodl took their views back to Hitler, but on 3 November he told them that the Führer's mind was made up, and that he wanted the attack to begin before the end of November. The spearhead was to be the [[6th Panzer Army]], commanded by Sepp Dietrich and largely made up of Waffen-SS units such as the {{lang|de|Leibstandarte}}, {{lang|de|[[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|Das Reich]]}} and {{lang|de|[[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend|Hitlerjugend]]}}, and the [[5th Panzer Army]], commanded by General [[Hasso von Manteuffel]].

Model persuaded Jodl that the deadline was unrealistic, and on 2 December he and Westphal went to Berlin to argue their case with Hitler. Rundstedt refused to go, because, he said, he hated listening to Hitler's monologues.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|pp=211, 214}}</ref> This marked his effective abdication as a military leader: he was now only a figurehead, and apparently content to be so. After the war he disowned all responsibility for the offensive: "If old von Moltke thought that I had planned that offensive he would have turned over in his grave."<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=247}}</ref> Hitler arrived on the western front on 10 December to supervise the offensive, which was now set for 16 December. He gave orders directly to the army commanders, bypassing both Rundstedt and Model. Manteuffel said: "The plan for the Ardennes offensive was drawn up completely by OKW and sent to us as a cut-and-dried Führer order."{{Sfn|McCarthy|Syron|2003|p=222}}{{Sfn|Wilmot|1952|p=576}}

Taking advantage of surprise and poor weather (which helped neutralise the Allies' command of the air), the offensive made initial progress, breaking through the weak American formations in this quiet sector of the front. But the Allies were quick to react, and the Germans were soon falling behind their ambitious timetables. To the north, Dietrich's 6th Panzer Army was blocked by stubborn defence at [[St. Vith]] and [[Battle of Elsenborn Ridge|Elsenborn Ridge]] and advanced little more than 20&nbsp;km. Manteuffel, in the centre, did better, reaching [[Celles, Houyet|Celles]], a few kilometres short of the Meuse, on 25 December. This was a penetration of about 80&nbsp;km, less than halfway to Antwerp, and on such a narrow front as to create an indefensible salient. The resistance of the American garrison at [[Bastogne]] greatly delayed the advance, making a forcing of the Meuse impossible. When the cloud cover lifted on 24 December, the Allied air forces attacked with devastating effect. Rundstedt urged OKW to halt the offensive, lest the "bulge" created by the German advance become a "second Stalingrad", but Hitler was determined to press on.<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=221}}</ref> A few days later U.S. forces attacked from the north and south of the bulge, forcing the Germans first to halt and then to retreat.<ref>{{harvnb|Wilmot|1952|loc=chs. 30, 31}}; {{harvnb|Messenger|2011|loc=ch. 12}}; {{harvnb|Neillands|2006|loc=ch. 13}}</ref>

Waffen-SS units under Rundstedt's overall command committed war crimes during the campaign in the West, including the [[Malmedy massacre]], which was perpetrated by troops under the command of [[Joachim Peiper]]. His unit of the SS division {{lang|de|Leibstandarte}} was under the command of [[Wilhelm Mohnke]].{{Sfn|Reynolds|2009}}{{Page needed|date=October 2012}} Peiper's battle group ({{lang|de|Kampfgruppe}}) was charged with seizing the bridges over the Meuse ahead of the advance of the 6th Panzer Army. On 17 December, near [[Malmedy]], a group of Peiper's men, opened fire on a large group of unarmed U.S. prisoners of war, killing 84. Responsibility for this crime ran from Peiper to Mohnke to Dietrich to Model to Rundstedt, although none of them had been present and none had ordered such action. When Rundstedt heard about it, he ordered an investigation, but in the chaos of the failing offensive nothing came of this.{{citation needed|date=April 2016}}

Although such occurrences were commonplace on the Eastern Front from both sides, they were a rarity in the West, and the outraged Americans were determined to prosecute all those with responsibility for this massacre. Here Rundstedt's problem was his reputation. The Ardennes offensive was known to the Allies as "the Rundstedt offensive", and the Allied press routinely described him as being in charge of it. The British commander in Europe, Field Marshal [[Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein|Bernard Montgomery]], said on 7 January 1945: "I used to think that Rommel was good, but my opinion is that Rundstedt would have [[Cricket|hit him for six]]. Rundstedt is the best German general I have come up against."<ref>{{harvnb|Messenger|2011|p=222}}</ref> Since Rundstedt, as far as the Allies knew, was in charge of the offensive, it followed for them that he was responsible for what his subordinates did during it.{{citation needed|date=April 2016}}