Editing Erich von Manstein (section)

===Battle of the Dnieper===
{{Main|Battle of the Dnieper}}

In September 1943 Manstein withdrew to the west bank of the Dnieper in an operation that for the most part was well-ordered, but at times degenerated into a disorganised rout as his exhausted soldiers became "unglued".{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=393}} Hundreds of thousands of Soviet civilians travelled west with them, many bringing livestock and personal property.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=397}} Manstein correctly deduced that the next Soviet attack would be towards [[Kiev]], but as had been the case throughout the campaign, the Red Army used ''[[Russian military deception|maskirovka]]'' (deception) to disguise the timing and exact location of their intended offensive.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=399}} Historians [[Williamson Murray]] and Allan Reed Millett wrote that many German generals' "fanatical belief" in [[Nazism and race|Nazi racial theories]] " ... made the idea that Slavs could manipulate German intelligence with such consistency utterly inconceivable".{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=395}} The [[1st Ukrainian Front]], led by [[Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin]], met the outnumbered Fourth Panzer Army near Kiev. Vatutin first made a thrust near Liutezh, just north of Kiev, and then attacked near Bukrin, to the south, on 1 November. The German troops, thinking Bukrin would be the location of the main attack, were taken completely by surprise when Vatutin captured the bridgehead at Liutezh and gained a foothold on the west bank of the Dnieper. Kiev was liberated on 6 November.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=402}} The [[17th Army (Wehrmacht)|17th Army]] was cut off and isolated in the Crimea by the attacking [[4th Ukrainian Front]] on 28 October.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=400, Map 15}}

[[File:Map of dnieper battle grand.jpg|thumb|Operations along the Dnieper, July to December 1943]]

Under the guidance of General [[Hermann Balck]], the cities of [[Zhytomyr]] and [[Korosten]] were retaken in mid-November,{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=402}} but after receiving reinforcements Vatutin resumed the offensive on 24 December 1943,{{sfn|Barratt|2012|pp=21–22}} and the Red Army continued its successful advance. Manstein's repeated requests to Hitler for more reinforcements were turned down.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=402, 404, 411}} On 4 January 1944 Manstein met with Hitler to tell him that the Dnieper line was untenable and that he needed to retreat in order to save his forces.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|p=396}} Hitler refused, and Manstein again requested changes in the highest levels of the military leadership, but was turned down, as Hitler believed that he alone was capable of managing the wider strategy.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=410}}

In January Manstein was forced to retreat further west by the Soviet offensive. Without waiting for permission from Hitler, he ordered the German [[XI Army Corps (Wehrmacht)|XI]] and XXXXII Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South to break out of the [[Korsun Pocket]] during the night of 16–17 February 1944. By the beginning of March, the Soviet forces had driven the ''Wehrmacht'' well back of the river. Because of Hitler's directive of 19 March that from that point forward all positions were to be defended to the last man, Manstein's [[1st Panzer Army]] became encircled on 21 March when permission to break out was not received from Hitler in time. Manstein flew to Hitler's headquarters in [[Lvov]] to try to convince him to change his mind. Hitler eventually relented, but relieved Manstein of his command on 30 March 1944.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=414–418}}

Manstein appeared on the cover of the 10 January 1944 issue of [[Time (magazine)|''Time'' magazine]], above the caption "Retreat may be masterly, but victory is in the opposite direction".{{sfn|Melvin|2010|p=412}}{{sfn|''Time''|1944}}