Editing Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig (section)

===1915===

====Spring offensives====
[[File:Haig Joffre and French at the Front Gws joffrefrhaig 01.png|thumb|French, Joffre and Haig (left to right) visit the front line during 1915. Henry Wilson is second from the right.]]
Like French, Haig wanted to push along the North Sea Coast to Ostend and [[Zeebrugge]] but Joffre did not want the British acting so independently.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 175.</ref> Germany had recently sent eight infantry divisions to the Eastern Front, so French and Joffre agreed that a French offensive in Artois and Champagne, should be accompanied by a British offensive at [[Neuve-Chapelle]] to be conducted by Haig. At Neuve Chapelle, Haig wanted a quick bombardment and his subordinate [[Henry Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson|Henry Rawlinson]] a longer and more methodical one. Shortage of shells meant that only a thirty-five-minute bombardment was possible but the small front of the attack gave it the concentration to succeed.<ref name="auto">Groot 1988, pp. 178–180.</ref>

Haig was greatly interested in the potential of aircraft and met [[Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard|Major Trenchard]] of the [[Royal Flying Corps]] to organise photographic air reconnaissance and a map of German lines was obtained; aircraft were also used for artillery spotting.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 55.</ref> Four divisions attacked at the [[Battle of Neuve Chapelle]] on 10 March and penetrated {{convert|1500|m|yd|order=flip}} but no progress was made on subsequent days, as the Germans brought in reinforcements. Casualties were around 12,000 on each side.<ref name="auto"/> Rawlinson had wanted to end the offensive after the first day and Haig felt that reserves should have been committed quicker. On Rawlinson's suggestion Haig came close to sacking Major-General Joey Davies until it was found that Davies had followed Rawlinson's orders; Haig reprimanded Rawlinson but thought him too valuable to sack. This may have made Rawlinson reluctant to stand up to Haig thereafter.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 181.</ref>

Whilst the Germans attacked Smith-Dorrien at the Second Battle of Ypres (April), new Allied offensives were planned by the French at Vimy and by Haig at Aubers Ridge (9 May). It was believed on the British side that the lessons of Neuve Chapelle had been learned – reserves were ready to exploit and mortars were ready to support attackers who had advanced beyond artillery cover – and that this time success would be complete not partial. The attack was less successful than Neuve Chapelle as the bombardment was over a wider front and against stronger defences; Haig was still focussed on winning a decisive victory by capturing key ground, rather than amassing firepower to inflict maximum damage.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 132.</ref><ref>Groot 1988, p. 188.</ref> Attacks (at Festubert, 15–25 May) as a diversion, gained {{convert|1000|m|yd|order=flip}} over a front of {{convert|4000|m|yd|order=flip}}, with 16,000 British casualties to around 6,600 German losses.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 152.</ref> Sir John French was satisfied that the attacks had taken pressure off the French at their request but Haig felt that German reserves were being exhausted, bringing victory nearer.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 189.</ref>

[[Shell Crisis of 1915|Lack of shells at these offensives]] was, along with [[John Fisher, 1st Baron Fisher|Admiral Fisher]]'s resignation over the failed [[Dardanelles Campaign]], a cause of the fall of the Liberal Government (19 May). Haig did not approve of the [[Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Baron Northcliffe|Northcliffe]] press attacks on Kitchener, whom he thought a powerful military voice against the folly of civilians like Churchill (despite the fact that Kitchener was an opponent of the strong General Staff which Haig wanted to see). French had been leaking information about the shell shortage to [[Charles à Court Repington]] of ''The Times'', whom Haig detested and which he likened to "carrying on with a whore". French also communicated with Conservative leaders and to [[David Lloyd George]] who became Minister of Munitions in the new coalition government.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 193.</ref>

Haig was asked by Clive Wigram (one of the King's press staff) to smooth relations between French and Kitchener. At Robertson's suggestion, Haig received Kitchener at his HQ (despite French's attempt to block the meeting), where they shared their concerns about French. The two men met again in London (14 July), whilst Haig was receiving his GCB (awarded on French's recommendation after Neuve Chapelle) from the King,<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=29202|page=6111|date=22 June 1915|supp=y}}</ref> who also complained to him about French. Over lunch with the King and Kitchener, Haig remarked that the best time to sack French would have been after the retreat to the Marne; it was agreed that the men would correspond in confidence.<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 196–197.</ref>

Haig had long thought French petty, jealous, unbalanced, overly quick to meddle in party politics and easily manipulated by Henry Wilson.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 216.</ref> Haig was increasingly irritated by French's changes of orders and mercurial changes of mood as to the length of the war, which French now expected to last into 1916.<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 191, 195.</ref> Haig still thought Germany might collapse by November, although at the same time he was sending a memo to the War Office recommending that the BEF, now numbering 25 divisions, be equipped with the maximum number of heavy guns, ready for a huge decisive battle, 36 divisions strong in 1916.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 202.</ref>

====Loos====
{{further|Battle of Loos}}
The war was not going well – besides the failure at Cape Helles (landing 25 April), [[Bulgaria]] had joined the Central Powers ([[Kingdom of Serbia|Serbia]] was soon overrun). Allied attacks in the west were needed to take pressure off the Russians, who were being flung out of Poland. The original plan was to attack in July. At Joffre's insistence the offensive was planned next to the French Tenth Army at Loos.<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 203–204.</ref>

Haig inspected the [[Loos-en-Gohelle|Loos]] area (24 June) and expressed dissatisfaction with the ground. French and Haig would have preferred to renew the attack at Aubers Ridge.<ref>Neillands 2006, pp. 192–194.</ref> French was dissuaded by [[Ferdinand Foch|Foch]], who felt that only a British attack at Loos would pull in enough German reserves to allow the French to take Vimy Ridge. French wrote to Joffre saying he was willing to go along with these plans for the sake of Anglo-French cooperation, but then wrote to Joffre again suggesting an artillery bombardment with only limited British infantry attacks. Kitchener listened sympathetically to Joffre's suggestion that in future Joffre should set the size, dates and objectives of British offensives, although he only agreed for the Loos attack for the moment. It is unclear exactly why Kitchener and then Haig agreed to go along with Joffre's wishes – possibly the disastrous plight of the Russians, but it may be that a promise that poison gas could be used may have persuaded Haig. The French then postponed the attack as they picked new attacking ground in Champagne and arranged for extra shelling at Vimy, in both cases because of the very reasons – German-held villages and other obstructions – to which the British generals had objected.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 204.</ref>

Only 850 guns were available, too few for concentrated bombardment over a frontage far wider than at Neuve Chapelle.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 193.</ref> There was also argument over the placement of the reserve (including inexperienced [[Kitchener's Army|New Army]] divisions), which Haig wanted close to the front. Haig had persuaded himself that decisive victory was possible, and it may be that French wanted to keep control of the reserve to stop them being thrown into battle needlessly.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 205.</ref> French tried in vain to forbid Haig to discuss his plans with Kitchener (on the grounds that Kitchener might leak them to politicians). Battle began (25 September) after Haig ordered the release of [[chlorine gas]].<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 205–207.</ref>

The attack failed in the north against the Hohenzollern Redoubt but broke through the German first line in the centre. The reserves were tired after night marches to reach the front in secrecy and were not available until 2&nbsp;pm, but were thrown into battle without success on the second day.<ref>Neillands 2006, pp. 256–257.</ref>

====Haig replaces French====
Haig wrote a detailed letter to Kitchener claiming "complete" success on the first day and complaining that the reserves had not been placed as close to the front as agreed and that French had not released control of them when requested. Haig strengthened his case by reports that captured enemy officers had been astonished at the British failure to exploit the attack and by complaining about the government's foot-dragging at introducing conscription and the commitment of troops to sideshows like Salonika and Suvla Bay.<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 208–209.</ref>

The failure of Loos was debated in the British press. Kitchener demanded a report and Lord Haldane was sent to France to interview French and Haig.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 261.</ref> French in turn demanded a report from Haig, in particular his claim to have penetrated the German lines. [[Arthur Bigge, 1st Baron Stamfordham|Lord Stamfordham]], the King's Secretary, telephoned Robertson to ask his opinion of French and Robertson conferred with Haig – who was pushing for Robertson to be appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff – before giving his opinion. The King also discussed the matter with Haig over dinner on a visit to the front (24 October). Haig again told him that French should have been sacked in August 1914. Four days later the King, whilst inspecting troops, was injured when thrown by one of Haig's horses and had to be evacuated to England on a stretcher, which embarrassed Haig. French had his orders releasing the reserves published in ''The Times'' (2 November), with an article by Repington blaming Haig. Haig demanded a correction of French's "inaccuracies", whereupon French ordered Haig to cease all correspondence on this matter,. Haig met with the Prime Minister, [[H. H. Asquith]] on 23 November and [[Bonar Law]] (Conservative Leader) the next day. Rumours were rife that French was to be sacked.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 257.</ref> Matters had been delayed as Kitchener was away on an inspection tour of the Mediterranean and French was sick in bed. Kitchener returned to London (3 Dec) and at a meeting with Haig that day, told him that he was to recommend to Asquith that Haig replace French.<ref>Neillands 2006, p. 266.</ref>

Haig's appointment as Commander-in-Chief BEF was announced on 10 December and almost simultaneously Robertson became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. Haig and Robertson hoped that this would be the start of a new and more professional management of the war. Monro was promoted to GOC First Army in Haig's place, not Rawlinson whom Haig would have preferred, and for reasons of seniority Haig was forced to accept the weak-willed [[Launcelot Kiggell]], not Butler as chief of staff BEF in succession to Robertson.<ref>Groot 1988, pp. 219–220.</ref> Haig and French, who seemed ill, had a final handover meeting (18 December, the day before the formal change of command), at which Haig agreed that Churchill – recently resigned from the Cabinet and vetoed from command of a brigade – should be given command of a battalion.<ref>Groot 1988, p. 215.</ref>