Editing Donald Rumsfeld (section)

===War in Afghanistan===
Rumsfeld directed the planning for the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|War in Afghanistan]] after the September 11 attacks.<ref name="National Defense University Press" /> On September 21, 2001, [[United States Central Command|USCENTCOM]] Commander General [[Tommy Franks]], briefed the President on a plan to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the [[Taliban]] government. General Franks also initially proposed to Rumsfeld that the U.S. invade Afghanistan using a conventional force of 60,000 troops, preceded by six months of preparation. Rumsfeld, however feared that a conventional invasion of Afghanistan could bog down as had happened to the Soviets in the [[Soviet–Afghan War]] and the [[1842 retreat from Kabul]] by the British.<ref>{{cite web |title=Special forces and horses |url=http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/special-forces-and-horses/ |date=November 1, 2006 |access-date=February 8, 2016 |archive-date=February 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224191818/http://armedforcesjournal.com/special-forces-and-horses/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Rumsfeld rejected Franks's plan, saying "I want men on the ground now!" Franks returned the next day with a plan utilizing [[US Special Forces|U.S. Special Forces]].<ref>{{cite web|last1=Zimmerman|first1=Dwight Jon|title=21st Century Horse Soldiers – Special Operations Forces and Operation Enduring Freedom|url=http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-4/|date=September 16, 2011|access-date=September 11, 2015|archive-date=February 16, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216194220/https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/operation-enduring-freedom-the-first-49-days-4/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="National Defense University Press" /> Despite air and missile attacks against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, [[United States Central Command|USCENTCOM]] had no pre-existing plans for conducting ground operations there.<ref name="National Defense University Press" />

[[File:Brigadier General Lloyd Austin converse with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.jpg|thumb|Rumsfeld (center) converses with [[List of ambassadors of the United States to Afghanistan|U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan]] [[Zalmay Khalilzad]] (right) as Brig. Gen. [[Lloyd Austin]] (top left) looks on during a visit to [[Kandahar|Kandahar, Afghanistan]], on February 26, 2004.]]

The September 21, 2001 plan emerged after extensive dialogue, but Secretary Rumsfeld also asked for broader plans that looked beyond Afghanistan.<ref name="National Defense University Press" />

On October 7, 2001, just hours after the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan|2001 invasion of Afghanistan]] was launched, Rumsfeld addressed the nation in a press conference at the Pentagon stating "While our raids today focus on the Taliban and the foreign terrorists in Afghanistan, our aim remains much broader. Our objective is to defeat those who use terrorism and those who house or support them. The world stands united in this effort".<ref name="United States Department of Defense-2001">{{cite web|url=https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2011|title=Rumsfeld and Myers Briefing on Enduring Freedom|publisher=United States Department of Defense|date=October 7, 2001|access-date=July 4, 2020|archive-date=July 4, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200704213028/https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Rumsfeld also stated "the only way to deal with these terrorist threats is to go at them where they exist. You cannot defend at every place at every time against every conceivable, imaginable, even unimaginable terrorist attack. And the only way to deal with it is to take the battle to where they are and to root them out and to starve them out by seeing that those countries and those organizations and those non-governmental organizations and those individuals that are supporting and harboring and facilitating these networks stop doing it and find that there's a penalty for doing it".<ref name="United States Department of Defense-2001" />

Rumsfeld in another press conference at the Pentagon on October 29, 2001, stated "As the first weeks of this effort proceed, it bears repeating that our goal is not to reduce or simply contain terrorist acts, but our goal is to deal with it comprehensively. And we do not intend to stop until we've rooted out terrorist networks and put them out of business, not just in the case of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but other networks as well. And as I've mentioned, the Al Qaeda network crosses some 40, 50-plus countries."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_102901.html|title=Text: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=October 29, 2001|access-date=July 4, 2020|archive-date=November 4, 2002|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20021104072846/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_102901.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

Rumsfeld announced in November 2001, that he received "authoritative reports" that Al-Qaeda's number three [[Mohammed Atef]], bin Laden's primary military chief and a planner of the September 11 attacks on America, was killed by a U.S. airstrike.<ref name="Orlando Sentinel-2001">{{cite news |url=https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2001-11-17-0111170104-story.html |title=U.S. Thinks Bomb Killed Bin Laden's Top Aide |work=Orlando Sentinel |date=November 17, 2001 |access-date=July 4, 2020 |archive-date=October 22, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201022190425/https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2001-11-17-0111170104-story.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_111901.html|title=Text:Pentagon Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=November 19, 2001|access-date=July 4, 2020|archive-date=December 22, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131222045045/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_111901.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="archive.defense.gov">{{cite web|url=https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2444|title=DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld|date=November 19, 2001|access-date=July 4, 2020|archive-date=July 5, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200705040502/https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2444|url-status=dead}}</ref> "He was very, very senior," Rumsfeld said. "We obviously have been seeking [him] out."<ref name="Orlando Sentinel-2001" />

In a press conference at the Pentagon on November 19, 2001, Rumsfeld described the role of U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan as firstly in the north, American troops are "embedded in [[Northern Alliance]]" elements, helping arrange food and medical supplies and pinpointing airstrikes and in the south, commandos and other troops are operating more independently, raiding compounds, monitoring roadblocks and searching vehicles in the hope of developing more information about al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.<ref name="archive.defense.gov" /><ref name="Orlando Sentinel-2001" /> On December 16, 2001, Rumsfeld visited U.S. troops in Afghanistan at [[Bagram Airfield|Bagram Air Base]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44350|title=Rumsfeld Visits Afghanistan, Meets With U.S. Troops|publisher=United States Department of Defense|date=December 16, 2001|access-date=July 5, 2020|archive-date=September 30, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170930023822/http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44350|url-status=dead}}</ref>

On March 15, 2002, in another press conference at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld commented on the mission of [[Operation Anaconda]] by stating "Operation Anaconda continues in the area south of Gardez in eastern Afghanistan. The fighting is winding down as you know. Coalition forces are for the most part in an exploitation phase, doing the difficult work of searching caves and clearing areas where the battles and fighting has taken place. Our forces are finding weapons, ammunition, some intelligence information. In the top 25 al Qaeda, we know some are dead and we know some may be dead; we know some are captured and there are a larger number that we don't know. And roughly the same proportions with respect to Taliban".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020315/epf503.htm|title=Transcript: Defense Department Briefing, March 15, 2002|date=March 15, 2002|access-date=22 February 2022}}</ref>

On May 1, 2003, Rumsfeld during a visit to Afghanistan meeting with U.S. troops stationed in Kabul told the press "General Franks and I have been looking at the progress that's being made in this country and have concluded that we are at a point where we clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction and activities." "I should underline however, that there are still dangers, there are still pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country and General McNeal and General Franks and their, the cooperation they have with the [[Hamid Karzai|President Karzai]]'s government and leadership and Marshall Fayheems assistance. We will be continuing as a country to work with the Afghan government and the new Afghan National Army to see that the any areas where there is resistance to this government and to the coalition forces will be dealt with promptly and efficiently."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2562|title=Secretary Rumsfeld Joint Media Availability with President Karzai|publisher=United States Department of Defense|date=May 1, 2003|access-date=July 22, 2020|archive-date=July 22, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200722114646/https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2562|url-status=dead}}</ref>

There was also controversy between the Pentagon and the CIA over who had the authority to fire [[Hellfire missiles]] from [[RQ-1 Predator|Predator drones]].<ref name="gpo">{{cite web|url=http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec6.pdf |title=From Threat to Threat|access-date=February 5, 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112165907/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec6.pdf |archive-date=January 12, 2012}} (pp. 189–90, 211–214)</ref> Even though the drones were not ready for deployment until 2002,<ref name="gpo" /> [[Daniel Benjamin]] and [[Steven Simon]] have argued that "these quarrels kept the Predator from being used against al Qaeda ... One anonymous individual who was at the center of the action called this episode 'typical' and complained that 'Rumsfeld never missed an opportunity to fail to cooperate. The fact is, the Secretary of Defense is an obstacle. He has helped the terrorists.'<ref>{{cite book|author1=Daniel Benjamin|author2=Steven Simon|title=The Next Attack|place=New York City|publisher=[[Times Books]]|year=2005|isbn=978-0-8050-7941-8|page=[https://archive.org/details/nextattackfailur00benj/page/161 161]|url=https://archive.org/details/nextattackfailur00benj/page/161}}</ref>

In December 2005, Rumsfeld again visited Kabul and met with the Afghan defense minister, [[Rahim Wardak]]. During the meeting, Rumsfeld expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the [[Afghan Army|Afghan army]] and attributed the worsening situation in Afghanistan to ineffective governance. He criticized the longstanding plan to expand the Afghan army to 70,000 troops and requested a reduction in the size of the Afghan army to 52,000 at most, claiming that this was necessary to "suit Afghanistan's limited revenues." Shortly after the trip, Rumsfeld also withdrew 3,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan and canceled the planned deployment of one army brigade headed there.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Malkasian |first1=Carter |title=The American War in Afghanistan: A History |date=2021 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-755077-9 |pages=131–132 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VPQuEAAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref>

In 2009, three years after Rumsfeld's tenure as Defense secretary ended, the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] led an investigation into the [[Battle of Tora Bora]] in December 2001, during the early phase of the U.S-led coalition war in Afghanistan. They concluded that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Franks had not committed enough troops during the battle to secure the area around Tora Bora. They believed that Al-Qaeda's number one leader [[Osama bin Laden]] had likely been at Tora Bora and his escape prolonged the war in Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT53709.htm|title=TORA BORA REVISITED: HOW WE FAILED TO GET BIN LADEN AND WHY IT MATTERS TODAY|access-date=20 February 2022}}</ref> Rumsfeld and Franks were apparently motivated by fear that a substantial American presence near Tora Bora could incite a rebellion by local [[Pashtuns]], despite the latter's lack of organizational capability at the time and the fierce dissent voiced by many CIA analysts including [[Charles E. Allen]] (who warned Franks that "the back door [to [[Pakistan]]<nowiki>]</nowiki> was open") and [[Gary Berntsen]] (who called for [[United States Army Rangers|army rangers]] to "kill this baby in the crib"). Instead of rangers or [[United States Marine Corps|marines]], the U.S. assault on Tora Bora relied on the CIA-backed Afghan militias of [[Hazrat Ali (Afghan politician)|Hazrat Ali]] and [[Zahir Qadeer]], supplemented with [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress|B-52]] bombardment. The resulting influx of hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters into Pakistan destabilized the country and damaged [[Pakistan–United States relations]].<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2019|isbn=9780143132509|pages=102–111}}</ref> The follow-up [[Operation Anaconda]] "witnessed failures of planning and execution, the product of the fractured lines of command," as recounted by [[Steve Coll]].<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2019|isbn=9780143132509|pages=125–127}}</ref> In mid-2002, Rumsfeld announced that "The war is over in Afghanistan," to the disbelief of State Department, CIA, and military officials in the country. As a result, Rumsfeld downplayed the need for an Afghan army of even 70,000 troops, far fewer than the 250,000 envisaged by Karzai.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2019|isbn=9780143132509|pages=134–135}}</ref>