Editing Concept (section)

== Ideasthesia ==
{{Main|Ideasthesia}}
According to the theory of [[ideasthesia]] (or "sensing concepts"), activation of a concept may be the main mechanism responsible for the creation of phenomenal experiences. Therefore, understanding how the brain processes concepts may be central to solving the mystery of how conscious experiences (or [[qualia]]) emerge within a physical system e.g., the sourness of the sour taste of lemon.<ref name="MroczkoNikolic2014">{{Cite journal|doi = 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00509|doi-access = free|title = Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia|year = 2014|last1 = Mroczko-Wä…Sowicz|first1 = Aleksandra|last2 = Nikoliä‡|first2 = Danko|journal = Frontiers in Human Neuroscience|volume = 8|page = 509|pmid = 25191239|pmc = 4137691}}</ref> This question is also known as the [[hard problem of consciousness]].<ref>Stevan Harnad (1995). Why and How We Are Not Zombies. ''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' 1: 164–167.</ref><ref>David Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. ''Journal of Consciousness Studies'' 2 (3): 200–219.</ref> Research on ideasthesia emerged from research on [[synesthesia]] where it was noted that a synesthetic experience requires first an activation of a concept of the inducer.<ref>Nikolić, D. (2009) Is synaesthesia actually ideaesthesia? An inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon. Proceedings of the Third International Congress on Synaesthesia, Science & Art, Granada, Spain, April 26–29, 2009.</ref> Later research expanded these results into everyday perception.<ref name = Gomez2013>Gómez Milán, E., Iborra, O., de Córdoba, M.J., Juárez-Ramos V., Rodríguez Artacho, M.A., Rubio, J.L. (2013) The Kiki-Bouba effect: A case of personification and ideaesthesia. ''The Journal of Consciousness Studies.'' 20(1–2): pp. 84–102.</ref>

There is a lot of discussion on the most effective theory in concepts. Another theory is semantic pointers, which use perceptual and motor representations and these representations are like symbols.<ref>{{Cite journal|doi = 10.1111/cogs.12265|title = Concepts as Semantic Pointers: A Framework and Computational Model|year = 2016|last1 = Blouw|first1 = Peter|last2 = Solodkin|first2 = Eugene|last3 = Thagard|first3 = Paul|last4 = Eliasmith|first4 = Chris|journal = Cognitive Science|volume = 40|issue = 5|pages = 1128–1162|pmid = 26235459| s2cid=16809232 |doi-access = free}}</ref>