Editing Causality (section)

=== Manipulation theories ===
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability.<ref name="Collingwood">Collingwood, R. (1940) ''An Essay on Metaphysics.'' Clarendon Press.</ref><ref name="Gasking">{{cite journal | last1 = Gasking | first1 = D | year = 1955 | title = Causation and Recipes | journal = Mind | volume = 64 | issue = 256| pages = 479–487 | doi=10.1093/mind/lxiv.256.479}}</ref><ref name="MenPrice">{{cite journal | last1 = Menzies | first1 = P. | last2 = Price | first2 = H. | year = 1993 | title = Causation as a Secondary Quality | journal = British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | volume = 44 | issue = 2| pages = 187–203 | doi=10.1093/bjps/44.2.187| citeseerx = 10.1.1.28.9736 | s2cid = 160013822 }}</ref><ref name="vonWright">von Wright, G. (1971) ''Explanation and Understanding.'' [[Cornell University Press]].</ref> Under these theories, ''x'' causes ''y'' only in the case that one can change ''x'' in order to change ''y''. This coincides with commonsense notions of causations, since often we ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the world. For instance, we are interested in knowing the [[causes of crime]] so that we might find ways of reducing it.

These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these accounts are [[Begging the question|circular]]. Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that manipulation is more basic than causal interaction. But describing manipulations in non-causal terms has provided a substantial difficulty.

The second criticism centers around concerns of [[anthropocentrism]]. It seems to many people that causality is some existing relationship in the world that we can harness for our desires. If causality is identified with our manipulation, then this intuition is lost. In this sense, it makes humans overly central to interactions in the world.

Some attempts to defend manipulability theories are recent accounts that do not claim to reduce causality to manipulation. These accounts use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without claiming that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.<ref name="Pearl" /><!-- Pearl, Judea (2000) ''Causality'', Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-77362-8</ref> --><ref name="Woodward">{{cite book |last1=Woodward |first1=James |author1-link=James Woodward (philosopher) |title=Making Things Happen A Theory of Causal Explanation |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=0-19-515527-0}}</ref>