Editing Benjamin Lee Whorf (section)

==== Degree of influence of language on thought ====
If read superficially, some of Whorf's statements lend themselves to the interpretation that he supported [[linguistic determinism]]. For example, in an often-quoted passage Whorf writes:
{{blockquote|text=We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data that the agreement decrees. We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.<ref name="SCIENCE" group="w" />}}

The statements about the obligatory nature of the terms of language have been taken to suggest that Whorf meant that language completely determined the scope of possible conceptualizations.<ref name="Pinker 1994"/> However, neo-Whorfians argue that here Whorf is writing about the terms in which we speak of the world, not the terms in which we think of it.<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Gumperz|Levinson|1996|p=22}}; {{harvcoltxt|Levinson|2012}}</ref> Whorf noted that to communicate thoughts and experiences with members of a [[speech community]] speakers must use the linguistic categories of their shared language, which requires moulding experiences into the shape of language to speak them—a process called "thinking for speaking". This interpretation is supported by Whorf's subsequent statement that "No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality, but is constrained by certain modes of interpretation even when he thinks himself most free". Similarly, the statement that observers are led to different pictures of the universe has been understood as an argument that different conceptualizations are not comparable, making translation between different conceptual and linguistic systems impossible. Neo-Whorfians argue this to be a misreading since throughout his work one of his main points was that such systems could be "calibrated" and thereby be made commensurable, but only when we become aware of the differences in conceptual schemes through linguistic analysis.<ref name="LeavittPhil" />