Editing Battle of the Coral Sea (section)

==Significance==

The public on both sides were informed of victory with overstatement of enemy losses and understatement of their own—the Americans claimed to have sunk between 18 and 37 ships.{{sfn|Hoyt|1986|pp=283–284}} In terms of actual ships lost, the Japanese won a tactical victory by sinking the  U.S. [[fleet carrier]] ''Lexington'', an [[Replenishment oiler|oiler]], and a [[destroyer]]—{{convert|41826|LT|t|abbr=on}}—versus a [[Light aircraft carrier|light carrier]], a destroyer, and several smaller warships—{{convert|19000|LT|t|abbr=on}}—sunk by the U.S. side. ''Lexington'' represented, at that time, 25% of U.S. carrier strength in the Pacific.<ref>{{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=109–11}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|pp=134–135}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=203}}; {{harvnb|D'Albas|1965|p=109}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|p=72}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|p=63}}. The Japanese thought they sank ''Lexington''{{'}}s sister ship, {{USS|Saratoga|CV-3|2}}.</ref>

From a strategic perspective, however, the battle was an Allied victory as it averted the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, lessening the threat to the supply lines between the U.S. and Australia. Although the withdrawal of ''Yorktown'' from the Coral Sea conceded the field, the Japanese were forced to abandon the operation that had initiated the Battle of the Coral Sea in the first place.<ref>{{harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=286–7, 515}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=109–11, 160}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=203}}; {{harvnb|D'Albas|1965|p=109}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|p=72}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|p=63}}.</ref>

The battle marked the first time that a Japanese invasion force was turned back without achieving its objective, which greatly lifted the morale of the Allies after a series of defeats by the Japanese during the initial six months of the Pacific Theatre. Port Moresby was vital to Allied strategy and its garrison could well have been overwhelmed by the experienced Japanese invasion troops. The U.S. Navy also exaggerated the damage it inflicted, which later caused the press to treat its reports of [[Battle of Midway|Midway]] with more caution.{{sfn|O'Neill|1993|pp=119, 125}}

The results of the battle had a substantial effect on the strategic planning of both sides. Without a hold in New Guinea, the subsequent Allied advance, arduous as it was, would have been even more difficult.<ref>{{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=203}}; {{harvnb|D'Albas|1965|p=109}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|p=72}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|p=64}}.</ref> For the Japanese, who focused on the tactical results, the battle was seen as merely a temporary setback. The results of the battle confirmed the low opinion held by the Japanese of U.S. fighting capability and supported their overconfident belief that future carrier operations against the U.S. were assured of success.{{sfn|Willmott|1983|p=118}}

===Forces available for Midway===
One of the most significant effects of the Coral Sea battle was the temporary loss of ''Shōkaku'' and ''Zuikaku'' to Yamamoto's planned battle against the U.S. carriers at Midway. (''Shōhō'' was to have been employed at Midway in a tactical role supporting the Japanese invasion ground forces.) Although ''Zuikaku'' was undamaged, she had lost a large number of aircraft in the battle, and the Japanese apparently did not even consider trying to include ''Zuikaku'' in the forthcoming operation. No effort appears to have been made to combine the surviving ''Shōkaku'' aircrews with ''Zuikaku''{{'}}s air groups or to quickly provide ''Zuikaku'' with replacement aircraft. ''Shōkaku'' herself was unable to conduct further aircraft operations, with her flight deck heavily damaged, and she required almost three months of repair in Japan.{{sfn|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=63–67}}

[[File:G13065 USS Yorktown Pearl Harbor May 1942.jpg|thumb|left|''Yorktown'' in drydock at Pearl Harbor on 29 May 1942, shortly before departing for Midway]]

The Japanese believed that they sank two carriers in the Coral Sea, but this still left at least two more U.S. Navy carriers, ''Enterprise'' and ''Hornet'', to help defend Midway. In fact, ''Yorktown'' had only been damaged, but she had also lost a large number of planes in the battle. Unlike the Japanese, the U.S. Navy put forth a maximum effort to make ''Yorktown'' available for the coming battle. Although the damage was estimated to take 90 days to repair, Nimitz gave the shipyard only three days, and only the most critical repairs were made to make the ship seaworthy. ''Yorktown'' left Pearl Harbor with three of her boilers inoperative and a maximum speed of 27 knots.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Larrabee |first1=Eric |title=Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War |date=1987 |publisher=Simon & Schuster |location=New York |isbn=0671663828 |page=362 |edition=1st Touchstone}}</ref> Unlike the Japanese, the U.S. Navy was willing to put one aircraft carrier's air group on another ship. To make up aircraft losses from the Coral Sea, three of the four ''Yorktown'' squadrons were sent ashore and replaced by squadrons from ''Saratoga'', which had been sent to the West Coast for repairs after being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. ''Yorktown'' would go into battle with her own scouting squadron, but ''Saratoga''{{'}}s torpedo bomber, dive bomber, and fighter squadrons.

The U.S. aircraft carriers had slightly larger aircraft complements than the Japanese carriers, which, when combined with the land-based aircraft at Midway, the availability of ''Yorktown'', and the loss of two Japanese carriers, meant that the Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy would have near parity in aircraft for the impending battle. At Midway, aircraft flying from ''Yorktown'' played crucial roles in the American victory. ''Yorktown''{{'}}s planes sank the {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Sōryū||2}}, located {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Hiryū||2}}, and helped ''Enterprise'' planes sink ''Hiryū''. ''Yorktown'' also absorbed both Japanese aerial counterattacks at Midway which otherwise would have been directed at ''Enterprise'' and ''Hornet''.<ref>{{harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=63–67}}, {{harvnb|Millot|1974|p=118}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=135}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=203}}, {{harvnb|Ito|1956|pp=48–49}}.</ref>

Historians H. P. Willmott, Jonathan Parshall, and Anthony Tully believe Yamamoto made a significant strategic error in his decision to support ''Operation MO'' with strategic assets. Since Yamamoto had decided the decisive battle with the U.S. was to take place at Midway, he should not have diverted any of his important assets, especially fleet carriers, to a secondary operation like ''MO''. Yamamoto's decision meant Japanese naval forces were weakened just enough at both the Coral Sea and Midway battles to allow the Allies to [[Defeat in detail|defeat them in detail]]. Willmott adds, if either operation was important enough to commit fleet carriers, then all of the Japanese carriers should have been committed to each in order to ensure success. By committing crucial assets to ''MO'', Yamamoto made the more important Midway operation dependent on the secondary operation's success.<ref>{{harvnb|Willmott|1982|pp=459–460}}; {{harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=58–59}}.</ref>

Yamamoto apparently missed two major implications of the Coral Sea battle. The unexpected appearance of U.S. carriers in exactly the right place and time, might have led him to believe the US had cracked IJN codes with [[cryptanalysis]]. He also failed to appreciate the U.S. Navy carrier aircrews demonstrating sufficient skill and determination to do significant damage to the Japanese carrier forces. Both would be repeated at Midway, where Japan lost four fleet carriers, the core of her naval offensive forces, and thereby lost the strategic initiative in the Pacific War. Parshall and Tully point out that, due to U.S. industrial strength, once Japan lost its numerical superiority in carrier forces as a result of Midway, Japan could never regain it, adding "The Battle of the Coral Sea had provided the first hints that the Japanese high-water mark had been reached, but it was the Battle of Midway that put up the sign for all to see."<ref>{{harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=63–67, 58–59, 430}}; {{harvnb|Ito|1956|p=59}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=222}}.</ref>

===Situation in the South Pacific===
The Australians and U.S. forces in Australia were initially disappointed with the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea, fearing the ''MO'' operation was the precursor to an invasion of the Australian mainland and the setback to Japan was only temporary. In a meeting held in late May, the Australian [[Advisory War Council (Australia)|Advisory War Council]] described the battle's result as "rather disappointing" given that the Allies had advance notice of Japanese intentions. General MacArthur provided Australian Prime Minister [[John Curtin]] with his assessment of the battle, stating that "all the elements that have produced disaster in the Western Pacific since the beginning of the war" were still present as Japanese forces could strike anywhere if supported by major elements of the IJN.<ref>{{harvnb|Gill|1968|pp=55–56}}; {{harvnb|Frame|1992|p=57}}.</ref>

[[File:Kokoda retreat (AWM 013288).jpg|thumb|left|The [[39th Battalion (Australia)|39th Australian Infantry Battalion]] defending the approach to Port Moresby along the Kokoda Track in September 1942. AWM 013288.]]
Because of the severe losses in carriers at Midway, the Japanese were unable to support another attempt to invade Port Moresby from the sea, forcing Japan to try to take Port Moresby by land. Japan began its [[Kokoda Track campaign|land offensive]] towards Port Moresby along the [[Kokoda Track]] on 21 July from [[Buna, Papua New Guinea|Buna]] and [[Gona, Papua New Guinea|Gona]]. By then, the Allies had reinforced New Guinea with additional troops (primarily Australian) starting with the [[14th Brigade (Australia)|Australian 14th Brigade]] which embarked at Townsville on 15 May.{{sfn|McCarthy|1959|p=111}} The added forces slowed, then eventually halted the Japanese advance towards Port Moresby in September 1942, and defeated an attempt by the Japanese to overpower an Allied base at [[Battle of Milne Bay|Milne Bay]].<ref>{{harvnb|USACMH Vol. II|1994|pp=138–139}}; {{harvnb|Frame|1992|p=56}}; {{harvnb|Bullard|2007|pp=87, 94}}; {{harvnb|McDonald|Brune|2005|p=77}}; {{harvnb|Willmott|2002|pp=98–99, 104–105, 113–114, 117–119}}.</ref>

In the meantime, the Allies learned in July that the Japanese had begun building an airfield on Guadalcanal. Operating from this base the Japanese would threaten the shipping supply routes to Australia. To prevent this from occurring, the U.S. chose Tulagi and nearby Guadalcanal as the target of their first offensive. The failure of the Japanese to take Port Moresby, and their defeat at Midway, had the effect of dangling their base at Tulagi and Guadalcanal without effective protection from other Japanese bases. Tulagi and Guadalcanal were four hours flying time from Rabaul, the nearest large Japanese base.<ref>{{harvnb|Frank|1990|pp=17, 194–213}}; {{harvnb|Willmott|2002|pp=90–96}}.</ref>

Three months later, on 7 August 1942, 11,000 [[United States Marine Corps|United States Marines]] landed on Guadalcanal, and 3,000 U.S. Marines landed on Tulagi and nearby islands.{{sfn|Frank|1990|p=51}} The Japanese troops on Tulagi and nearby islands were outnumbered and killed almost to the last man in the [[Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo]] and the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal captured an [[Henderson Field (Guadalcanal)|airfield]] under construction by the Japanese.{{sfn|Frank|1990|p=61–62, 79–81}} Thus began the [[Guadalcanal Campaign|Guadalcanal]] and [[Solomon Islands campaign|Solomon Islands]] campaigns that resulted in a series of attritional, combined-arms battles between Allied and Japanese forces over the next year which, in tandem with the [[New Guinea campaign]], eventually neutralized Japanese defenses in the South Pacific, inflicted irreparable losses on the Japanese military—especially its navy—and contributed significantly to the Allies' eventual victory over Japan.<ref>{{harvnb|Frank|1990|pp=428–92}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|pp=245–69}}; {{harvnb|Willmott|2002|pp=xiii–xvii, 158, 167}}; {{harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=xx}}.</ref>

The delay in the advance of Japanese forces also allowed the Marine Corps to land on [[Funafuti]] on 2 October 1942, with a Naval Construction Battalion ([[Seabees]]) building airfields on three of the atolls of [[Tuvalu]] from which [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] [[Consolidated B-24 Liberator|B-24 Liberator]] bombers of the [[Seventh Air Force]] operated. [[History of Tuvalu#The Pacific War and Operation Galvanic|The atolls of Tuvalu]] acted as a staging post during the preparation for the [[Battle of Tarawa]] and the [[Battle of Makin]] that commenced on 20 November 1943, which was the implementation of [[Operation Galvanic]].{{sfn|Dyer|1972|p=622}}

===New type of naval warfare===
[[File:Coral Sea Japan Times cartoon.jpg|thumb|right|A 13 May 1942 editorial cartoon from the Japanese English-language newspaper ''[[The Japan Times|Japan Times & Advertiser]]'' depicts a dejected [[Uncle Sam]] joining [[John Bull]] in erecting grave markers for Allied ships which Japan had sunk, or claimed to have sunk, at Coral Sea and elsewhere.]]

The battle was the first naval engagement in history in which the participating ships never sighted or fired directly at each other. Instead, manned aircraft acted as the offensive artillery for the ships involved. Thus, the respective commanders were participating in a new type of warfare, carrier-versus-carrier, with which neither had any experience. In H. P. Willmot's words, the commanders "had to contend with uncertain and poor communications in situations in which the area of battle had grown far beyond that prescribed by past experience but in which speeds had increased to an even greater extent, thereby compressing decision-making time."{{sfn|Willmott|2002|pp=37–38}} Because of the greater speed with which decisions were required, the Japanese were at a disadvantage as Inoue was too far away at Rabaul to effectively direct his naval forces in real time, in contrast to Fletcher who was on-scene with his carriers. The Japanese admirals involved were often slow to communicate important information to one another.<ref>{{harvnb|Willmott|2002|pp=37–38}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=114, 117–118}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=135}}; {{harvnb|Lundstrom|2006|p=135}}; {{harvnb|D'Albas|1965|p=101}}; {{harvnb|Ito|1956|p=48}}; {{harvnb|Morison|1949|pp=63–64}}.</ref>

Research has examined how commanders' choices affected the battle's outcome.{{sfn|Armstrong|2018}} Two studies used mathematical models to estimate the impact of various alternatives.<ref>{{harvnb|Armstrong|2014}}; {{harvnb|Armstrong|Powell|2005}}.</ref> For example, suppose the U.S. carriers had chosen to sail separately (though still nearby), rather than together. The models indicated the Americans would have suffered slightly less total damage, with one ship sunk but the other unharmed. However, the battle's overall outcome would have been similar. By contrast, suppose one side had located its opponent early enough to launch a first strike, so that only the opponent's survivors could have struck back. The modeling suggested striking first would have provided a decisive advantage, even more beneficial than having an extra carrier.

The experienced Japanese carrier aircrews performed better than those of the U.S., achieving greater results with an equivalent number of aircraft. The Japanese attack on the U.S. carriers on 8 May was better coordinated than the U.S. attack on the Japanese carriers. The Japanese suffered much higher losses to their carrier aircrews, losing ninety aircrew killed in the battle compared with thirty-five for the U.S. side. Japan's cadre of highly skilled carrier aircrews with which it began the war were, in effect, irreplaceable because of an institutionalised limitation in its training programs and the absence of a pool of experienced reserves or advanced training programs for new airmen. Coral Sea started a trend which resulted in the irreparable attrition of Japan's veteran carrier aircrews by the end of October 1942.<ref>{{harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=286–287, 515}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=109–111, 160}}; {{harvnb|Cressman|2000|pp=118–119}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=135}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|pp=74–76}}; {{harvnb|Peattie|1999|pp=174–175}}.</ref>

The U.S. did not perform as expected, but it learned from its mistakes in the battle and made improvements to its carrier tactics and equipment, including fighter tactics, strike coordination, torpedo bombers and defensive strategies, such as anti-aircraft artillery, which contributed to better results in later battles. Radar gave the U.S. a limited advantage in this battle, but its value to the U.S. Navy increased over time as the technology improved and the Allies learned how to employ it more effectively. Following the loss of ''Lexington'', improved methods for containing aviation fuel and better damage control procedures were implemented by the U.S.<ref>{{harvnb|ONI|1943|pp=46–47}}; {{harvnb|Millot|1974|pp=113–115, 118}}; {{harvnb|Dull|1978|p=135}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|pp=48–51}}; {{harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=407}}. A ''Yorktown'' crewman, Machinist Oscar W. Myers, noted that an aviation gasoline fire on the hangar deck contributed to ''Lexington''{{'}}s demise. Myers developed a solution, soon implemented in all U.S. carriers, of draining the fuel pipes after use and filling the pipes with [[carbon dioxide]] to prevent such fires from taking place again (Parshall &amp; Tully, p. 407).</ref> Coordination between the Allied land-based air forces and the U.S. Navy was poor during this battle, but this too would improve over time.<ref>{{harvnb|Crave|Cate|1947|p=451}}; {{harvnb|Gillison|1962|pp=523–524}}. According to Gillison, the poor coordination between Fletcher and MacArthur contributed to the friendly fire incident against Crace on 7 May.</ref>

Japanese and U.S. carriers faced off against each other again in the battles of Midway, the [[Battle of the Eastern Solomons|Eastern Solomons]], and the [[Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands|Santa Cruz Islands]] in 1942; and the [[Battle of the Philippine Sea|Philippine Sea]] in 1944. Each of these battles was strategically significant, to varying degrees, in deciding the course and ultimate outcome of the Pacific War.<ref>{{harvnb|D'Albas|1965|p=102}}; {{harvnb|Stille|2007|pp=4–5, 72–78}}. The U.S. Navy later named a {{sclass|Midway|aircraft carrier|1}} {{USS|Coral Sea|CV-43|6}} after the battle.</ref>