Editing Battle of Verdun (section)

====April====
[[File:Blaa DSCF9933 Verdun the Worldpump.JPG|thumb|upright=0.8|{{centre|Death works "Verdun the World-blood-pump", German propaganda medal, 1916}}]]
The failure of German attacks in early April by {{lang|de|Angriffsgruppe Ost}}, led Knobelsdorf to take soundings from the 5th Army corps commanders, who unanimously wanted to continue. The German infantry were exposed to continuous artillery fire from the flanks and rear; communications from the rear and reserve positions were equally vulnerable, which caused a constant drain of casualties. Defensive positions were difficult to build, because existing positions were on ground which had been swept clear by German bombardments early in the offensive, leaving German infantry with very little cover. General [[Berthold von Deimling]], commander of XV Corps, also wrote that French heavy artillery and gas bombardments were undermining the morale of the German infantry, which made it necessary to keep going to reach safer defensive positions. Knobelsdorf reported these findings to Falkenhayn on 20 April, adding that if the Germans did not go forward, they must go back to the start line of 21 February.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=228–229}}

Knobelsdorf rejected the policy of limited piecemeal attacks tried by Mudra as commander of {{lang|de|Angriffsgruppe Ost}} and advocated a return to wide-front attacks with unlimited objectives, swiftly to reach the line from Ouvrage de Thiaumont to Fleury, Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes. Falkenhayn was persuaded to agree to the change and by the end of April, {{nowrap|21 divisions,}} most of the OHL reserve, had been sent to Verdun and troops had also been transferred from the Eastern Front. The resort to large, unlimited attacks was costly for both sides but the German advance proceeded only slowly. Rather than causing devastating French casualties by heavy artillery with the infantry in secure defensive positions, which the French were compelled to attack, the Germans inflicted casualties by attacks which provoked French counter-attacks and assumed that the process inflicted five French casualties for two German losses.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=230–231}}

In mid-March, Falkenhayn had reminded the 5th Army to use tactics intended to conserve infantry, after the corps commanders had been allowed discretion to choose between the cautious, "step by step" tactics desired by Falkenhayn and maximum efforts, intended to obtain quick results. On the third day of the offensive, the [[6th Division (German Empire)|6th Division]] of the III Corps (General [[Ewald von Lochow]]), had ordered that Herbebois be taken ''regardless of loss'' and the [[5th Division (German Empire)|5th Division]] had attacked [[Wavrille]] to the accompaniment of its band. Falkenhayn urged the 5th Army to use {{lang|de|Stoßtruppen}} (storm units) composed of two infantry squads and one of engineers, armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, trench mortars and flame-throwers, to advance in front of the main infantry body. The {{lang|de|Stoßtruppen}} would conceal their advance by shrewd use of terrain and capture any blockhouses which remained after the artillery preparation. Strongpoints which could not be taken were to be by-passed and captured by follow-up troops. Falkenhayn ordered that the command of field and heavy artillery units was to be combined, with a commander at each corps headquarters. Common observers and communication systems would ensure that batteries in different places could bring targets under converging fire, which would be allotted systematically to support divisions.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=232–233}}

[[File:Bataille de Verdun 1916.jpg|thumb|{{center|French soldiers attacking from their trench}}]]
In mid-April, Falkenhayn ordered that infantry should advance close to the barrage, to exploit the neutralising effect of the shellfire on surviving defenders, because fresh troops at Verdun had not been trained in these methods. Knobelsdorf persisted with attempts to maintain momentum, which was incompatible with casualty conservation by limited attacks, with pauses to consolidate and prepare. Mudra and other commanders who disagreed were sacked. Falkenhayn also intervened to change German defensive tactics, advocating a dispersed defence with the second line to be held as a main line of resistance and jumping-off point for counter-attacks. Machine-guns were to be set up with overlapping fields of fire and infantry given specific areas to defend. When French infantry attacked, they were to be isolated by {{lang|de|Sperrfeuer}} (barrage-fire) on their former front line, to increase French infantry casualties. The changes desired by Falkenhayn had little effect, because the main cause of German casualties was artillery fire, just as it was for the French.{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=234}}