Editing Battle of New Orleans (section)

===Analysis===
The Battle of New Orleans was remarkable both for its apparent brevity and its casualties, though some numbers are in dispute and contradict the official statistics. The defenders of the Left Bank had casualties amounting to 11 killed and 23 wounded;{{sfnp|Tatum|1922|p=130}} American losses were only 13 killed, 39 wounded, and 19 missing or captured in total on that day.{{sfnp|Remini|1977|p=285}} Robert Remini{{sfnp|Remini|1999|p=195}} and William C Davis{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=278}} make reference to the British casualty reports of 291 killed, 1,262 wounded, and 484 missing, a total loss of 2,037 men. Among the prisoners taken when the British retreated from the battlefield, Jackson estimated three hundred were mortally wounded.{{NoteTag|Contains despatch from Jackson to Secretary of War dated January 9. 'The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of three hundred have already been delivered over for burial.... We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally.'{{sfnp|James|1818|pp=557-559}} }} Colonel [[Arthur P. Hayne]]'s dispatch to Jackson dated January 13 estimated the British had 700 fatalities and 1400 wounded, with 501 prisoners of war in his custody.{{NoteTag|Brannan contains despatch from Hayne to Jackson dated January 13. 'Prisoners taken - Prisoners taken - One major, 4 captains, 11 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 483 camp followers and privates'{{sfnp|Brannan|1823|p=459}} }} A reduction in headcount due to 443 British soldiers' deaths since the prior month was reported on January 25, which is lower than Hayne's estimate of 700 for the battle alone.{{sfnp|Bamford|2014}}

The large number of casualties suffered by the British on the Left Bank reflects their failure to maintain the element of surprise, with plenty of advance notice being given to the defenders, owing to the delays in executing the attack on the Right Bank.{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=332}} The failure of the British to have breached the parapet and conclusively eliminated the first line of defense was to result in high casualties as successive waves of men marching in column whilst the prepared defenders were able to direct their fire into a [[Kill zone]], hemmed in by the riverbank and the swamp.{{sfnp|Gleig|1827|p=335}} The American cannon opened fire when the British were at 500 yards, the riflemen at 300 yards, and the muskets at 100 yards.{{sfnp|Horsman|1969|p=244}}

Reilly supports the assertion that it was the American artillery that won the battle. The losses among the regiments out of range of small arms fire were disproportionately high, with almost every British account emphasizing the effect of heavy gunfire. In contrast, the riflemen of the 95th Foot in skirmish order, the most difficult target for artillery, had lost only 11 killed. Dickson's eyewitness account is clear that the British were only within musket shot range for less than five minutes. The account by [[Arsène Lacarrière-Latour|Latour]] states the battalions of Plauché, Daquin, Lacoste, along with three quarters of the 44th US Infantry did not fire at all. In order to have inflicted such a heavy toll on the British, it would not have been possible to have done this primarily with musket fire, of which the best trained men could only manage two shots per minute.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=307}} Unlike their British counterparts, the American forces had larger guns, and more of them. They were situated in well-protected earthworks, with a ditch and stockade. The Americans therefore had a number of advantages, but they should not minimize the skill and bravery of their gunners.{{sfnp|Ritchie|1969|p=10}} Stoltz is of the opinion that Jackson was victorious because an American army guarded a strategic choke point and defended it with professionally designed fieldworks and artillery.{{sfnp|Stoltz|2017|p=12}}

Almost universal blame was assigned to Colonel Mullins of the 44th Foot which had been detailed to carry fascines and ladders to the front to enable the British soldiers to cross the ditch and scale the parapet and fight their way to the American breastwork. Mullins was found half a mile to the rear when he was needed at the front.{{NoteTag|Major McDougall, the aide-de-camp to Pakenham testified at the court martial on Mullins. 'It is my opinion, that the whole confusion of the column proceeded from the original defective formation of the 44h; the fall of Sir edward Pakenham deprived the column of its best chance of success; and, had the column moved forward according to order, the enemy's lines would have been carried with little loss.'{{sfnp|Gleig|1840|p=344}} }} Pakenham learned of Mullins' conduct and placed himself at the head of the 44th, endeavoring to lead them to the front with the implements needed to storm the works, when he fell wounded after being hit with grapeshot. He was hit again while being helped to mount a horse, this time mortally wounded.{{sfnmp|Davis|2019|1pp=255-256|Porter|1889|2p=363}}

Pakenham's choice of units has come under question. Pakenham's aide, Wylly, was scornful about the 44th Foot, and thought the 21st Foot was lacking in discipline. His most experienced infantry regiments, the 7th Foot and 43rd Foot, veterans of Wellington's Peninsular War army, were kept in reserve in the plan of attack.{{sfnp|Davis|2019|p=223}}

The inability of Thornton's troops to have taken the Right Bank at night, in advance of the main assault, meant that the British were enfiladed by the American batteries. It has been observed that Keane's failure, to have taken the Chef Menteur Road, was compounded when the aggressively natured Pakenham went ahead and launched a frontal assault before the vital flank operation on the other bank of the river had been completed, at a cost of over 2,000 casualties.{{sfnp|Lambert|2012|p=344}}

Poor British planning and communication, plus costly frontal assaults against an entrenched enemy, caused lopsided British casualties.{{sfnp|NPS ''Alexander Cochrane''|2007}} The [[Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington|Duke of Wellington]] was saddened by the death of this man, his brother-in-law, with whom he had been on campaign in Spain. A grieving Wellington vented his anger towards Cochrane, whom he blamed:

{{blockquote|I cannot but regret that he was ever employed on such a service or with such a colleague. The expedition to New Orleans originated with that colleague&nbsp;... The Americans were prepared with an army in a fortified position which still would have been carried, if the duties of others, that is of the Admiral [Cochrane], had been as well performed as that of he whom we now lament.{{sfnp|Holmes|2003|pp=206-207}}}}

Patterson notes that the plan of attack was not his own, he conceded to follow it, despite his reservations, and his death prevented him from reformulating a subsequent attack, following the initial failure.{{sfnp|Patterson|2008|p=265}}

Reilly opines that the brilliance of Cochrane's plan to take possession of the Right Bank batteries was fully comprehended, after its capture. He believes it was the failure of Pakenham's staff to wake him, and to let him know the Right Bank landing was not possible, neither at daylight, nor with the numbers of soldiers originally envisaged, more than any other action or omission in the entire campaign, that was the biggest failure on the part of the British that led to proceed with the attack, with the disastrous outcome that day.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=299}}

Regarding the American forces on the Right Bank, Reilly states their defenses were inadequate, and that Morgan's deployment of his troops was incompetent.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=288}} The resultant court of inquiry made no mention of General David Bannister Morgan at all.{{sfnp|Reilly|1976|p=321}}