Editing Armed Forces of the Philippines (section)

==Reforms and modernization==
{{main|Security sector governance and reform|Security sector governance and reform in the Philippines}}
The AFP is one of the "core security actors"<ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/> that are the focus of [[security sector governance and reform in the Philippines]], which involves civilianizing, professionalizing, modernizing, and capacitating the Philippine government's security institutions<ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/><ref name=AteneoOretaAFPPNP>{{cite web |url=https://www.ateneo.edu/ls/news/research/security-reform-agenda-afp-and-pnp-2018-blueboard-jennifer-santiago-oreta |title=The Security Reform Agenda for the AFP and PNP in 2018 - Blueboard by Jennifer Santiago Oreta &#124; Ateneo de Manila University |access-date=August 2, 2021 |archive-date=September 5, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210905171928/http://ateneo.edu/ls/news/research/security-reform-agenda-afp-and-pnp-2018-blueboard-jennifer-santiago-oreta |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name=BWOretaSEASSR >{{cite web|url=https://www.bworldonline.com/security-sector-governance-and-reform-in-southeast-asia/|title=Security sector governance and reform in Southeast Asia|website=[[BusinessWorld]] |date=October 8, 2019}}</ref> to align them [[good governance]] and to principles such as [[human rights]], [[freedom of information]], and the [[rule of law|rule of civilian law]].<ref name=":02">{{Cite book|url=http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_Security_Sector_Governance_EN.pdf|title=Security Sector Governance: Applying the principles of good governance to the security sector|publisher=Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)|year=2015|series=SSR Backgrounder Series|location=Geneva|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170915023424/http://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_1_Security_Sector_Governance_EN.pdf|archive-date=September 15, 2017}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=Security System Reform and Governance|url=https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_LYLVAgAAQBAJ|publisher=OECD DAC|year=2005|isbn=978-92-64-00786-4|series=DAC Guidelines and Reference Series|location=Paris}}</ref> This has been a continuing process since the establishment of the [[Fifth Philippine Republic]] after the 1986 [[People Power Revolution]],<ref name=AteneoOretaAFPPNP/> before the concept had even been fully defined internationally in the 1990s.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/ssr-securing-its-success-justifying-its-relevance|title=SSR: Securing its success, justifying its relevance|last1=Price|first1=Megan|date=August 19, 2014|work=Clingendael|last2=van Veen|first2=Erwin|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170826234737/https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/ssr-securing-its-success-justifying-its-relevance|archive-date=August 26, 2017}}</ref>

=== Civilianization ===
{{see also|Civilian control of the military}}
The need to assert [[civilian control of the military]] was a reform agenda which began being addressed almost as soon as [[Ferdinand Marcos]] was deposed by the 1986 [[People Power Revolution]]; within a year of Marcos' ouster, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines enshrined the principle of civilian supremacy over the military.<ref name="MEI"/> After the various [[Coup attempts against Corazon Aquino|coup attempts of the 1980s]], the recommendations of the [[Davide Commission]] included the dissolution of the [[Philippine Constabulary]] as a service under the AFP, resulting in the eventual creation of the civilian [[Philippine National Police]].<ref name=about>[http://www.pnp.gov.ph/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46:about-the-philippine-national-police&catid=25:organization&Itemid=56 About the Philippine National police] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120326192226/http://www.pnp.gov.ph/main/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46:about-the-philippine-national-police&catid=25:organization&Itemid=56 |date=March 26, 2012 }}</ref> In 1998, Executive Orders 475 and 477 asserting the civilian nature of the [[Philippine Coast Guard]] and transferring it from the [[Philippine Navy]] to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) were signed by President Fidel Ramos.<ref>{{cite web |title=Legacies |url=https://coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/transparency/about-us/legacies |access-date=August 30, 2021 |website=coastguard.gov.ph}}</ref>

In a December 2013 paper for the [[National Defense College of the Philippines]]’ National Security Review, former [[Department of National Defense]] Undersecretary Rodel Cruz identified some aspects of civilianization which need attention under security sector reform as:<ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/><blockquote>	
* Increasing civilian capacity for defense management;
* Establishing an active constituency supportive of Security Sector Reform;
* Prudent budget preparation and execution;
* Supporting a local defense industry;
* Intelligent and coherent policy development and execution; and
* the passage of an updated National Defense Act.</blockquote>

==== Involvement of Civil Society====
For the most part, oversight of the Philippine state's security actors has fallen on government agencies through the constitutional system of checks and balances - most prominently, congress and the Commission on Human Rights.<ref name="MEI">{{cite web |title=Security Sector Reform in the Philippines |url=https://www.mei.edu/publications/security-sector-reform-philippines |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181106065411/http://www.mei.edu/publications/security-sector-reform-philippines |archive-date=November 6, 2018 |access-date=September 5, 2021 |website=Middle East Institute |language=en}}</ref> But civil society organizations have also become involved in civilianizing, professionalizing, modernizing, and capacitating the Philippine state's security institutions, depending on how much emphasis each President, as Commander in Chief, places on civil society engagement.<ref name="FerrerPHDR2015">{{Cite journal |last=CORONEL-FERRER |first=MIRIAM |date=2005 |title=Institutional Response: Civil Society |url=http://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20Civil_Society_Assessment.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Philippine Human Development Report 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110919113206/http://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20Civil_Society_Assessment.pdf |archive-date=September 19, 2011 |access-date=September 6, 2021}}https://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20Civil_Society_Assessment.pdf</ref>

Given a greater emphasis on Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) beginning in 2010, a shift towards engagement with Civil Society Organizations was put in place under the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) of 2010, and similar principles were enshrined in the 2016 AFP-Development Support and Security Plan (DSSP) of the next administration.<ref>{{cite web |date=January 29, 2018 |title=Security Reform in the Philippines for 2018 |url=https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/01/29/security-reform-in-the-philippines-for-2018/ |access-date=August 29, 2021 |website=Asia Dialogue |language=en-GB}}</ref> However, civil society is no longer identified as a major strategic priority under the 15 year AFP Transformation Roadmap initiated during the Duterte administration, as it had been under the 2003-2016 PDR Program.<ref name="philstar201020">{{Cite news |last1=Toledo |first1=Mike |last2=Kropholler |first2=Peter |date=August 24, 2020 |title=Protect, perform, transform |volume=3 |pages=981–998 |work=Annales Henri Lebesgue |url=https://www.philstar.com/other-sections/newsmakers/2020/10/20/2051054/protect-perform-transform |access-date=August 29, 2021 |doi=10.5802/ahl.51 |issn=2644-9463}}</ref>

=== Professionalization ===
The AFP went through a number of changes during the 21 years under Ferdinand Marcos, notably in terms of the promotion of officers based on loyalty and connections to the president, and in terms of being given the task of implementing Martial Law, which led to officers being involved in human rights violations and in corruption.<ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/> The years from 1965 to 1986 are thus considered to have marked a decline for AFP in terms of its traditional values of civilian supremacy and professionalism,<ref name="Lim2011CESRAN"/><ref name="secgovcentressrbriefer"/> leading to a need to actively professionalize the AFP.<ref name="secgovcentressrbriefer"/><ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/> The 1990 Davide Commission and 2003 Feliciano Commission made recommendations towards the professionalization of the AFP as early as 1990 and 2003, respectively.<ref name="Lim2011CESRAN"/><ref name="NDCPCruzSSR"/>

Under the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program from 2003 to 2016, steps the AFP sought to take towards professionalization included the development of "Integrity Development Programs", programmatic efforts to improve the quality of service performance, continuing development programs for commanders and staff, and reforms in the recruitment of enlisted personnel.<ref>{{Cite tech report |last=Department of National Defense |first=Republic of the Philippines |title=TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE TO EFFECTIVELY MEET THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE 21st CENTURY |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167331/Philippines_ENG_2012.pdf}}</ref> Alongside capability development, "professionalization of all ranks" is one of two strategic priorities identified by the 15 year AFP Transformation Roadmap which replaced the PDR Program during the Duterte administration.<ref name="philstar201020" />

===Modernization===
{{Main|AFP Modernization Act}}

Republic Act No. 7898, approved by President [[Fidel V. Ramos]] on February 23, 1995, declared it the policy of the State to modernize the AFP to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines, and mandated specific actions to be taken to achieve this end<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws/laws/RA_7898.pdf|title=Republic Act No. 7898 : AFP Modernization Act|date=February 23, 1995|publisher=Government of the Philippines}}</ref> over a 15-year period ending in 2010.<ref name="SSRAquinoDuterteAdmins">{{Cite news |last=Oreta |first=Jennifer Santiago |date=July 12, 2021 |title=Security sector reform under PNoy and Duterte administrations |language=en-US |work=[[BusinessWorld]] |url=https://www.bworldonline.com/security-sector-reform-under-pnoy-and-duterte-administrations/ |access-date=August 5, 2021}}</ref> Republic Act No. 10349, approved by President [[Benigno Aquino III]] on December 11, 2012, amended RA7898 to establish a revised AFP modernization program<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/12/11/republic-act-no-10349/|title=REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10349 : AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7898, ESTABLISHING THE REVISED AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES|date=December 11, 2012|publisher=Government of the Philippines}}</ref> lasting another 15 years ending in 2027.<ref name="SSRAquinoDuterteAdmins"/> The act included new provisions for the acquisition of equipment for all the branches of AFP.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

====Philippine Defense Reform Program (2003-2016)====
[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program framework.png|thumb|Framework of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
In October 1999, the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) began as a policy level discussion between the Philippine Secretary of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense. An initial JDA report in 2001 provided an objective evaluation of Philippine defense capability. During a May 2003 state visit to Washington DC, President Arroyo requested U.S. assistance in conducting a strategic assessment of the Philippine defense system. This led to a follow-up JDA and formulation of recommendations addressing deficiencies found in the Philippine defense structure.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|pp=6–7}}</ref>

The results of the 2003 JDA were devastating. The JDA findings revealed that the AFP was only partially capable of performing its most critical missions. Moreover, the results pointed overwhelmingly toward institutional and strategic deficiencies as being the root cause of most of the shortcomings. A common thread in all: the lack of strategy-based planning that would focus DND/AFP on addressing priority threats and link capability requirements with the acquisition process.

Specifically, the 2003 JDA revealed critical deficiencies in the following specific areas:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=7}}</ref>
* Systemic approach to policy planning
* Personnel management and leadership
* Defense expenditures and budgeting
* Acquisition
* Supply and maintenance
* Quality assurance for existing industrial base
* Infrastructure support

During a reciprocal visit to the Philippines in October 2003 by U.S. President Bush, he and President Arroyo issued a joint statement expressing their commitment to embark upon a multi-year plan to implement the JDA recommendations. The Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program is the result of that agreement.

The JDA specifically identified 65 key areas and 207 ancillary areas of concern. These were reduced to ten broad-based and inter-related recommendations that later became the basis for what became known as the PDR Priority Programs. The ten are:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=8}}, [https://web.archive.org/web/20060128011809/http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php DND and AFP: Transforming while Performing], [http://www.afp.mil.ph/ Armed forces of the Philippines]. (archived from [http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php the original] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060128011809/http://www.afp.mil.ph/0/news/transforming.php |date=January 28, 2006 }} on January 28, 2006)</ref>

# Multi-Year Defense Planning System (MYDPS)
# Improve Intelligence, Operations, and Training Capacities
# Improve Logistics Capacity
# Professional Development Program
# Improve Personnel Management System
# Multi-year Capabilities Upgrade Program (CUP)
# Optimization of Defense Budget and Improvement of Management Controls
# Centrally Managed Defense Acquisition System Manned by a Professional Workforce
# Development of Strategic Communication Capability
# Information Management Development Program

From the perspective of the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND), the framework for reforms is based on an environment of increasing economic prowess and a gradually decreasing threat level over time, and seeks to make the following improvements:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|pp=12–14}}</ref>
1. Address AFP capability gaps to enable the AFP to effectively fulfill its mission.
2. Implement capability for seamless interoperability by developing proficiency in the conduct of joint operations, eliminating crisis handling by individual major services as done previously.
3. improve effectiveness of internal security operations.
4. Enhance capability to counter terrorism and other transnational threats.
5. Provide sustainment and/or long-term viability of acquired capabilities.
6. Improve cost-effectiveness of operations.
7. Improve accountability and transparency in the DND.
8. Increase professionalism in the AFP through reforms in areas such as promotions, assignments, and training.
9. Increase involvement of AFP in the peace process.

[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program steps.png|thumb|Steps of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
According to the goals stated in the Philippines Defense Reform Handbook: "The PDR serves as the overall framework to re-engineer our systems and re-tool our personnel."<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=14}}, citing Philippine Defense Reform Handbook, Revised January 31, 2008.</ref> The Philippine Defense Reform follows a three-step implementation plan:<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=16}}</ref>
1. Creating the environment for reform (2004–2005);
2. Enabling the defense establishment (2005–2007);
3. Implementing and institutionalizing reform (2007–2010).

On September 23, 2003, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 240, streamlining procedures for defense contracts for the expeditious implementation of defense projects and the speedy response to security threats while promoting transparency, impartiality, and accountability in government transactions. Executive Order 240, creating the Office of the Undersecretary of Internal Control in the DND, mandated in part to institutionalize reforms in the procurement and fund disbursement systems in the AFP and the DND.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=21}}, [https://web.archive.org/web/20120429220810/http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 Executive Order No. 240], [http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/ Philippine Supreme Court E-Library]. (archived from [http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 the original] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110815144610/http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=a45475a11ec72b843d74959b60fd7bd645fb139b33ad8 |date=August 15, 2011 }} on April 29, 2012)</ref> On November 30, 2005, the Secretary of National Defense issued Department Order No. 82 (DO 82), creating the PDR Board and formalizing the reform organizational set-up between the DND and the AFP and defining workflow and decision-making processes.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=18}}</ref>

[[File:Philippine Defense Reform Program funding.png|thumb|Funding of the Philippine Defense Reform Program]]
The PDR is jointly funded by the U.S. and R.P. governments. From 2004 to 2008, funding amounted to $51.8 million from the U.S. and $514.0 million from the RP.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=27}}</ref> Initial planning assumptioned that the 18-year span of reform would encompass a period of steady rise in economic growth coupled with equally steady decline in the military threat from terrorists and separatists. Neither of these projections have proven accurate. {{as of|2010}}, at the six-year mark of PDR, the Philippine economy was internally strong, but suffering during a period of recession that crippled Philippine purchasing power. Worse, the threat situation in the Philippines had not improved significantly, or as in the case of the Sulu Archipelago, was deteriorating.<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=34}}</ref>

During the Arroyo presidency, deliberate 'Rolodexing' of senior leadership within the DND and AFP constantly put U.S. PDR advocates in a position of re-winning previously won points and positions, and gave U.S. observers a 'two steps forward, one step back' impression of the program. {{as of|2010}}, U.S. observers were uncertain whether Arroyo's successor, [[Benigno Aquino III]], chosen in Philippine Presidential elections on May 10, 2010, will continue the tradition of rapid turnover of senior leadership.<ref name="Comer 2010 35">{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=35}}</ref>

U.S. observers have reported that overall progress of the PDR is unmistakable and has clearly struck a wider swath of the Philippine defense establishment than originally hoped. However, they see some troubling signs that the depth of the PDR's impact may not be as significant as originally desired. For example, the Philippine legislature continues to significantly underfund the DND and AFP, currently at.9 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 2 percent worldwide, and a 4 percent outlay by the U.S. Even with full implementation of all the PDR's programs and recommendations, the defense establishment would not be able to sustain itself at current funding levels. While this can be made up by future outlays, {{as of|2010|lc=on}} observers see no outward sign the legislature is planning to do so.<ref name="Comer 2010 35"/> One U.S. observer likened PDR process to the progress of a [[Jeepney]] on a busy Manila avenue—explaining, "a Jeepney moves at its own pace, stops unexpectedly, frequently changes passengers, moves inexplicably and abruptly right and left in traffic, but eventually arrives safely."<ref>{{Harvnb|Comer|2010|p=36}}</ref> President Aquino has promised to implement the PDR program.<ref>[http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/aquino-promises/62 Promise 62: Implement the Defense Reform Program] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317145649/http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ |date=March 17, 2011 }}, [http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ ABS-CBN News].</ref> {{as of|2011|3|9}}, a major Philippine news organization tracking performance on his promises evaluated that one as "To Be Determined."<ref>[http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/aquino-promises/summaries/table Aquino Promises] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110317145649/http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ |date=March 17, 2011 }}, [http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/ ABS-CBN News].</ref>

The [[Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S.–Philippines)|Mutual Defense Treaty]] between the Philippines and the United States has not been updated since its signing in 1951. {{as of|2013}}, discussions were underway for a formal U.S.-Philippine Framework Agreement detail how U.S. forces would be able to "operate on Philippine military bases and in Philippine territorial waters to help build Philippine military capacity in maritime security and maritime domain awareness."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/|title=News Archive|website=U.S. Department of Defense}}</ref> In particular, this Framework Agreement would which would increase rotational presence of American forces in the Philippines.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/351920/news/nation/phl-us-inch-closer-to-deal-on-increased-rotational-presence-of-us-troops|title=PHL, US inch closer to deal on increased rotational presence of US troops|work=GMA News Online|date=March 10, 2014 }}</ref>

Longstanding treaties, such as the aforementioned 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the [[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]] (UNCLOS) of 1982,<ref>Department of Environment and Natural Resources/United Nations Development Programme/Marine
Environment and Resources Foundation, Inc. (2004) ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Archipelagic Development.
</ref> are of great importance to the Philippines in supporting maritime security in particular; respectively, their legally binding nature provides long-term effectiveness for mutual defense cooperation and for the development of the Philippine maritime and archipelagic domain.

Philippine defense operations are supported in part through U.S. Section 1206 ($102.3 million) and 1207 ($16.02 million) funds. These funds are aimed at carrying out security, counterterrorism training and rule of law programs.<ref>Serafino, N. (2013). Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Accessed from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf</ref> Overall, the United States is increasing U.S. funding for military education and training programs in Southeast Asia. The most recent U.S. Department of Defense budget for the region includes $90 million for programs, which is a 50 percent increased from four years ago.<ref>Voice of America (August 26, 2013). U.S. Significantly Boosts Military Funding for SE Asia. Voice of America. Accessed from: https://www.voanews.com/a/hagel-se-asia-corrected/1737438.html</ref>

Defense Secretary [[Voltaire T. Gazmin]] formally ended the PDR Program on June 23, 2016, because the upcoming administration of Rodrigo Duterte, which would begin its term later that month, had indicated that it wanted to set its own direction for the running of Philippine defense matters.<ref name="ReneAcosta2016PDRProgramEnded">{{Cite news |last=Acosta |first=Rene |date=June 23, 2016 |title=Gazmin closes Philippine Defense Reform Program {{!}} Rene Acosta |language=en-US |url=https://businessmirror.com.ph/2016/06/23/gazmin-closes-philippine-defense-reform-program/ |access-date=June 18, 2021}}</ref>

===Fixed Term for key officials===
On May 16, 2022, the [[Malacañang Palace]] announced that the President [[Rodrigo Duterte]] has signed a law, known as Republic Act no. 11709, that enables a three-year fixed term for key officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, such as [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]], the Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the [[Commanding General of the Philippine Army]], the [[Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force]], the [[Flag Officer-in-Command of the Philippine Navy]], The Inspector General, and for the respective commanders of the Unified Commands. Meanwhile, junior officers ranging from the ranks of second lieutenant/ensign to colonel/captain, as well as enlisted personnel, will be compulsorily retired upon reaching the age of 56 or served a maximum of 30 years of active service, while flag officers who reached the rank of brigadier general/commodore to lieutenant general/vice admiral will have a retirement age of 59, unless named as a commander of the service branch or unified command, as defined in the law. Under the new law, members who will be appointed in the Corps of Professors will be retired upon reaching the age of 60 or the completion of 20 years of active duty, while the Superintendent of the [[Philippine Military Academy]] will have a four-year term, and will not be eligible to be placed in a higher position, such as the Chief of Staff, and shall be retired upon reaching the end of their term. The law also enables the [[President of the Philippines]] to terminate their respective roles before the expiration of their fixed term, and has the powers to extend the term of the Chief of Staff in times of war, or national emergency matters, with the consent of the [[Congress of the Philippines]].<ref name="Fixed 3-year terms for military chiefs ensure stability of programs">{{cite news |title=Fixed 3-year terms for military chiefs ensure stability of programs |url=https://mb.com.ph/2022/05/19/fixed-3-year-terms-for-military-chiefs-ensure-stability-of-programs/ |work=Manila Bulletin |date=May 19, 2022}}</ref><ref name="Duterte signs law granting fixed three-year term for top military officials">{{cite news |last1=Panti |first1=Llanesca |date=May 16, 2022 |title=Duterte signs law granting fixed three-year term for top military officials |language=en |work=GMA News Online |url=https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/831829/duterte-signs-law-granting-fixed-three-year-term-for-top-military-officials/story/ |access-date=May 7, 2023}}</ref> The new law aims to increase the AFP's organizational professionalism and stability in within the institution, and will further enhance the AFP's efficiency, preparedness and effectiveness to the AFP's mandate. The law also aims to lessen the effects of the "revolving door" policy and eliminating short-term duties for the commanders within the ranks.<ref name="PRRD signs law fixing term of AFP chief, other senior officers">{{cite news |title=PRRD signs law fixing term of AFP chief, other senior officers |url=https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1174571 |work=www.pna.gov.ph |language=en}}</ref>

However, the new law encountered many problems within the AFP's organization, which caused some middle ranking officers to raise their concerns regarding the promotions of younger officers within the hierarchy, while addressing concerns for the possible reduction of promoted officers within the ranks of lieutenant colonel to colonel/ lieutenant commander to commander due to reduced tenure limits, and allaying fears of lowering a merit-based promotion system.<ref name="Lawmakers taking AFP pulse about new law on tenure">{{cite news |last1=Mangosing |first1=Frances |title=Lawmakers taking AFP pulse about new law on tenure |url=https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1699927/lawmakers-taking-afp-pulse-about-new-law-on-tenure |work=INQUIRER.net |date=December 1, 2022 |language=en}}</ref> Additionally, another hurdles also hounded the higher ranks, due to the fixed tenures of various officers, and on the appointment of [[Bartolome Vicente Bacarro]] as the [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines|AFP Chief of Staff]], where in an editorial made by then-AFP Spokesman retired Major General Edgard Arevalo in [[The Manila Times]] named "The fates of two AFP chiefs of staff", where Bacarro's appointment as AFP Chief was made months prior of General [[Andres Centino]]'s mandatory retirement age, in which makes Centino's position as the only four star officer in the AFP is still higher than Bacarro's, which prevented Bacarro to be promoted to the next rank.<ref name="The fates of two AFP chiefs of staff">{{cite news |last1=Arevalo (Ret.) |first1=Maj Gen Edgard A. |title=The fates of two AFP chiefs of staff |url=https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/11/27/opinion/columns/the-fates-of-two-afp-chiefs-of-staff/1867963 |work=The Manila Times |date=November 27, 2022 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Amend RA 11709">{{cite news |last1=Villanueva |first1=Marichu A. |title=Amend RA 11709 |url=https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2023/01/09/2236228/amend-ra-11709 |work=Philstar.com}}</ref> The problems regarding the new law caused rumblings in the AFP's organization, which was also admitted by then [[Secretary of National Defense (Philippines)|DND Officer-in-Charge]] [[Carlito Galvez Jr.]].<ref name="Grumblings in AFP must end: Senate bill proposes 5 changes to unpopular 3-year rule">{{cite news |last1=Fernandez |first1=Daniza |title=Grumblings in AFP must end: Senate bill proposes 5 changes to unpopular 3-year rule |url=https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1726664/senate-bill-seeks-five-amendments-to-law-to-put-afp-grumblings-to-rest |work=INQUIRER.net |date=February 7, 2023 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Alleged rumblings in AFP merely due to RA 11709: Galvez">{{Cite web|url=https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1193157|title=Alleged rumblings in AFP merely due to RA 11709: Galvez &#124; Philippine News Agency|website=Philippine News Agency }}</ref> After months of deliberations, a new law was made in order to fix the problems caused by Republic Act no. 11709, and on May 17, 2023, the Republic Act no. 11939 was signed by President [[Bongbong Marcos]], which reduced number of officials of having fixed terms to only five, namely the [[Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]], which will have a maximum of a three-year tenure. Four other high ranking officers will also  will have a maximum of a two-year tenure, which consists of the [[Commanding General of the Philippine Army]], the [[Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force]], the [[Flag Officer-in-Command of the Philippine Navy]], and the Superintendent of the [[Philippine Military Academy]]. The newly revised law also maintained the powers of the [[President of the Philippines]] to terminate their terms at his/her pleasure.<ref name="Republic Act No. 11939 {{!}} GOVPH">{{cite web |title=Republic Act No. 11939 {{!}} GOVPH |url=https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2023/05/17/republic-act-no-11939/ |website=Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines |date=May 17, 2023}}</ref> On January 7, 2023, General [[Andres Centino]] was reappointed as AFP Chief of Staff, replacing Lieutenant General [[Bartolome Vicente Bacarro]], which made Centino the only AFP Chief to be appointed in the same office twice, from November 12, 2021, to August 8, 2022, and on January 6, 2023, to July 19, 2023, and is the only AFP Chief to be appointed in the post by two Presidents.<ref name="AFP welcomes General Centino as 59th Chief of Staff, bids farewell to Lieutenant General Bacarro">{{cite news |title=AFP welcomes General Centino as 59th Chief of Staff, bids farewell to Lieutenant General Bacarro |url=https://pia.gov.ph/news/2023/01/07/afp-welcomes-general-centino-as-59th-chief-of-staff-bids-farewell-to-lieutenant-general-bacarro |work=PIA |date=January 7, 2023}}</ref>