Editing United States Football League (section)

===The Dixon plan vs. building a league of stars===
At first the USFL competed with the older, more established [[National Football League]] by following the Dixon plan.  The plan allowed the league to compete not just by playing its games on a March–June schedule during the NFL off-season, but also by having the following conditions:
* Teams play in large, NFL-caliber stadiums.
* Teams plan for large year 1 pre-season promotional budgets to introduce the team to the local market.
* A tight players' salary cap of $1.8 million per team (the NFL introduced a salary cap in 1994).
* A territorial draft,  to better stock teams with familiar local collegiate stars to help the gate (similar to the proposed [[All-American Football League]] and used by the now-defunct [[Alliance of American Football]]).

The Dixon plan laid out a budget to allow all teams to manage losses in the initial lean years. As mentioned earlier, prospective owners had to meet strict capitalization requirements and post a $1.3 million line of credit for emergencies.

The league's TV revenue met the requirements of the Dixon plan.  The Plan called for first year attendance over 18,000 per game.  In 1983, 10 of the 12 teams exceeded that threshold.  Player spending was where the league deviated from the plan, in the name of pursuing stars.

The league's biggest splash—the signing of Herschel Walker, a three time All-American and the 1982 Heisman Trophy winner—represented a significant breach from the Dixon Plan. Like the NFL, the USFL barred [[Underclassman (student)|underclassmen]] from signing. However, league officials were certain that this rule would never stand up in court, so they allowed Walker to sign with the [[New Jersey Generals]]. More importantly, Walker signed a three-year contract valued at $4.2 million with a $1 million signing bonus. Due to the USFL's salary cap rules, this was a personal-services contract with Generals owner J. Walter Duncan, and not a standard player contract. Nonetheless, the other owners did not raise any objections, knowing that having the reigning Heisman winner in the fold would lend the league instant credibility.

Other marquee stars to sign with the league were [[Craig James (running back)|Craig James]], [[Anthony Carter (American football)|Anthony Carter]] and [[Kelvin Bryant]] as well as some familiar NFL vets like [[Chuck Fusina]] and members of the NFL vet laden [[Chicago Blitz]], like [[Greg Landry]], showed that the upstart league was a credible challenger to the NFL. The league also made a serious run at some other stars, such as [[Eric Dickerson]] and [[Dan Marino]].

The pursuit of top-level talent proved to be a double-edged sword. While the presence of many blue-chip stars proved the league could put a competitive product on the field, many teams wildly exceeded the league's player salary cap in order to put more competitive teams on the field. For instance, the Michigan Panthers reportedly lost $6 million—three times what Dixon suggested a team could afford to lose in the first season—even as they became the league's first champions. The desire to compete with other loaded USFL teams and for the league to be seen as approaching NFL caliber led to almost all of the teams exceeding the Dixon Plan's team salary cap amount within the league's first 6–18 months.

Dixon urged the members of the league to reduce spending.  Rather than backing off spending, recommitting to a firmer salary cap, and dispersing some of the larger contracts to expansion teams to alleviate the problem, the league sought other options to take on revenue to cover increased costs overruns.  These actions magnified the problem.

The league added six more teams in 1984 rather than the four initially envisioned by Dixon, to pocket two more expansion fees. This put more pressure on the TV deal, which was not designed to support an 18 team league. A frustrated Dixon sold his stake and got out.

Additionally, the league was so determined to appear to put a credible product on the field that on some occasions, it set aside its own vetting procedures–all of which backfired disastrously. When Diethrich sold the Blitz to Hoffman in order to clear the way for his purchase of the Wranglers before the 1984 season, they did not take a close look at Hoffman's financial statements. Realizing he was in over his head, Hoffman was forced to scramble to find minority partners. When there were no takers, he walked away from the team after the second preseason game, forcing the league to take over the team.<ref name=Reeths>{{cite book|title=The United States Football League, 1982–1986|last=Reeths|first=Paul|publisher=[[McFarland & Company]]|date=2017|isbn=978-1476667447}}</ref><ref name=Buck>{{cite book|title=Football For A Buck: The Crazy Rise and Crazier Demise of the USFL|last=Pearlman|first=Jeff|author-link=Jeff Pearlman|publisher=[[Houghton Mifflin Harcourt]]|date=2018|isbn=978-0544454385}}</ref>

In San Antonio, the league was so enamored at Manges' apparent oil wealth that it not only did not closely vet his application, but did not require him to make an initial capital investment. Instead, Manges paid team expenses out of pocket as they arose, resulting in an operation that appeared short of professional standards. The Gunslingers' offices were in a double-wide trailer, and they used folding chairs to bring [[Alamo Stadium]] up to minimum capacity. Manges' practices caught up with him in 1985, when the oil market collapsed. The result was a litany of bounced checks, culminating in the team going the last four games without pay.<ref name=Reeths/><ref name=Buck/> It later emerged that Manges had been in financial difficulty as early as 1980.

The worst situation of all, however, was in Los Angeles. Original owners Alan Harmon and Bill Daniels sold the Express to mortgage banker J. William Oldenburg before the 1984 season. Swayed by Oldenburg's apparent net worth of $100 million, the USFL took his word as evidence that he would be a solid owner for one of its marquee franchises. However, in June 1984, investigations by the FBI, ''[[The New York Times]]'' and ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' revealed that the man who made waves by signing a roster of high-priced young talent did not have even a fraction of the money to buy the team. He abruptly walked away from the team during the playoffs. Gamblers minority owner Jay Roulier took over the team in October, only to be pushed out just months later when it emerged that he too had lied about his net worth. The league was forced to run the team on a shoestring that season.<ref name=Reeths/><ref name=Buck/>

With the new wave of teams, more college stars like [[Marcus Dupree]], [[Mike Rozier]], [[Reggie White]], [[Jim Kelly]], [[Steve Young (American football)|Steve Young]] and other young stars of the day signed high dollar contracts to play for USFL teams in 1984, as did high-profile NFL stars like [[Doug Williams (quarterback)|Doug Williams]], [[Brian Sipe]], [[Joe Cribbs]], and [[Gary Barbaro]].