Editing Thomas R. Marshall (section)

===Succession crisis===

President Wilson experienced a mild [[cerebrovascular accident|stroke]] in September 1919.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 275.</ref> On October 2, he was struck by a much more severe stroke that left him partially paralyzed and almost certainly incapacitated.<ref name = g240/><ref name="Bennett 2007, p. 279">Bennett 2007, p. 279.</ref><ref name = g302>Gray 1977, p. 302.</ref> Wilson's closest adviser, [[Joseph Patrick Tumulty|Joseph Tumulty]], did not believe Marshall would be a suitable acting president and took precautions to prevent him from assuming presidential powers and duties. Wilson's wife [[Edith Bolling Galt Wilson|Edith]] strongly disliked Marshall because of what she called his "uncouthed" disposition, and also opposed his assumption of presidential powers and duties.<ref name = f13>Feerick 1992, p. 13.</ref><ref>Bennett 2007, p. 235.</ref> Tumulty and the First Lady believed that an official communication from Wilson's staff on his condition would allow Marshall to trigger the constitutional mechanism allowing him to become acting president, and made sure no such communication occurred.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 277.</ref><ref>Congressional Quarterly 1976, p. 212.</ref> After Marshall demanded to know Wilson's status so that he could prepare for the possibility of becoming president, they had a reporter from ''[[The Baltimore Sun]]'' brief Marshall and inform him that Wilson was near death.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 285.</ref> Marshall later said that "it was the first great shock of my life", but without an official communication on Wilson's condition, he didn't believe he could constitutionally assume presidential powers and duties.<ref name = g302/><ref name = b243>Bennett 2007, p. 243.</ref><ref>Congressional Quarterly 1976, p. 213.</ref>

On October 5, [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Robert Lansing]] was the first official to propose that Marshall forcibly assume presidential powers and duties. Other cabinet secretaries backed Lansing's request. Congressional leaders of both parties also sent private communications to Marshall, who was cautious in accepting their support.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 282.</ref> After consulting with his wife and his long-time personal adviser, Mark Thistlethwaite, he privately refused to assume Wilson's duties and become [[Acting president of the United States|acting president]].<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 244.</ref><ref>Gray 1977, p. 303.</ref> The process for declaring a president incapacitated was unclear at that time, and he feared the precedent that might be set if he forcibly removed Wilson from his powers and duties.<ref name = f13/> Marshall wanted the president to voluntarily allow his powers to devolve to the vice president, but that was impossible given his condition and unlikely given Wilson's dislike for Marshall. The vice president informed the cabinet that he would assume Wilson's powers and duties only in response to a joint resolution of Congress calling on him to do so or an official communication from Wilson or his staff asserting his inability to perform his duties.<ref name="Bennett 2007, p. 279"/><ref name = g302/>

Wilson was kept secluded by his wife and personal physician and only his close advisers were allowed to see him; none would divulge official information on his condition.<ref name="Bennett 2007, p. 279"/> Although Marshall sought to meet with Wilson to determine his condition, he was unable to do so. He instead relied on vague updates received through bulletins published by Wilson's physician.<ref name = f14>Feerick 1992, p. 14.</ref> Believing that Wilson and his advisers would not voluntarily transfer power to the vice president, a group of congressional leaders initiated Marshall's requested joint resolution. However, senators opposed to the League of Nations treaty blocked the joint resolution in hopes of preventing the treaty's ratification. These senators believed that as acting president Marshall would make several key concessions that would allow the treaty to win ratification. Wilson, in his present condition, was either unwilling or unable to make the concessions, and debate on the bill had resulted in a deadlock.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 280.</ref>

On December 4, Lansing announced in a Senate committee hearing that no one in the cabinet had spoken with or seen Wilson in over sixty days. The senators seeking to elevate Marshall requested that a committee be sent to check on Wilson's condition, hoping to gain evidence to support their cause. Dubbed the "smelling committee" by several newspapers, the group discovered Wilson was in very poor health, but seemed to have recovered enough of his faculties to make decisions. Their report ended the perceived need for the joint resolution.<ref>Bennett 2007, pp. 281–282.</ref>

At a Sunday church service in mid-December, in what Marshall believed was an attempt by other officials to force him to assume the presidency, a courier brought a message informing him that Wilson had died. Marshall was shocked, and rose to announce the news to the congregation. The ministers held a prayer, the congregation began singing hymns, and many people wept. Marshall and his wife exited the building, and made a call to the White House to determine his next course of action, only to find that he had been the victim of a hoax, and that Wilson was still alive.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 297.</ref>

Marshall performed a few ceremonial functions for the remainder of Wilson's term, such as hosting foreign dignitaries. Among these was [[Albert I of Belgium|Albert I]], [[Monarchy of Belgium|King of the Belgians]], the first European monarch to visit the United States. [[Edward VIII|Edward, Prince of Wales]], the future monarch of the United Kingdom, spent two days with Marshall and received a personal tour of Washington from him.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 292.</ref> [[First Lady of the United States|First Lady]] Edith Wilson performed most routine duties of government. She reviewed Wilson's communications and decided what to share with him and what to delegate to others. The resulting lack of leadership allowed the administration's opponents to prevent ratification of the League of Nations treaty.<ref name = f14/><ref>Gray 1977, p. 304.</ref> They attacked the treaty's tenth article, which they believed would allow the United States to be bound in an alliance to European countries that could force the country to return to war without an act of Congress.<ref>Bennett 2007, pp. 256–258.</ref> Marshall personally supported the treaty's adoption, but recommended several changes, including the requirement that all parties to it acknowledge the [[Monroe Doctrine]] and the United States' sphere of influence, and that the tenth article be made non-binding.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 264.</ref><ref>Gray 1977, p. 305.</ref>

Wilson began to recover by the end of 1919, but remained secluded for the remainder of his term, steadfast in his refusal or inability to accept changes to the treaty. Marshall was prevented from meeting with him to ascertain his true condition until his final day in office. It remains unclear who made executive decisions during Wilson's incapacity, but it was likely the first lady with the help of the presidential advisers.<ref>Bennett 2007, p. 247.</ref><ref name = g241>Gugin and St. Clair, eds., 2006, p. 241.</ref>