Editing Thirty Years' War (section)

==Military developments==

Innovations made by Gustavus in particular are considered part of the evolution known as the "[[Military Revolution]]", although whether tactics or technology were at the heart of these changes is still debated.{{Sfn|Sharman|2018|pp=493–495}} Introduced by [[Maurice, Prince of Orange|Maurice of Orange]] in the 1590s, these sought to increase infantry firepower by moving from massed [[Column (formation)|columns]] to [[Line (formation)|line formation]]. Gustavus further reduced the ten ranks used by Maurice to six, and increased the proportion of [[musketeer]]s to [[Pike (weapon)|pikemen]]. He also enhanced their firepower by providing each unit with quick-firing light artillery pieces on either flank. The best example of their application in battle was the victory over Tilly's traditionally organised army at Breitenfeld in September 1631.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=185}}

[[Image:Firing Breitenfeld formations.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.2|[[Battle of Breitenfeld (1631)|Breitenfeld]] 1631; Tilly's army ''(left)'' are deployed two companies deep, the Swedes ''(right)'' just one company deep.]]

Line formations were often harder to co-ordinate, as demonstrated when the supposedly obsolete Spanish [[tercios]] defeated the Swedes at [[Battle of Nördlingen (1634)|Nördlingen]] in 1634.{{Sfn|Parker|1976|p=200}} Since they also lacked the offensive impact of columns, Gustavus compensated by requiring his cavalry to be far more aggressive, often employing Finnish ''[[Hakkapeliitta]]'' as shock troops. However, even the Swedes used columns on occasion, notably the failed assault at Alte Veste in September 1632. The line versus column debate continued into the early 19th century, and both were employed during the [[Napoleonic Wars]].{{Sfn|Chandler|1990|pp=130–137}}

Such tactics needed professional soldiers, who could retain formation, reload and fire disciplined [[salvo]]s while under attack, as well as the use of standardised weapons. The first half of the 17th century saw the publication of numerous instruction manuals showing the movements required, thirty-two for pikemen and forty-two for musketeers.{{Sfn|Parker|1976|p=202}} In theory, it took up to six months to train infantry to operate in this way, but in reality many went into battle with far less experience.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=184}} It also placed greater responsibility on junior officers who provided the vital links between senior commanders and the tactical unit. One of the first military schools designed to produce such men was set up at [[Siegen]] in 1616, and others soon followed.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=184}}

On the other hand, strategic thinking failed to develop at the same pace. Historian [[Jeremy Black (historian)|Jeremy Black]] claims most campaigns were "inconclusive", since they were primarily concerned with gaining access to supplies and money for the soldiers, rather than focused strategic objectives. The disconnect between military and diplomatic goals helps explain why the war lasted so long, and peace proved so elusive.{{Sfn|Croxton|1998|p=254}} When fighting officially ended in 1648, there were still over 150,000 troops under arms within the Empire, small numbers by modern standards, but unprecedented at the time.{{Sfn|Wilson|2009|p=770}} Most 17th century states could not finance armies of this size for extended periods, forcing them to depend on "contributions" from areas they passed through.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=177}}

Supplies thus became the limiting factor in planning campaigns, a problem that grew more acute as the war progressed. Armies became smaller, with a greater emphasis on cavalry that could cover greater distances and move faster, rather than slow moving infantry. Poor infrastructure also required commanders to stay close to rivers, then the primary means of bulk transportation, and meant they could not move too far from their main bases.{{Sfn|Croxton|1998|pp=255–256}} Feeding the troops became an objective in itself, unconnected to diplomatic goals and largely uncontrolled by their central governments. The result was "armies increasingly devoid of intelligible political objectives...degenerating into travelling armed mobs, living in a symbiotic relationship with the countryside they passed through".{{Sfn|O'Connell|1990|p=147}} This often conflicted with the political aims of their employers; the devastation inflicted in 1628 and 1629 by Imperial troops on Brandenburg and Saxony, both nominally allies, was a major factor in their support for Swedish intervention.{{Sfn|Wedgwood|1938|pp=257–258}}

Finally, some commentators argue that while the Thirty Years War certainly played its part in accelerating new tactics and technology, of greater significance was the need to fund, supply and direct permanent armies for long periods, across wide-ranging theatres. Doing so required much more sophisticated mechanisms, and led to the transfer of organised violence from "contractor" generals like Wallenstein or Mansfeld to nation states. In that sense, the truly "revolutionary" aspect of the Military Revolution was less on the tactics and technology used by soldiers, but the institutions required to support them.{{sfn|Backstrom|2023|pp=246-248}}