Editing Tatmadaw (section)

===Kuomintang invasion/Burma Socialist Programme Party era (1958–1988)===
At the beginning of the 1950s, while the Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) troops under General [[Li Mi (Republic of China general)|Li Mi]], with support from the [[United States]], invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against [[China]], which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February 1953 against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from the [[United States]] and as a result it failed to deliver its objectives and ended in a humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw.<ref name=":2" />

The Tatmadaw leadership then argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example, [[Brigadier General]] Maung Maung pointed out that newspapers, such as the "Nation", carried reports detailing the training and troops positioning, even went as far to the name and social background of the commanders who are leading the operation thus losing the element of surprise. [[Colonel]] Saw Myint, who was second in command for the operation, also complained about the long lines of communications and the excessive pressure imposed upon the units for public relations activities to prove that the support of the people was behind the operation.<ref name=":2" />

[[File:Burmese Navy visit to Indonesia, Jalesveva Jayamahe, p198.jpg|thumb|Myanmar Navy visiting [[Indonesia]] in 1960]]
Despite failure, the Tatmadaw continued to rely on this [[doctrine]] until the mid-1960s. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late 1950s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late 1950s as the [[Insurgency|insurgents]] and KMT changed their positional [[Asymmetric warfare|warfare]] strategy to [[hit-and-run tactics|hit and run]] [[guerrilla warfare]].<ref>Aung San Thuriya Hla Thaung (Armanthit Sarpay, Yangon, 1999)</ref><ref>In Defiance of the Storm (Myawaddy Press, Yangon, 1997</ref>

At the 1958 the Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, [[Colonel]] Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that the 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with [[Insurgency|insurgents]]', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were [[guerrilla]] fighters during the anti-British and anti-Japanese campaigns during the [[World War II|Second World War]], they had very little knowledge of anti-guerrilla or [[counterinsurgency]] warfare. Based upon Colonel Kyi Win's report, the Tatmadaw began developing an appropriate military doctrine and strategy to meet the requirements of [[counterinsurgency]] warfare.

This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress [[insurgency]] with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the [[foreign policy]] based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable,<ref>Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region (St. Martin's Press)</ref> therefore [[counterinsurgency]] became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1961, the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of [[War|conflicts]], collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion.<ref name=":2" />

In 1962, as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and [[counterinsurgency]]-training courses were delivered at the training schools. The new doctrine laid out three potential enemies and they are internal insurgents, historical enemies with roughly an equal strength (i.e. [[Thailand]]), and enemies with greater strength. It states that in suppressing insurgencies, the Tatmadaw must be trained to conduct long-range penetration with a tactic of continuous [[search and destroy]]. Reconnaissance, [[Ambush]] and all weather day and night offensive and attack capabilities along with winning the hearts and minds of people are important parts of anti-guerrilla warfare. For countering an historical enemy with equal strength, the Tatmadaw should fight a [[conventional warfare]] under total war strategy, without giving up an inch of its territory to the enemy. For powerful enemy and foreign invaders, the Tatmadaw should engage in total people's war, with a special focus on [[guerrilla]] strategy.<ref name=":2" />

To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine, [[Brigadier General]] [[San Yu]], the then Vice [[Chief of staff (military)|Chief of Staff]] ([[Myanmar Army|Army]]), sent a delegation led by [[Lieutenant Colonel]] Thura [[Tun Tin]] was sent to [[Switzerland]], [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], [[Czechoslovakia]] and [[East Germany]] in July 1964 to study organisation structure, armaments, training, territorial organisation and strategy of people's [[militias]]. A research team was also formed at General Staff Office within the War Office to study defence capabilities and militia formations of neighbouring countries.

The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for [[counterinsurgency]] and [[guerrilla warfare]] for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active [[foreign policy]], total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences.

The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space ({{lang|my|du-thone-du}}) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale ({{lang|my|Panama-lay-yat}}). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its [[guerrilla]] strategy to counter any form of foreign invasion. The overall [[counterinsurgency]] strategy included not only elimination of insurgents and their support bases with the '[[four cuts]]' strategy, but also the building and designation of 'white area' and 'black area' as well.

In April 1968, the Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on [[ambush]] and counter-ambush, [[counterinsurgency]] weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, [[commando]] tactics, and reconnaissance. [[Battalion]] size operations were also practised in the Southwest Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in 1971.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Myoe |first=Maung Aung |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g4bA3Oasvn4C&dq=myanmar++doctrine+1971+BSPP+people's+war&pg=PA29 |title=Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948 |date=2009-01-22 |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |isbn=978-981-230-848-1 |language=en}}</ref> BSPP laid down directives for "complete [[annihilation]] of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making.

Throughout the BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In 1985, the then [[Lieutenant General]] [[Saw Maung]], Vice-[[Chief of staff (military)|Chief of Staff]] of Tatmadaw reminded his commanders during his speech at the Command and General Staff College:
<blockquote>
In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about 0.01%. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops... therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. To defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war.
</blockquote>