Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Chile: Allende===
[[Image:Prats Schneider Cheyre-2.jpg|thumb|Commander-in-Chief of the [[Chilean Army]], the constitutionalist [[René Schneider]] (1913–1970), was killed by rogue fellow officers, who were met by CIA, but cut adrift before the shooting.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 269–273. Powers opines (at 273) that the General's assassins "would have done nothing at all without American encouragement to move. If the CIA did not actually shoot General Schneider, it is probably fair to say that he would not have been shot without the CIA."</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 310–311, 312–313.</ref>]]

Helms engaged in efforts to block the [[socialism|socialist]] programs of [[Salvador Allende]] of Chile, actions done at President Nixon's behest. The operation was code-named [[Project Fubelt]]. After Allende's victory in the 1970 election, CIA jumped into action with a series of sharp and divisive maneuvers. Nonetheless, Allende was inaugurated as president of Chile. Thereafter, the CIA's efforts declined in intensity, though softer tactics continued. Three years later (11 Sept. 1973) the [[Chilean coup of 1973|military coup]] led by [[Augusto Pinochet]] violently ended the democratically elected regime of President Allende.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 251–273.</ref><ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 306–317.</ref><ref>Turner (2005) pp. 128–130.</ref>

During the [[1970 Chilean presidential election]], the USG had sent financial and other assistance to the two candidates opposing Allende, who won anyway.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 260–262.</ref><ref>Colby (1978) p. 302. Colby, DCI 1973–1976, notes that the CIA often funded foreign "center democrats", e.g., in Italy during the 1950s (cf., 108–140).</ref><ref>Cf., [[Anthony Sampson]], [[The Sovereign State of ITT]] (New York: Stein and Day 1973, reprint Fawcett Crest 1974). [[John McCone]], then on the board of directors at [[ITT Corporation]] and former DCI, had met with Helms twice, and Kissinger, in early 1970 to discuss stopping Allende's candidacy (p. 263, 268). ITT owned and operated the telephone system in Chile (p. 256), which in 1972 President Allende moved to nationalize (pp. 258–259, 280).</ref> Helms states that then, on Sept. 15, 1970, he met with President Nixon who [[U.S. intervention in Chile|ordered the CIA to support an army coup]] to prevent an already elected Allende from being confirmed as president; it was to be kept secret. "He wanted something done and he didn't care how," Helms later characterized the order.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 403–407, quote at 404. Only Kissinger, the Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell|John Mitchell]], and Helms were to know about Nixon's secret order to enlist the Chilean Army to stage a ''coup''. Helms (2003) p. 405. Thus [[Edward Korry]] the Ambassador to Chile remained out of the loop. Helms writes (at 404) that he tried to caution Nixon but to no avail.</ref><ref>Regarding Ambassador Korry, see Powers (1979) pp. 256–271.</ref> The secret, illegal (in Chile) activity ordered by Nixon was termed "track II" to distinguish it from the CIA's covert funding of Chilean "democrats" here called "track I".<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 303–304. Nixon directed that "Track II" be kept secret from everybody, including the State Department and its ambassador in Chile, Defense, and the [[Forty Committee|interdepartmental oversight committee]]. "However unusual, this order was fully within the President's authority to order covert action."</ref><ref>Senate [Church Committee] (1975) pp. 229–232.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 315–317.</ref> Accordingly, the CIA took assorted covert steps, including actions to badger a law-abiding Chilean army to seize power. CIA agents were once in communication, but soon broke off such contact, with rogue elements of the country's military who later assassinated the "[[Chilean Constitution of 1980|constitutionally minded]]" General René Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief. Following this criminal violence, the Chilean army's support swung firmly behind Allende, whom the Congress confirmed as president of Chile on November 3, 1970.<ref name="Powers 1979 p. 273">Powers (1979) p. 273.</ref><ref>Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 72–73. The Soviet [[KGB]] claimed some small credit for Allende's election, having sent him campaign contributions through the [[Communist Party of Chile]].</ref> CIA did not intend the killing. "At all times, however, Helms made it plain that assassination was not an option."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 517 (quote).</ref><ref>Senate [Church Committee], ''Alleged Assassination Plots'' (1975) pp. 228; cf., 226.</ref> Nixon and Kissinger blamed Helms for Allende's presidency.<ref name="Powers 1979 p. 273"/><ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 520.</ref>

Thereafter, the CIA funneled millions of dollars to opposition groups, e.g., political parties, the media, and striking truck drivers, in a continuing, long-term effort to destabilize [[Economy of Chile|Chile's economy]] and so subvert the Allende administration. Nixon's initial, memorable phrase for such actions had been "to make the Chilean economy ''scream''".<ref>Turner (2005) p. 129.</ref> Even so, according to DCI Helms, "In my remaining months in office, Allende continued his determined march to the left, but there was no further effort to instigate a coup in Chile." Helms here appears to parse between providing funds for Allende's political opposition ("track I") versus actually supporting a military overthrow ("track II").<ref>Helms (2003) p. 407.</ref> Although in policy disagreement with Nixon, Helms assumed the role of the "good soldier" in following his presidential instructions.<ref>Powers (1979) pp. 124, 270–271.</ref> Helms left office at the CIA on February 2, 1973, seven months before the [[coup d'etat]] in Chile.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 412.</ref>

Another account of CIA activity in Chile, however, states that during this period 1970–1973 the CIA worked diligently to propagandize the military into countenancing a ''coup'', e.g., the CIA supported and cultivated rightists in the formerly "constitutionally minded" army to start thinking 'outside the box', i.e., to consider a ''coup d'etat''. Thus, writes author [[Tim Weiner]], while not per se orchestrating the 1973 ''coup'', the CIA worked for years, employing economic and other means, to seduce the army into doing so.<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 315.</ref> Allende's own actions may have caused relations with his army to become uneasy.<ref>Allende was counselled by the Soviets to set up a new and separate security force independent of the army, yet Allende only mustered forces sufficient to antagonize the army but not enough to provide himself with protection. Cf., Andrew and Mitrokhin (2007) p. 82.</ref> The CIA sowed "political and economic chaos in Chile" which set the stage for a successful ''coup'', Weiner concludes.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 315–316, states that American actions after 1970 reveal the persistent goal of having an army ''coup'' overthrow Allende. During the next year, 1971, the new CIA station chief in Santiago "built a web of military men and political saboteurs who sought to shift the Chilean military off its constitutional foundation." Yet Weiner also notes how Allende made his own trouble with the army.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 519–520. CIA's 1970 efforts continued against Allende until the 1973 coup.</ref><ref>U.S. Senate (Church), ''Alleged Assassination Plots'' (1975) p. 254. The CIA understood that their 1970 efforts were to be "replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile." Former DDP [[Thomas Karamessines]] testified that CIA actions in Chile continued, and that "the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973."</ref> Hence, Helms's careful parsing appears off the mark. Views and opinions differ, e.g., Kissinger contests,<ref>[[Henry Kissinger]], ''White House Years'' (Boston: Little, Brown 1979) pp. 652–683. "[I]t was not American economic pressure but Allende's own policies that brought him down," writes Kissinger (at 682) about Allende's failures in managing the Chilean economy during 1970–1973. Kissinger notes that USG foreign aid and assistance to Chile did not altogether stop during Allende's presidency (at 681–682, cf. 1486–1487). About the 1970 "''coup'' strategy", Kissinger understood Nixon's initial 'go ahead' to Helms differently (at 673–674), but states that after first contacting the Viaux group of assassins, the CIA had called them off five days before their killing of General René Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Chile (at 676–677). Kissinger decades later wrote the "Foreword" to Helms' memoirs, published in 2003.</ref> what William Colby in part acknowledges.<ref>Colby (1978) pp. 305–306. Although "track II" coup plotting ceased in 1970, Nixon's "hostility" toward Allende continued. American policy included "the administration's attempts to rally private capital against Chile, the State Department's efforts to cut off its international credits, and the American military's continued warm contacts with the Chilean military." Yet Colby protests making the CIA the "scapegoat" for the evils of the military ''coup'' in Chile.</ref>

After Helms' departure from the CIA in early 1973, Nixon continued to work directly against the Allende regime.<ref>On August 22, 1973, a hostile congress passed (by 81 to 47) its resolution condemning Allende's extra-constitutional actions. In reply Allende coolly noted that they failed to get the two-thirds required for impeachment, and their own resolution seemed to invite a ''coup d'etat''. Paul E. Sigmund, ''The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964–1976'' (University of Pittsburgh 1980) pp. 232–234. In the weeks before the ''coup'' Chilean society seemed locked in an unsustainable polarization; also an immediate, palpable tension gripped Chile, due to shortages and strikes. Sigmund (1980) pp. 238–239</ref> Although [[1970 Chilean presidential election|elected]] with 36.3% of the vote (to 34.9% for runner-up in a three-way contest), [[Chile under Allende|Allende as President]] reportedly ignored the [[Chilean Constitution of 1925|Constitución de 1925]] in pursuit of his socialist policies, namely, ineffective projects which proved very unpopular and polarizing.<ref>The Soviets apparently thought that "economic mismanagement by the Allende regime almost certainly did far more damage than the CIA." Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 73–74.</ref> The military junta's successful [[Chilean coup of 1973|September 1973 ''coup d'etat'']] was unconstitutional. Thousands of citizens were eventually killed and tens of thousands were held as political prisoners, many being tortured.<ref>Weiner (2007) p. 316 (3200 killed). The then CIA task force chief in Chile later said the Agency was not able to finely orchestrate such covert actions, such as the ''coup'' initiated by the Chilean Army, so as to be able to "start" and then "stop" the violence. The CIA later admitted that after the ''coup'' it dealt with Chilean military officers complicit in "serious human rights abuses".</ref><ref>Cf., Christopher Hitchens, ''The Trial of Henry Kissinger'' (London: Verso 2001) p. 67: a contemporary USG document put the number of summary executions during the coup's first 19 days at 320.</ref><ref>When civilian rule returned after 1990, an official commission documented "a total of 3,197 extra-judicial executions, deaths under torture, and 'disappearances' during the Pinochet era." Andrew and Mitrokhin (2005) p. 87.</ref><ref>Cf., Paul W. Drake, "Chile" at 126–128, in ''The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World'' (2d ed., 2001), edited by Joel Krieger.</ref><ref>Air Force General [[Alberto Bachelet|Alberto Bachelet Martínez]] opposed the ''coup d'etat''. He was arrested for treason and for months tortured; he died in prison. His wife and daughter [[Michelle Bachelet]] were blindfolded and tortured, and held for half a year. From 1975 to 1979 they went into exile, living in the [[German Democratic Republic]] where she studied medicine. In 2005 she was [[2005–06 Chilean presidential election|elected president of Chile]]. Cf., Richard Worth, ''Michelle Bachelet'' (Chelsea House 2007).</ref> The civil violence of the military coup provoked widespread international censure.<ref>Weiner (2007) pp. 316–317.</ref><ref>Andrews and Mitrokhin (2005) pp. 86–88. "For the KGB, Pinochet represented an almost a perfect villain, an ideal counterpoint to the martyred Allende."</ref>