Editing Physicalism (section)

=== Argument from first-person perspectives ===
[[Christian List]] argues that the existence of first-person perspectives, i.e. one existing as oneself and not as someone else, is a compelling argument against physicalism. List argues that since first-personal facts cannot supervene on physical facts, this refutes not only physicalism, but also most forms of dualism that have purely third-personal metaphysics.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LISTFA |title=The first-personal argument against physicalism |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher= |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> List also argues that there exists a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness. He claims that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: 'first-person [[Philosophical realism|realism]]', 'non-[[solipsism]]', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world' – and thus at least one of these four must be false.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISAQF |title=A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> List has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISTMT-2 |title=The many-worlds theory of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> These ideas relating to first-person perspectives are related to the [[vertiginous question]] proposed by Benj Hellie.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hellie|first=Benj|year=2013|title=Against egalitarianism|journal=Analysis|volume=73|issue=2|pages=304–320|doi=10.1093/analys/ans101}}</ref>