Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

=== Others ===
Various other philosophical methods have been proposed. The [[Socratic method]] or Socratic debate is a form of cooperative philosophizing in which one philosopher usually first states a claim, which is then scrutinized by their interlocutor by asking them questions about various related claims, often with the implicit goal of putting the initial claim into doubt. It continues to be a popular method for teaching philosophy.<ref>{{cite web |title=Socrates - Plato |url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Socrates/Plato#ref388441 |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=1 March 2022 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Byrd |first1=Miriam |last2=Byrd |first2=Jeremy |title=The Value of Academic Discourse |date=2017 |publisher=Lanham, MD 20706, USA: Rowman & Littlefield |pages=3–22 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BYRTSM |chapter=The Socratic Method}}</ref><ref name="MacmillanPhilosophy"/> [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]] emphasize the role of wonder in the practice of philosophy. On this view, "philosophy begins in [[wonder (emotion)|wonder]]"<ref>Plato, ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Theaetetus]]'' 155 d (tr. [[Benjamin Jowett]])</ref> and "[i]t was their wonder, astonishment, that first led men to philosophize and still leads them".<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'' 982b12</ref> This position is also adopted in the more recent philosophy of [[Nicolai Hartmann]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Cicovacki |first1=Predrag |title=New Research on the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann |date=29 January 2016 |publisher=De Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-043437-8 |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110434378-018/html |language=en |chapter=17. “The Socratic Pathos of Wonder”: On Hartmann’s Conception of Philosophy|pages=313–332 |doi=10.1515/9783110434378-018 }}</ref> Various other types of methods were discussed in [[ancient Greek philosophy]], like analysis, synthesis, dialectics, demonstration, definition, and reduction to absurdity. The medieval philosopher [[Thomas Aquinas]] identifies composition and division as ways of forming propositions while he sees invention and judgment as forms of reasoning from the known to the unknown.<ref name="McKeon"/>

Various methods for the selection between competing theories have been proposed.<ref name="OvergaardMethodology"/><ref name="Dever"/> They often focus on the theoretical virtues of the involved theories.<ref name="Keas">{{cite journal |last1=Keas |first1=Michael N. |title=Systematizing the theoretical virtues |journal=Synthese |date=1 June 2018 |volume=195 |issue=6 |pages=2761–2793 |doi=10.1007/s11229-017-1355-6 |s2cid=46923450 |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1355-6 |language=en |issn=1573-0964}}</ref><ref name="Schindler">{{cite journal |last1=Schindler |first1=Samuel |title=Theoretical virtues: do scientists think what philosophers think they ought to think? |journal=Philosophy of Science |year=2022 |volume=89 |issue=3 |pages=542–564 |doi=10.1017/psa.2021.40 |s2cid=249572764 |language=en |issn=0031-8248|doi-access=free }}</ref> One such method is based on the idea that, everything else being equal, the [[Simplicity|simpler theory]] is to be preferred. Another gives preference to the theory that provides the [[best explanation]]. According to the method of [[epistemic conservatism]], we should, all other things being equal, prefer the theory which, among its competitors, is the most conservative, i.e. the one closest to the [[belief]]s we currently hold.<ref name="Ichikawa"/><ref name="Keas"/><ref name="Schindler"/> One problem with these methods of theory selection is that it is usually not clear how the different virtues are to be weighted, often resulting in cases where they are unable to resolve disputes between competing theories that excel at different virtues.<ref name="Keas"/><ref name="DalyHandbook"/>

[[Methodological naturalism]] holds that all philosophical claims are [[Analytic–synthetic distinction|synthetic claims]] that ultimately depend for their justification or rejection on empirical observational evidence. In this sense, philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences in that they both give priority to the scientific method for investigating all areas of reality.<ref name="StanfordNaturalism">{{cite web |last1=Papineau |first1=David |title=Naturalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 February 2022 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bikaraan-Behesht |first1=Hamed |title=Methodological Naturalism and Reflexivity Requirement |journal=Logos & Episteme |date=2021 |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=311–330 |doi=10.5840/logos-episteme202112323 |s2cid=244235536 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BIKMNA}}</ref>

According to [[truthmaker theorists]], every true proposition is true because another entity, its truthmaker, exists. This principle can be used as a methodology to critically evaluate philosophical theories.<ref name="IEPTruthmaker">{{cite web |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=Truthmaker Theory |url=https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=1 March 2022}}</ref><ref name="DalyHandbook"/> In particular, this concerns theories that accept certain truths but are unable to provide their truthmaker. Such theorists are derided as ''ontological cheaters''. For example, this can be applied to [[philosophical presentism]], the view that nothing outside the present exists. Philosophical presentists usually accept the very common belief that dinosaurs existed but have trouble in providing a truthmaker for this belief since they deny existence to past entities.<ref name="IEPTruthmaker"/><ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Ingram |first1=David |last2=Tallant |first2=Jonathan |title=Presentism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presentism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref><ref name="Sider">{{cite book |last1=Sider |first1=Theodore |title=Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDFDA |chapter=2. Against Presentism}}</ref>

In philosophy, the term "[[genealogical method]]" refers to a form of criticism that tries to expose commonly held beliefs by uncovering their historical origin and function.<ref name="Bowman"/><ref name="Hill"/><ref name="Prinz"/> For example, it may be used to reject specific [[Morality|moral claims]] or the status of [[truth]] by giving a concrete historical reconstruction of how their development was contingent on [[Power (social and political)|power]] relations in society. This is usually accompanied by the assertion that these beliefs were accepted and became established, because of non-rational considerations, such as because they served the interests of a predominant class.<ref name="Bowman">{{cite book |last1=Bowman |first1=Brett |title=Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power |date=2007 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-0-230-59232-2 |pages=138–177 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230592322_5 |language=en |chapter=Foucault’s ‘philosophy of the event’: Genealogical Method and the Deployment of the Abnormal|doi=10.1057/9780230592322_5 }}</ref><ref name="Hill">{{cite book |last1=Hill |first1=R. Kevin |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/genealogy/v-1 |chapter=Genealogy}}</ref><ref name="Prinz">{{cite journal |last1=Prinz |title=Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche's Method Compared |journal=Journal of Nietzsche Studies |date=2016 |volume=47 |issue=2 |pages=180–201 |doi=10.5325/jnietstud.47.2.0180 |s2cid=171199302 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PRIGOM}}</ref>