Editing Phenomenology (philosophy) (section)

===Noesis and noema===
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{{Main|Noema}}
[[Franz Brentano]] introduced a distinction between [[Sensory perception|sensory]] and '''noetic consciousness'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->: the former describes [[Mental representation|presentations]] of sensory objects or [[intuition]]s, while the latter describes the [[thinking]] of [[concept]]s.{{sfn|Tassone|2012|p=307}}

In Husserl's phenomenology, this pair of terms, derived from the Greek ''[[nous]]'' (mind) designate respectively the real content, '''noesis'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, and the ideal content, [[noema]], of an intentional act (an act of consciousness). The noesis is the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character (as in judging or perceiving something, loving or hating it, accepting or rejecting it, etc.). This is real in the sense that it is actually part of what takes place in the consciousness of the subject of the act. The noesis is always correlated with a noema. For Husserl, the full noema is a complex ideal structure comprising at least a noematic sense and a noematic core. The correct interpretation of what Husserl meant by the noema has long been controversial, but the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal meaning of the act. For instance, if A loves B, loving is a real part of A's conscious activity – noesis – but gets its sense from the general concept of loving, which has an abstract or ideal meaning, as "loving" has a meaning in the English language independently of what an individual means by the word when they use it. The noematic core as the act's referent or object ''as it is meant in the act''. One element of controversy is whether this noematic object is the same as the actual object of the act (assuming it exists) or is some kind of ideal object.{{sfn|Smith|2007|pages=304–11}}