Editing Nikita Khrushchev (section)

==== Consolidation of power and "Secret Speech" ====
{{main|On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences}}
After the demotion of Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov initially worked together well. Molotov even proposed that Khrushchev, not Bulganin, replace Malenkov as premier. However, Khrushchev and Molotov increasingly differed on policy. Molotov opposed the Virgin Lands policy, instead proposing heavy investment to increase yields in developed agricultural areas, which Khrushchev felt was not feasible due to a lack of resources and a lack of a sophisticated farm labor force. The two differed on foreign policy as well; soon after Khrushchev took power, he sought a peace treaty with [[Austria]], which would allow Soviet troops then occupying part of the country to leave. Molotov was resistant, but Khrushchev arranged for an Austrian delegation to come to Moscow and negotiate the treaty.{{sfn|Fursenko|2006|p=27}} Although Khrushchev and other Presidium members attacked Molotov at a Central Committee meeting in mid-1955, accusing him of conducting a foreign policy which turned the world against the USSR, Molotov remained in his position.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=266–269}}

By the end of 1955, thousands of political prisoners had returned home and told their experiences of the [[Gulag]] labor camps.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=275}} Continuing investigation into the abuses brought home the full breadth of Stalin's crimes to his successors. Working together with his close ally Anastas Mikoyan, Khrushchev believed that once the stain of Stalinism was removed, the Party would inspire loyalty among the people.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=276}} Beginning in October 1955, Khrushchev fought to tell the delegates to the upcoming [[20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|20th Party Congress]] about Stalin's crimes. Some of his colleagues, including Molotov and Malenkov, opposed the disclosure and persuaded him to make his remarks in a closed session.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=279–280}}

The 20th Party Congress opened on 14 February 1956. In his opening words in his initial address, Khrushchev denigrated Stalin by asking delegates to rise in honour of the Communist leaders who had died since the last congress, whom he named, equating Stalin with [[Klement Gottwald]] and the little-known [[Kyuichi Tokuda]].{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=153}} In the early morning of 25 February, Khrushchev delivered what became known as the "[[On the Personality Cult and its Consequences|Secret Speech]]" to a closed session of the Congress limited to Soviet delegates. In four hours, he demolished Stalin's reputation. Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the "congress listened to me in silence. As the saying goes, you could have heard a pin drop. It was all so sudden and unexpected."{{sfn|Khrushchev|2006|p=212}} Khrushchev told the delegates:
{{blockquote|It is here that Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality, and his abuse of power&nbsp;... he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party or the Soviet Government.{{sfn|''The New York Times'', 1956-05-06}}}}

The Secret Speech did not fundamentally change Soviet society but had wide-ranging effects. The speech was a factor in [[Poznań 1956 protests|unrest in Poland]] and [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|revolution in Hungary]] later in 1956, and Stalin defenders led [[1956 Georgian demonstrations|four days of rioting]] in his native Georgia in June, calling for Khrushchev to resign and Molotov to take over.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=286–291}} In meetings where the Secret Speech was read, communists would make even more severe condemnations of Stalin (and of Khrushchev), and even call for multi-party elections. However, Stalin was not publicly denounced, and his portrait remained widespread through the USSR, from airports to Khrushchev's Kremlin office. [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], then a [[Komsomol]] official, recalled that though young and well-educated Soviets in his district were excited by the speech, many others decried it, either defending Stalin or seeing little point in digging up the past.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=286–291}} Forty years later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev applauded Khrushchev for his courage in taking a huge political risk and showing himself to be "a moral man after all".{{sfn|Taubman|2003|p=282}}

The term "Secret Speech" proved to be an utter misnomer. While the attendees at the Speech were all Soviet, Eastern European delegates were allowed to hear it the following night, read slowly to allow them to take notes. By 5 March, copies were being mailed throughout the Soviet Union, marked "not for the press" rather than "top secret". An official translation appeared within a month in [[Poland]]; the Poles printed 12,000 extra copies, one of which soon reached the West.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=279–280}} Khrushchev's son, [[Sergei Khrushchev|Sergei]], later wrote: <blockquote>clearly, Father tried to ensure it would reach as many ears as possible. It was soon read at Komsomol meetings; that meant another eighteen million listeners. If you include their relatives, friends, and acquaintances, you could say that the entire country became familiar with the speech&nbsp;... Spring had barely begun when the speech began circulating around the world.{{sfn|Khrushchev|2000|p=200}}</blockquote>

The anti-Khrushchev minority in the Presidium was augmented by those opposed to Khrushchev's proposals to decentralize authority over industry, which struck at the heart of Malenkov's power base. During the first half of 1957, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich worked to quietly build support to dismiss Khrushchev. At an 18 June Presidium meeting at which two Khrushchev supporters were absent, the plotters moved that Bulganin, who had joined the scheme, take the chair, and proposed other moves which would effectively demote Khrushchev and put themselves in control. Khrushchev objected on the grounds that not all Presidium members had been notified, an objection which would have been quickly dismissed had Khrushchev not held firm control over the military, through [[List of Ministers of Defense of the Soviet Union|Minister of Defense]] Marshal Zhukov, and the security departments. Lengthy Presidium meetings took place, continuing over several days. As word leaked of the power struggle, members of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev controlled, streamed to Moscow, many flown there aboard military planes, and demanded to be admitted to the meeting. While they were not admitted, there were soon enough Central Committee members in Moscow to call an emergency Party Congress, which effectively forced the leadership to allow a session of the Central Committee. At that meeting, the three main conspirators were dubbed the [[Anti-Party Group]], and denounced with accusations of factionalism and complicity in Stalin's crimes. The three were expelled from the Central Committee and Presidium, as was former Foreign Minister and Khrushchev client [[Dmitri Shepilov]] who joined them in the plot. Molotov was sent as Ambassador to [[Mongolia]]; the others were sent to head industrial facilities and institutes far from Moscow.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|pp=176–183}}

Marshal Zhukov was rewarded for his support with full membership in the Presidium, but Khrushchev feared his popularity and power. In October 1957, the defense minister was sent on a tour of the Balkans, as Khrushchev arranged a Presidium meeting to dismiss him. Zhukov learned what was happening, and hurried back to Moscow, only to be formally notified of his dismissal. At a Central Committee meeting several weeks later, not a word was said in Zhukov's defense.{{sfn|Taubman|2003|pp=361–364}} Khrushchev completed the consolidation of power in March 1958, arranging for Bulganin's dismissal as premier in favor of himself (Bulganin was appointed to head the ''[[Gosbank]]'') and by establishing a USSR Defense Council, led by himself, effectively making him commander in chief.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}} Though Khrushchev was now preeminent, he did not enjoy Stalin's absolute power.{{sfn|Tompson|1995|p=189}}