Editing Military strategy (section)

===Post–Cold War===
{{See also|Asymmetric warfare|Network-centric warfare}}

Strategy in the post Cold War is shaped by the global geopolitical situation: a number of potent powers in a [[Polarity in international relations#Multipolarity|multipolar]] array which has arguably come to be dominated by the hyperpower status of the United States.<ref>The term was coined by French politician Hubert Vérdine. See: ''International Herald Tribune'', "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower'," February 5, 1999.</ref> 

Parties to conflict which see themselves as vastly or temporarily inferior may adopt a strategy of [[hunkering down (strategy)|"hunkering down"]] – witness [[Gulf War|Iraq]] in 1991<ref>
{{cite book |last1=Loges |first1=Marsha J. |title=The Persian Gulf War: Military Doctrine and Strategy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8sYmAQAAMAAJ |series=Executive research project |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University |date=1996 |page=16 |access-date=2020-04-02 |quote=U.S. officials described Saddam Hussein's military strategy in Desert Storm as 'hunkering down.'}}</ref> or [[Kosovo War|Yugoslavia]] in 1999.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Daalder |first1=Ivo H. |author-link1=Ivo H. Daalder |last2=O'Hanlon |first2=Michael E. |author-link2=Michael E. O'Hanlon |year=2000 |chapter=Losing the War |title=Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aeQLUvtZnMcC |series=G - Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |publication-date=2004 |page=106 |isbn=9780815798422 |access-date=2020-04-02 |quote=[... Milosevic] had a fairly promising strategy: hunker down, tolerate the bombing, and wait for Russian pressure or NATO internal dissension to weaken the alliance's resolve. [...] Had Milosevic not thoroughly 'cleansed' Kosovo [...] a hunker-down strategy might well have succeeded, as a number of NATO officials with whom we spoke acknowledged.}}</ref>

The major militaries of today are usually built to fight the "last war" (previous war) and hence have huge armored and conventionally configured infantry formations backed up by air forces and navies designed to support or prepare for these forces.<ref>''The Utility of Force'', General Sir Rupert Smith, Allen Lane, London, 2005, {{ISBN|0-7139-9836-9}}</ref>