Editing Khmer Rouge (section)

==== Sihanouk and the GRUNK ====
{{see also|Cambodian Civil War}}
The region where Pol Pot and the others moved to was inhabited by tribal minorities, the [[Khmer Loeu]], whose rough treatment (including resettlement and [[forced assimilation]]) at the hands of the central government made them willing recruits for a guerrilla struggle. In 1965, Pol Pot made a visit of several months to North Vietnam and China.<ref name="Frey" /> From the 1950s on, Pol Pot had made frequent visits to the People's Republic of China, receiving political and military training—especially on the theory of [[dictatorship of the proletariat]]—from the personnel of the CCP.<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="Wilson Center 2018" /><ref name="ifeng shidian">{{Cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200804/0410_2666_485387.shtml|script-title=zh:西哈努克、波尔布特与中国|website=ifeng.com|language=zh|access-date=26 November 2019|archive-date=30 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030081609/http://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200804/0410_2666_485387.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> From November 1965 to February 1966, Pol Pot received training from high-ranking CCP officials such as [[Chen Boda]] and [[Zhang Chunqiao]], on topics such as the [[Chinese Communist Revolution|communist revolution in China]], [[class conflict]]s, and [[Communist International]].<ref name="yhcqw">{{cite web|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/13/2114.html|script-title=zh:波尔布特：并不遥远的教训|publisher=炎黄春秋|language=zh|access-date=23 November 2019|archive-date=27 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200627212910/http://www.yhcqw.com/13/2114.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Pol Pot was particularly impressed by the lecture on political purge by [[Kang Sheng]].<ref name="Chandler 2018" /><ref name="yhcqw" /> This experience had enhanced his prestige when he returned to the WPK's "liberated areas". Despite friendly relations between Sihanouk and the Chinese, the latter kept Pol Pot's visit a secret from Sihanouk.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}

In September 1966, the WPK changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} The change in the name of the party was a closely guarded secret. Lower ranking members of the party and even the Vietnamese were not told of it and neither was the membership until many years later. The party leadership endorsed armed struggle against the government, then led by Sihanouk. In 1968, the Khmer Rouge was officially formed, and its forces launched a national insurgency across Cambodia. Though North Vietnam had not been informed of the decision, its forces provided shelter and weapons to the Khmer Rouge after the insurgency started. Vietnamese support for the insurgency made it impossible for the Cambodian military to effectively counter it. For the next two years, the insurgency grew as Sihanouk did very little to stop it. As the insurgency grew stronger, the party finally openly declared itself to be the Communist Party of Kampuchea.<ref name="Frey" />

The political appeal of the Khmer Rouge was increased as a result of the situation created by the [[1970 Cambodian coup d'état|removal of Sihanouk as head of state in 1970]]. Premier Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk with the support of the [[National Assembly of Cambodia|National Assembly]]. Sihanouk, who was in exile in Beijing, made an alliance with the Khmer Rouge on the advice of CCP, and became the nominal head of a Khmer Rouge–dominated government-in-exile (known by its French acronym [[GRUNK]]) backed by China. In 1970 alone, the Chinese reportedly gave 400 tons of military aid to the United Front.<ref name="Xiamen Forum 2013">{{Cite journal|author=宋梁禾|year=2013|others=吴仪君|script-title=zh:中国对柬埔寨的援助：评价及建议|url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41448796.pdf|url-status=live|journal=Xiamen University Forum on International Development|language=zh|issue=6|pages=54–58|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190414161319/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41448796.pdf|archive-date=14 April 2019|access-date=25 November 2019}}</ref> Although thoroughly aware of the weakness of Lon Nol's forces and loath to commit American military force to the new conflict in any form other than air power, the [[Presidency of Richard Nixon|Nixon administration]] supported the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic.<ref name="Shawcross 1979" />{{rp|181–2, 194}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Isaacs|first1=Arnold|last2=Hardy|first2=Gordon|last3=Brown|first3=MacAlister|title=The Vietnam Experience: Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos|publisher=Boston Publishing Company|year=1987|isbn=978-0-939526246|page=[https://archive.org/details/pawnsofwarcambod00isaa/page/98 98]|url=https://archive.org/details/pawnsofwarcambod00isaa/page/98}}</ref>

On 29 March 1970, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against the Cambodian army. Documents uncovered from the Soviet Union archives revealed that the invasion was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge following negotiations with Nuon Chea.<ref name="Mosyakov">Mosyakov, Dmitry. "The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives". In Cook, Susan E., ed. (2004). "Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda". ''Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series''. '''1''': 54. "In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: "Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have "liberated" five provinces of Cambodia in ten days."</ref> A force of North Vietnamese quickly overran large parts of eastern Cambodia reaching to within {{convert|15|mi|km}} of Phnom Penh before being pushed back. By June, three months after the removal of Sihanouk, they had swept government forces from the entire northeastern third of the country. After defeating those forces, the North Vietnamese turned the newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The Khmer Rouge also established "liberated" areas in the south and the southwestern parts of the country, where they operated independently of the North Vietnamese.<ref>Sutsakhan, Lt. Gen. Sak, The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1987. p. 32.</ref>

After Sihanouk showed his support for the Khmer Rouge by visiting them in the field, their ranks swelled from 6,000 to 50,000 fighters. Many of the new recruits for the Khmer Rouge were apolitical peasants who fought in support of the king, not for communism, of which they had little understanding.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC15Ae01.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070328161501/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC15Ae01.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=2007-03-28|title=Dining with the Dear Leader|work=Asia Time}}</ref> Sihanouk's popular support in rural Cambodia allowed the Khmer Rouge to extend its power and influence to the point that by 1973 it exercised ''de facto'' control over the majority of Cambodian territory, although only a minority of its population.{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} By 1975, with the Lon Nol government running out of ammunition, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the government would collapse. On 17 April 1975, there was the [[Fall of Phnom Penh]], as the Khmer Rouge captured the capital.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-08-21 |title=Khmer Rouge |url=https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge |access-date=2023-09-29 |website=HISTORY |language=en |archive-date=17 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221117085947/https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/the-khmer-rouge |url-status=live }}</ref>

During the civil war, unparalleled atrocities were executed on both sides.<ref name="Karllson & Schoenhals 2008" />{{rp|90}} While the civil war was brutal, its estimated death toll has been revised downwards over time.<ref>Heuveline, Patrick (2001). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979". Forced Migration and Mortality. National Academies Press. pp. 103–104. {{ISBN|9780309073349}}.</ref>