Editing John Diefenbaker (section)

=== Foreign policy ===
==== Britain and the Commonwealth ====
[[File:Queen Elizabeth II and the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth Nations, at Windsor Castle (1960 Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference).jpg|thumb|alt=A number of older men in formal dress surround a young woman with a white gown.|Diefenbaker stands to the right of Queen [[Elizabeth II]] at the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.]]

Diefenbaker attended a [[1957 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference|meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers]] in London shortly after taking office in 1957. He generated headlines by proposing that 15% of Canadian spending on US imports instead be spent on imports from the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=251–53}} Britain responded with an offer of a free trade agreement, which was rejected by the Canadians.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=255–56}} As the [[Harold Macmillan]] government in the UK sought to enter the [[Common Market]], Diefenbaker feared that Canadian exports to the UK would be threatened. He also believed that the mother country should place the Commonwealth first, and sought to discourage Britain's entry. The British were annoyed at Canadian interference. Britain's initial attempt to enter the Common Market was vetoed by French President [[Charles de Gaulle]].{{sfn|Newman|1963|pp=272–274}}

Through 1959, the Diefenbaker government had a policy of not criticizing South Africa and its [[apartheid]] government.{{sfn|Gabriel|1987|p=53}} In this stance, Diefenbaker had the support of the Liberals but not that of CCF leader [[Hazen Argue]].{{sfn|Gabriel|1987|pp=56–57}} In 1960, however, the South Africans sought to maintain membership in the Commonwealth even if South African white voters chose to make the country a republic in a [[1960 South African republic referendum|referendum scheduled for later that year]]. South Africa asked that year's [[1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference|Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference]] to allow it to remain in the Commonwealth regardless of the result of the referendum. Diefenbaker privately expressed his distaste for apartheid to South African External Affairs Minister [[Eric Louw]] and urged him to give the black and coloured people of South Africa at least the minimal representation they had originally had. Louw, attending the conference as Prime Minister [[Hendrik Verwoerd]] recovered from an assassination attempt, refused.{{sfn|Gabriel|1987|pp=58–63}} The conference resolved that an advance decision would be interfering in South Africa's internal affairs.{{sfn|Diefenbaker|1976|pp=211–212}}

On October 5, 1960, South Africa's white voters decided to make the country a republic.{{sfn|Gabriel|1987|p=66}} At the [[1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference|Prime Ministers' Conference]] in 1961, Verwoerd formally applied for South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth. The prime ministers were divided; Diefenbaker broke the deadlock by proposing that South Africa only be re-admitted if it joined other states in condemning apartheid in principle. Once it became clear that South Africa's membership would be rejected, Verwoerd withdrew his country's application to remain in the Commonwealth and left the group. According to Peter Newman, this was "Diefenbaker's most important contribution to international politics&nbsp;... Diefenbaker flew home, a hero."{{sfn|Newman|1963|p=258}}

==== Policy towards the United States ====

===== Ike and John: the Eisenhower years =====
[[File:John Diefenbaker and Dwight Eisenhower at signing of Columbia River Treaty (January 1961).jpg|thumb|left|alt=Diefenbaker and a Dwight Eisenhower sit at a table. Two women and three men stand behind them.|Diefenbaker (seated left) and US President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] at the signing of the Columbia River Treaty, 1961.]]

American officials were uncomfortable with Diefenbaker's initial election, believing they had heard undertones of anti-Americanism in the campaign. After years of the Liberals, one U.S. State Department official noted, "We'll be dealing with an unknown quantity."{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=46}} U.S. officials viewed Diefenbaker's 1958 landslide with disappointment; they knew and liked Pearson from his years in diplomacy and felt the Liberal Party leader would be more likely to institute pro-American policies.{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=50}} However, U.S. President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] took pains to foster good relations with Diefenbaker. The two men found much in common, from Western farm backgrounds to a love of fishing, and Diefenbaker had an admiration for war leaders such as Eisenhower and [[Churchill]].{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=54–55}} Diefenbaker wrote in his memoirs, "I might add that President Eisenhower and I were from our first meeting on an 'Ike–John' basis, and that we were as close as the nearest telephone."{{sfn|Diefenbaker|1976|p=157}} The Eisenhower–Diefenbaker relationship was sufficiently strong that the touchy Canadian Prime Minister was prepared to overlook slights. When Eisenhower addressed Parliament in October 1958, he downplayed trade concerns that Diefenbaker had publicly expressed. Diefenbaker said nothing and took Eisenhower fishing.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=56–57}}

Diefenbaker had approved plans to join the United States in what became known as [[NORAD]], an integrated air defence system, in mid-1957.{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=292}} Despite Liberal misgivings that Diefenbaker had committed Canada to the system before consulting either the Cabinet or Parliament, Pearson and his followers voted with the government to approve NORAD in June 1958.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=295–296}}

===== Avro CF-105 Arrow jet fighter affair ===== 

In 1959, the Diefenbaker government cancelled the development and manufacture of the [[Avro CF-105 Arrow]]. The Arrow was a supersonic jet interceptor built by [[Avro Canada]] in [[Malton, Ontario]], to defend Canada in the event of a [[Soviet]] attack. The interceptor had been under development since 1953, and had suffered from many cost overruns and complications.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=307–308}} In 1955, the [[RCAF]] stated it would need only nine squadrons of Arrows, down from 20, as originally proposed.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=307–308}} According to [[C. D. Howe]], the former minister responsible for postwar reconstruction, the St. Laurent government had serious misgivings about continuing the Arrow program, and planned to discuss its termination after the 1957 election.{{sfn|Stewart|1991|pp=254–255}} In the run-up to the 1958 election, with three Tory-held seats at risk in the Malton area, the Diefenbaker government authorized further funding.{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=309}} Even though the first test flights of the Arrow were successful, the US government was unwilling to commit to a purchase of aircraft from Canada.{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=310}} In September 1958, Diefenbaker warned{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=316}} that the Arrow would come under complete review in six months.{{sfn|Stewart|1991|pp=244–245}} The company began seeking out other projects including a US-funded "saucer" program that became the [[VZ-9 Avrocar]], and also mounted a public relations offensive urging that the Arrow go into full production.{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=317}} On February 20, 1959, the Cabinet decided to cancel the Avro Arrow, following an earlier decision to permit the United States to build two [[Bomarc]] missile bases in Canada. The Avro company immediately dismissed its 14,000 employees, blaming Diefenbaker for the firings, though it rehired 2,500 employees to fulfill existing obligations.{{efn|name=Avro jobs}}

Although Diefenbaker and Eisenhower had a strong relationship, by 1960 U.S. officials were becoming concerned by what they viewed as Canadian procrastination on vital issues, such as whether Canada should join the [[Organization of American States]] (OAS). Talks on these issues in June 1960 produced little in results.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=56–57}} Diefenbaker hoped that U.S. Vice President [[Richard Nixon]] would win the [[1960 United States presidential election|1960 presidential election]], but when Nixon's Democratic opponent, Senator [[John F. Kennedy]], won the race, he sent Kennedy a note of congratulations. Kennedy did not respond until Canadian officials asked what had become of Diefenbaker's note, two weeks later. Diefenbaker, for whom such correspondence was very meaningful, was annoyed <!-- suggest "aggravated" or "vexed" as more direct -->at the [[President-elect of the United States|President-elect]]'s slowness to respond.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=59–61}} In January 1961, Diefenbaker visited Washington to sign the [[Columbia River Treaty]]. However, with only days remaining in the Eisenhower administration, little else could be accomplished.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=61–62}}

===== Bilateral antipathy: the Kennedy administration =====
[[File:John Diefenbaker at the US Naval base at Argentia, Newfoundland (17 May 1962).jpg|thumb|alt=Diefenbaker, wearing a coat over his suit, shakes hands with a smiling man. Two other men are in the background.|Diefenbaker (front right) at the US Naval base in Argentia, Newfoundland, during the 1962 campaign.]]

Kennedy and Diefenbaker started off well, but matters soon worsened. When the two met in Washington on February 20, Kennedy impressed Diefenbaker, and the Prime Minister invited Kennedy to visit Ottawa.<ref>Asa McKercher, "Diefenbaker's World: One Canada and the History of Canadian–American Relations, 1961–63." ''The Historian'' 75.1 (2013): 94-120, at pp. 99–100.</ref>  Kennedy, however, told his aides that he never wanted "to see the boring son of a bitch again".{{sfn|Smith|1995|p=382}} The Ottawa visit began awkwardly. Kennedy accidentally left behind a briefing note suggesting he "push" Diefenbaker on several issues, including the decision to accept nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, which bitterly divided the Canadian Cabinet. Diefenbaker was also annoyed by Kennedy's speech to Parliament, in which he urged Canada to join the OAS (which Diefenbaker had already rejected),{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=385–388}} and by the President spending most of his time talking to Leader of the Opposition Pearson at the formal dinner.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=126–128}}{{sfn|''Montreal Gazette'' 1979-08-17, Obituary}} Both Kennedy and [[Jacqueline Kennedy|his wife Jackie]] were bored by Diefenbaker's Churchill anecdotes at lunch, stories that Jackie Kennedy later described as "painful".{{sfn|Druzin|2011}}

Diefenbaker was initially inclined to go along with Kennedy's request that nuclear weapons be stationed on Canadian soil as part of NORAD. However, when an August 3, 1961 letter from Kennedy which urged this was leaked to the media, Diefenbaker was angered and withdrew his support. The Prime Minister was also influenced by a massive [[Anti-nuclear movement in Canada|demonstration against nuclear weapons]], which took place on [[Parliament Hill]]. Diefenbaker was handed a petition containing 142,000 names.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=139–141}}

By 1962, the American government was becoming increasingly concerned at the lack of a commitment from Canada to take nuclear weapons. The interceptors and Bomarc missiles with which Canada was being supplied as a NORAD member were either of no use or of greatly diminished utility without nuclear devices.{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=144}} Canadian and American military officers launched a quiet campaign to make this known to the press, and to advocate Canadian agreement to acquire the warheads.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=144–146}} Diefenbaker was also upset when Pearson was invited to the White House for a dinner for Nobel Prize winners in April, and met with the President privately for 40 minutes.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=156–158}} When the Prime Minister met with retiring American Ambassador [[Livingston Merchant]], he angrily disclosed the paper Kennedy had left behind, and hinted that he might make use of it in the upcoming election campaign.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=433–435}} Merchant's report caused consternation in Washington, and the ambassador was sent back to see Diefenbaker again. This time, he found Diefenbaker calm, and the Prime Minister pledged not to use the memo, and to give Merchant advance word if he changed his mind.{{sfn|Smith|1995|pp=435–436}} Canada appointed a new [[Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C.|ambassador to Washington]], [[Charles Ritchie (diplomat)|Charles Ritchie]], who on arrival received a cool reception from Kennedy, and found that the squabble was affecting progress on a number of issues.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=162–164}}

Kennedy was careful to avoid overt favouritism during the [[1962 Canadian election]] campaign. Several times during the campaign, Diefenbaker stated that the Kennedy administration desired his defeat because he refused to "bow down to Washington."{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=167–168}} After Diefenbaker was returned with a minority, Washington continued to press for acceptance of nuclear arms, but Diefenbaker, faced with a split between Defence Minister [[Douglas Harkness]] and External Affairs Minister [[Howard Charles Green|Howard Green]] on the question, continued to stall, hoping that time and events would invite consensus.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=176–177}}

When the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] erupted in October 1962, Kennedy chose not to consult with Diefenbaker before deciding on what actions to take. The President sent former Ambassador Merchant to Ottawa to inform the Prime Minister as to the content of the speech that Kennedy was to make on television. Diefenbaker was upset at both the lack of consultation and the fact that he was given less than two hours advance word.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=180–184}} He was angered again when the U.S. government released a statement stating that it had Canada's full support.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=189–190}} In a statement to the Commons, Diefenbaker proposed sending representatives of neutral nations to Cuba to verify the American allegations, which Washington took to mean that he was questioning Kennedy's word.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=188–189}} When American forces went to a heightened alert, [[DEFCON]] 3, Diefenbaker was slow to order Canadian forces to match it. Harkness and the Chiefs of Staff had Canadian forces clandestinely go to that alert status anyway,{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=194}} and Diefenbaker eventually authorized it.{{sfn|Nash|1990|p=200}} The crisis ended without war, and polls found that Canadians widely supported Kennedy's actions. Diefenbaker was severely criticized in the media.{{sfn|Nash|1990|pp=203–204}}