Editing Hedonism (section)

=== Modern and contemporary ===
At the transition to the early modern period, [[Lorenzo Valla]] ({{circa|1406–1457}}) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with [[Christian ethics]], suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues.<ref>{{harvnb|Nauta|2021|loc=§ 4. Moral Philosophy}}</ref> Hedonism gained prominence during the [[Age of Enlightenment]].<ref>{{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}}</ref> According to [[Thomas Hobbes]]'s (1588–1679)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=88}}</ref> psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation.<ref name="auto3"/> [[John Locke]] (1632–1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sheridan|2024|loc=§ 1.1 The puzzle of Locke’s moral philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Rossiter|2016|pp=203, 207–208}} }}</ref> [[Joseph Butler]] (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|1992|pp=211–214}} | {{harvnb|Garrett|2023|loc=§ 5. Self-Love and Benevolence}} }}</ref> According to [[David Hume]] (1711–1776),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=91}}</ref> pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}} | {{harvnb|Dorsey|2015|pp=245–246}} | {{harvnb|Merivale|2018|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IjZ7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT54 § 3.1. The Prospect of Pain or Pleasure]}} }}</ref> The [[libertine]] novels of [[Marquis de Sade]] (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or [[sexual restraint]].<ref>{{harvnb|Airaksinen|1995|pp=11, 78–80}}</ref>

[[File:Jeremy Bentham by Henry William Pickersgill detail.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting of Jeremy Bentham|[[Jeremy Bentham]] formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.]]

[[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748–1832)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=25}}</ref> developed an influential form of hedonism known as [[classical utilitarianism]]. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the [[hedonic calculus]] to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3a. Bentham}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=666}} }}</ref> His student [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=132}}</ref> feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3b. Mill}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> [[Henry Sidgwick]] (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=26–27}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2024|loc=Lead section, § 2.2 Reconstruction and Reconciliation}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref>

[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=144}}</ref> rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hassan|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5Cz_EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 227]}} | {{harvnb|Faustino|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by [[Franz Brentano]] (1838–1917).<ref>{{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2]}}</ref> He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects{{efn|According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.<ref>{{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=[https://brill.com/display/book/9789401209939/B9789401209939-s018.xml 307–308]}}</ref>}}{{em dash}}a position also later defended by [[Roderick Chisholm]] (1916–1999).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=668}} | {{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=[https://brill.com/display/book/9789401209939/B9789401209939-s018.xml 307–308]}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} }}</ref> [[Sigmund Freud]] (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theory]]. He stated that the [[Pleasure principle (psychology)|pleasure principle]] describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the [[reality principle]] represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wallwork|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5hf_KTvrypAC&pg=PA115 115]}} | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=snys_ihoEigC&pg=PA475 475]}} }}</ref>

The 20th century saw various criticisms of hedonism.<ref>{{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}}</ref> [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=443}}</ref> rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his [[Value theory#Monism and pluralism|axiological pluralism]], there are other sources, such as [[beauty]] and [[knowledge]],<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2021|loc=§ 4. The Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> a criticism also shared by [[W. D. Ross]] (1877–1971).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Skelton|2022|loc=§ 4.2 The Good}} | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> Both [[C. D. Broad]] (1887–1971) and [[Richard Brandt]] (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2011a|p=73}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2002|p=616}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|p=38}} }}</ref> [[Robert Nozick]] (1938–2002) used his [[experience machine]] thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.<ref name="auto4"/>

In response to these and similar criticisms, [[Fred Feldman]] (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=120–123}} | {{harvnb|McLeod|2017|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q8w3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT225 § 3. Justice-adjusted Utilitarianism, § 7. Revising Feldman's Desert-value Principles]}} }}</ref> [[Peter Singer]] (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about [[animal welfare]].{{efn|Singer was initially a proponent of [[preference utilitarianism]] but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rice|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zZdGCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA379 379]}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fQVpDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA514 514]}} }}</ref>}} He has advocated [[effective altruism]], relying on [[empirical evidence]] and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fQVpDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA514 514]}} | {{harvnb|Fesmire|2020|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5vzvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT33 § Ends, the Good, and Wisdom]}} | {{harvnb|Miligan|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEjLCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA26 26]}} }}</ref> Inspired by the philosophy of [[Albert Camus]] (1913–1960), [[Michel Onfray]] (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McClellan|2015|pp=xviii–xx}} | {{harvnb|Bishop|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IYLPDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110–112]}} }}</ref> [[David Pearce (philosopher)|David Pearce]] (1959–present) has developed a [[transhumanist]] version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from [[genetic engineering]] to [[nanotechnology]], to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Adams IV|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ygIiRL7mQBkC&pg=PA167 167]}} | {{harvnb|Ross|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jy3fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA134 134]}} }}</ref> The emergence of [[positive psychology]] at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=44}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FGpIA9RmCngC&pg=PA4 4–5, 78]}} }}</ref>